

THE COMMUNICATION HUB ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE ASEAN WAY  
OF REGIONALISM: THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE COMMUNICATION HUB ROLE OF INDONESIA IN THE ASEAN WAY OF REGIONALISM: THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA**

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This dissertation aims to clarify the foreign policy role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism since the establishment of the organization in 1967. By taking the agent (Indonesia) - structure (ASEAN Way) relations at the core of the inquiry, the dissertation argues that Indonesia has developed a communication hub role that facilitates communication among the ASEAN member states in light of the structural demand. This role entails the layers of maintaining the group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales. After evaluating these three layers through a set of foreign policy cases of Indonesia, the dissertation examines the communication hub role of Indonesia in the framework of the South China Sea disputes through the initiation of the workshops on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea, the establishment of Code of Conduct on South China Sea, and the Joint Communique failure in 2012. The dissertation concludes that the communication hub role of Indonesia and the ASEAN Way of regionalism are mutually constitutive constructs. While the normative character of the ASEAN Way enables Indonesia to perform its role, the role of Indonesia enables ASEAN Way to sustain. In this sense, although the recent rise of Indonesia provides

minor diversions in Indonesia's foreign policy inclinations in terms of increasing nationalism under the rule of Joko Widodo, Indonesia continues to perform and even develops its communication hub role in the ASEAN matters.

**Keywords:** Indonesia, ASEAN Way, South China Sea, Foreign Policy Roles, Regionalism

## ÖZ

### ASEAN YOLU BÖLGESELÇİLİĞİNDE ENDONEZYA'NIN İLETİŞİM MERKEZİ ROLÜ: GÜNEY ÇİN DENİZİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez, ASEAN'ın 1967'de kuruluşundan bu yana Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki dış politika rolüne açıklık getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Aktör (Endonezya)- yapı (ASEAN Yolu) ilişkilerini araştırmanın merkezine alan tez, Endonezya'nın yapısal talepler doğrultusunda ASEAN üye ülkeleri arasında iletişimi kolaylaştıran bir iletişim merkezi rolü geliştirdiğini savunmaktadır. Bu rol, grup birliğini koruma, grup vizyonunu ve gündemini belirleme ve grubu bölge dışı ölçeklerde temsil etme gibi katmanlar içermektedir. Bu üç katmanı Endonezya'nın bir dizi dış politika vakası üzerinden değerlendirdikten sonra tez, Güney Çin Denizi ihtilafları çerçevesinde Güney Çin Denizi'ndeki potansiyel çatışmaların yönetilmesine ilişkin çalıştayların başlatılması, Güney Çin Denizi Davranış Kurallarının oluşturulması ve 2012'deki Ortak Bildiri başarısızlığı vakaları üzerinden Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi olma rolünü incelemektedir. Tez, Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünün ve ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinin birbirini karşılıklı var eden yapılar oldukları sonucuna varmaktadır. ASEAN Yolu'nun normatif yapısı Endonezya'nın rolünü yerine getirmesini sağlarken, Endonezya'nın rolü de ASEAN Yolu'nun varlığını korumasını sağlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Joko Widodo



döneminde artan milliyetçilik çerçevesinde Endonezya dış politikasında birtakım sapmalar gözükse de özellikle ASEAN ile ilgili hususlarda Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi olma rolünü geliştirerek devam ettirdiği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Endonezya, ASEAN Yolu, Güney Çin Denizi, Dış Politika Roller, Bölgeselcilik

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## THE LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	ASEAN Coordinating Council
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
APEC	Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHT	Cooperative Hegemony Theory
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COC	The Code of Conduct on South China Sea
CPR	Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN
DOC	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Group of Experts
GMF	Global Maritime Fulcrum
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
JSMU	Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding
JWG- DOC	Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties

MPAC	Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity
MSR	Maritime Silk Road
NAM	Non- Aligned Movement
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NRCT	National Role Conception Theory
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OST	Organicist State Theory
SADC	South Africa in the South African Development Community
SCS	South China Sea
SCS- IWG	South China Sea Informal Working Group
SDNT	Single Draft of the South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SOM- DOC	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZOPFAN	Zone for Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
ZOPFFC	Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The introduction chapter of this thesis consists of research problem, research purpose and questions, literature review, methodology and research design and the thesis outline.

#### 1.1. Research Problem

“The rise of Indonesia” has received considerable attention both in academia and the media within the last two decades (Acharya, 2014b; Bresnan, 2005; Reid, 2012; Roberts et al., 2015; White, 2012). The most problematic issue, in this regard, has been the consequences of the rise of Indonesia on the future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although the rise of Indonesia is mainly based on democratization process with *reformasi* (Britannica, n.d.) and following economic development, the popularity of the subject is derived from the foreign policy discourses and projects of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administrations.

During SBY administration, Indonesia has adopted the rhetoric of “a million friends and zero enemies”. This discourse is a unilateral manifesto that Indonesia does not consider any state as its enemy, neither in Southeast Asia nor on a global scale, and that no state considers Indonesia as an enemy (Bimo Yusman & Ted Piccone, 2014). The aim of this discourse can be considered as partly about maintaining the flow of foreign investments and economic cooperation which are necessary for sustaining Indonesian economic growth, while not being perceived as a competitor or enemy by the other states. Additionally, during this period Jakarta has been quite proactive in its foreign policy within both the G20 (Hermawan et al., 2011; Weck, 2011) and the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Songbatumis, 2021). This can be interpreted as Indonesia having established a foreign policy outside of ASEAN.

With Jokowi administration in 2014, Indonesia started to take more concrete steps in its foreign policy. Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) project can be evaluated in this context. GMF is considered as a unilateral and nationalistic initiative that aims to revive Indonesia's maritime identity. With GMF, Jakarta began to restore and built-up seaports for the development of trade and security. In a way, GMF is considered as the announcement of Indonesia's rediscovery of its glorious pre-colonial past (Dewi Santoso; Fadhillah Nafisah, 2017; Yohanes, 2017). In addition to unilateral initiatives such as GMF, with the announcement of the “Indo-Pacific vision” of Indonesia, Jakarta has expressed its wider-Asia plans beyond ASEAN (Scott, 2019; Suryadinata, 2018). Thus, the concerns of repositioning “the rising Indonesia” in ASEAN intensified.

Considering that ASEAN had the priority in Indonesian foreign policy since the establishment of the organization, this recent diversion resulted in the questioning the future of Indonesia and ASEAN relations. Given that Indonesia is on the rise, there are a few possibilities in terms of how this will affect ASEAN as a whole. One is that Indonesia will take on more of a leadership role within ASEAN and be more effective on international platforms. Another possibility is that Indonesia will become more nationalistic and independent of ASEAN, which could have negative consequences for the unity of ASEAN (Halans & Nassy, 2013a; Roberts et al., 2015; White, 2012). Additionally, other ASEAN member states may see Indonesia as a threat, or ASEAN may serve as a constraint on Indonesia's global rise. These kind of possible outcomes of the rise of Indonesia can be found in the literature and the media (Halimi, 2014; Islam, 2011).

This dissertation argues that the problem and the uncertainty about this issue arise from ignoring the relationship between Indonesia and ASEAN. Making a detailed description of Indonesia's role in ASEAN in the historical spectrum allows for a clearer understanding which then can produce more accurate projections to the above-mentioned problem. In order to understand how a change in Indonesian foreign policy might affect ASEAN, or how any structural change in ASEAN might

affect Indonesia, it is necessary to understand the historical relationship between Indonesia and ASEAN.

ASEAN's member states engage with one another through a regionalism modus operandi called the ASEAN Way. To grasp how the ASEAN Way came to be, its evolution and current form, as well as Indonesia's role within the framework - including how it has changed and grown over time - it is necessary to have a firm understanding of the structure itself. Therefore, we can finally make projections about the future of Indonesia and ASEAN in terms of a possible foreign policy change in accordance with "the rise of Indonesia."

## **1.2. Research Purpose and Questions**

Although there are studies on the role of Indonesia in the literature, studies specifically on how Indonesia plays a role in the ASEAN Way are quite inadequate. In light of a possible foreign policy change in Indonesia, it is unclear what consequences this will have for the future of ASEAN. In this context, the importance and role of Indonesia for ASEAN should be more clearly demonstrated. With this in mind, the dissertation intends to ask two questions and illuminate a few points in order to answer these questions.

1- What is the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism?

2- To what extent the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism has changed in the 21st century?

Producing an answer to the first descriptive research question will provide inferences about several issues. The description of the foreign policy role adopted by Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism requires, first of all, to examine what kind of a structure the ASEAN Way is and how this structure has been shaped in the historical process. Thus, this dissertation aims to provide a detailed understanding of the ASEAN Way. The foreign policy role adopted by Indonesia will be located and examined within this detailed understanding. On the other hand, describing the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism will also reveal the mutually constitutive agent-structure relationship between the role of Indonesia and the ASEAN Way of regionalism. In this context, this relationship will be examined, and

the importance of both Indonesia for ASEAN and ASEAN for Indonesia will be emphasized. The dissertation claims that these implications obtained during answering the research question will provide knowledge to better evaluate the relation between Indonesia and ASEAN in their future projections, beyond defining the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism. After answering the first research question, the thesis will analyze whether or not Indonesia's role has changed in the 21st century, and if so, to what extent. In this way, during the SBY and Jokowi periods, which constituted the second wave of the rise of Indonesia, it will be examined whether or not there is a diversion in Indonesia's foreign policy.

In light of these research questions, the dissertation hypothesizes that Indonesia's role in the ASEAN Way of regionalism is to facilitate communication among ASEAN member states and between ASEAN and extra-regional actors. Indonesia is able to play this role due to its diplomatic capabilities, rather than its material power. Additionally, the recent rise of Indonesian nationalism under the rule of Joko Widodo has led to some minor changes in Indonesia's foreign policy inclinations. However, Indonesia continues to play a key role in ASEAN matters.

### **1.3. Literature Review**

In the literature, there are basically two groups that examine the role of Indonesia in ASEAN and in a global scale. The neo-liberal/realist group takes the concept of "hegemony" at the core of their inquiry and focus on the material capabilities of Indonesia and other ASEAN member states. The constructivist group, in turn, generally consider Indonesia as a middle power and assign some additional roles in the light of several foreign policy cases. Both sides of the dispute ignore to take into account the ASEAN Way of regionalism to a varying degree in determining the role of Indonesia.

After giving some insights about the literature over the contributions of these two groups, the dissertation focuses on national role conception theory and concept of role conflict to describe the role of Indonesia in ASEAN Way of regionalism. Acknowledging that the uncertainty about the role of Indonesia within ASEAN is partly related to the role conflict that Indonesia faces over different foreign policy cases, the dissertation intends to approach the issue from a different angle. In this

sense, the dissertation argues the role of Indonesia in ASEAN in terms of its relations with the ASEAN Way of regionalism. Although the dissertation stands in line with the works of the constructivist group, it basically differs from this group on two main factors. This study explores the role of Indonesia in ASEAN through the basic agent-structure relationship of constructivism. Secondly, the historical background of both the ASEAN Way and Indonesia's role in ASEAN will be examined. In this way, Indonesia's role will be defined not in specific cases, but in the ASEAN Way structure and Indonesia's ideational background.

This dissertation will focus on the agent-structure relation in the analysis of Indonesia's role in ASEAN, particularly regarding the ASEAN Way. It will explain what the ASEAN Way is, how it works, and where it originates from. Additionally, the dissertation will describe the role of foreign policy that Indonesia constructs in light of its ideational background within this ASEAN Way structure.

### **1.3.1. Theories and Approaches to Explain Indonesian Role in ASEAN**

It is possible to come across different contributions in the literature about the role of Indonesia in ASEAN. While some researchers consider Indonesia as the future world power or future Asian superpower based on the data (Biemondi Larissa, 2021; Federation of Business Information Service, 2021; Mukherjee, 2020), some others consider Indonesia as a middle power, an emerging power, and a regional power (Acharya, 2014b; Artner, 2017; Karim, 2018; Rattanasevee, 2014; Rüländ, 2014; Rüländ et al., 2015). These considerations are majorly based on Indonesia's material capabilities and foreign policy behaviors.

Indonesia is the 7th largest economy in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on a Purchasing Power Parity (GDP PPP) basis, with 3,495 billion US dollars. It is followed by Thailand in 19th place with 1,320 billion US dollars, Malaysia in 36th place with 999 billion US dollars, Philippines in 28th place with 953 billion US dollars, Vietnam in 34th place with 710 billion US dollars, and Singapore in 37th place with 566 billion US dollars (*World GDP PPP Ranking - MGM Research*, 2019). According to the Global Firepower Ranking, Indonesia comes in 16th place with 0.2804 Power Index Points out of 137 countries. Vietnam is close behind in 23rd place with 0.3988 points, followed by Thailand in 26th place

with 0.4302 points, Myanmar in 37th place with 0.6162 points, Malaysia in 41st place with 0.6523 points, and Singapore in 59th place with 0.8161 points. The Philippines comes in 64th place with 0.8862 points (*Indonesia Military Strength*, 2019). Given the numbers among ASEAN members, Indonesia seems neither economically nor militarily the far superior state of the organization.

In the light of these data, it can be understood that although Indonesia is one step ahead of other ASEAN states, it is not in a far superior position. Although Indonesia has the potential to surpass these states in the future, it cannot be deduced that Indonesia has an undisputed dominance over other ASEAN member states just by considering material capabilities at the moment. However, on the contrary to the numbers, Jakarta has proved that it is rather capable of handling some regional issues that generally regional hegemony would succeed such as moderating regional conflicts (e.g., Vietnam-Cambodia between 1978-1992) promoting new values (e.g., Bali Democracy Forum since 2008), or balancing extra-regional powers (e.g. dynamic equilibrium policy *vis a vis* China and the United States). In this sense, Amitav Acharya, one of the leading scholars of Southeast Asia and Indonesia studies, argues that Indonesia is doing much more for ASEAN than China or America can do. Yet at the same time, according to many others including Acharya, Indonesia is still a middle power (Acharya, 2014b).

This not easily defined position of Indonesia was thus reflected in the literature and there has been no consensus on the role of Indonesia in ASEAN. To define the position of Indonesia in ASEAN, the scholars generated terms such as *primus inter pares* (first among equals) or *de facto* leader (Chongkittavorn, 2017, p. 254; Putra, 2015, p. 189; Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014, p. 107).

There are two dominant groups in the literature when it comes to describing Indonesia's role in ASEAN. The first is the neo-liberal/realist group and the second is the constructivist group. The first group focuses on Indonesia's material capabilities and tries to explain Indonesia's position in ASEAN through concepts such as hegemony and dominion. In this sense, it is argued that Indonesia has hegemony over ASEAN or may establish hegemony in the future. The second group considers

Indonesia as a middle power and assign some additional roles such as democracy promoter in the light of specific foreign policy cases.

### **1.3.1.1. Neo-Liberal/Realist Group**

This group utilizes the concept of hegemony to describe the role of Indonesia in ASEAN. ASEAN, since its establishment in 1967, has managed to sustain stability in Southeast Asia which is a politically and socio-culturally highly diverse region. In this sense, the main idea is that Indonesia by being a hegemon in the region made all other states come together and provide stability in the region. The theory that backs this idea is the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST). By focusing on local traditions of Indonesian statehood in addition to its material power, *Bapakism* which is an extension of the Organicist State Approach can be listed here. Finally, to explain the role of Indonesia in ASEAN, cooperative hegemony theory resides in the neo-liberal/realist group.

#### **1.3.1.1.1. Hegemonic Stability Theory**

Hegemonic stability theory (HST) posits that one power is more dominant than the others in an international system, and this dominance ensures stable maintenance of the system. When this hegemonic power weakens, the international system begins to destabilize. HST emphasizes that stability is not likely possible in the absence of hegemonic power (Charles P. Kindleberger, 1973). The Southeast Asian region, where ASEAN member states are located, is one of the sub-systems of the international system. Since its establishment, ASEAN (1967) has brought considerable peace and stability to Southeast Asia, which is in many ways highly diverse and conflict prone region (Karimi et al., 2016; Kivimäki, 2001; Shafie, 1982).

HST posits that a hegemon state provides stability and peace to the system. The concept of hegemon is being utilized as a foreign policy role of a specific state in the system. In this sense, first of all, the hegemon sets rules to regulate the relations between the members of the system and punishes those who violate the rules. Punishing the members who violate the rules in their favor is important for the continuity of the hegemon's dominant status. The hegemon also should be able to

create a "public good" that all members of the system can benefit from within the hegemon role. This also strengthens the status of the hegemon in the system. This shows that the hegemon actually has a responsibility to other member states (Charles P. Kindleberger, 1973, p. 292). Finally, the hegemon should be the undisputed leader of the system. Therefore, the hegemon must be stronger in materialistic terms than other states of the system. In addition to an advanced economy and military, it should have advanced technology and strong allies from inside and outside the system (Webb & Krasner, 1989). Additionally, the power capabilities, hard or soft, are not solely definitive for considering a state as a regional hegemon. The state in question requires to demonstrate a will to act as a regional hegemon and this will is needed to be accepted by the other regional powers (Altunışık Benli, 2014). While the United States of America (USA) on a global scale, Germany in the European Union (EU), and South Africa in the South African Development Community (SADC) are suitable candidates for HST's hegemonic state concept, in the light of HST's requirements, Indonesia cannot be considered the regional hegemon of ASEAN.

The main reason for this is that Indonesia is not in a far superior position among ASEAN member states in terms of economy and military. In addition, Indonesia technologically comes behind Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand among the ASEAN members (Center for Research and Development Strategy Japan Science and Technology Agency, 2015). On the other hand, it cannot be suggested that Indonesia unilaterally determines the rules in ASEAN and punishes those who do not abide by these rules. Finally, Indonesia does not have strong allies. Above all, as a state famous for not forming alliances, Indonesia is one of the important members of the Non-Alignment Movement.

Although Indonesia tries to create public good for ASEAN members and takes responsibility in this regard, it does that jointly with other member states within the ASEAN framework. The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community can be considered in this context. Although Indonesia has taken a leading role here, it has not taken this initiative alone (Han, 2017).

Considering the possibility of the emergence of a hegemon in ASEAN in the context of HST, the closest member to obtain the "hegemon" role that provides peace and



stability in ASEAN can be considered as Indonesia. Indonesia has the two most important straits of the Southeast Asian region, the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, as a strategic location. These straits are strategic points where a significant part of world trade is carried out. In terms of population, Indonesia is the biggest power in the region. On the other hand, its underground resources put Indonesia one step ahead of many ASEAN member states. According to the report published by The McKinsey in 2012 (Oberman et al., 2012), Indonesia is expected to be the 7th largest economy in the world in 2030. According to these parameters, Indonesia seems to be the first candidate that can assume the role of hegemon among ASEAN member states in the future. Yet for now, it can hardly be claimed that Indonesia has such an ambition considering Jakarta's foreign policy behaviors. Therefore, the fact that Indonesia is the best candidate for this hegemon role does not allow us to explain the stability and peace in ASEAN within the framework of the HST. In this sense, the hegemon role is also associated with local traditions of Indonesian statehood (*Bapakism*) in addition to its material powers by the Organicist State Theory.

#### **1.3.1.1.2. Organicist State Theory- Bapakism**

Another theory describing Indonesia's role in ASEAN is the Organicist State Theory (OST). Rüländ associates the concept of *Bapakism* in Indonesia's statehood culture with an OST. According to *Bapakism*, the state is a family (*kekeluargaan*) system. The leader of the state is the father of the family, and the society is the "children" (Bourchier, 2019; Rüländ, 2018). The father's responsibility is to provide and maintain harmony in the family. Organicism became prominent in Indonesian domestic and foreign policy, especially with Suharto and the New Order regime. Hierarchy, harmony, and consensus, which are parts of Suharto's authoritarian decision-making approach, can be associated with *Bapakism* (Rüländ, 2018).

Rüländ suggests that this Indonesian statehood model can actually be applied to ASEAN as well (Rüländ, 2018). Estrella Solidum argues that leaders of ASEAN member states consider ASEAN as a family (Solidum, 1974, p. 63). In this sense, Indonesia considers itself as the father of the ASEAN family and it constructs its foreign policy accordingly. In turn, the other ASEAN member states acknowledge

Indonesia's supremacy and acknowledge that Indonesia is responsible for ASEAN's unity and harmony (Solidum, 1974, p. 63).

The *Bapakism* approach is based on the assumption that Indonesia and other ASEAN member states have the perception that Indonesia has a hegemonic power over since it is the most powerful state in the region. Although there are speeches that the leaders of the ASEAN member state consider ASEAN as a family, there is no general perception that Indonesia is perceived as the “father” of this family (Mcvey, 1967). The *Bapakism* approach, like hegemonic stability, requires the acceptance of the hegemon's undisputed superiority, but as explained in the paragraphs above, Indonesia does not have such power. Within the neo-liberal/realist group, there is another approach that describes the role of Indonesia in ASEAN with the concept of hegemony relatively better than HST and *Bapakism*: Cooperative Hegemony Theory.

#### **1.3.1.1.3. Cooperative Hegemony Theory**

Cooperative Hegemony Theory (CHT) suggests that a considerably strong regional power imposes its own values and norms through institutional channels by gaining the trust of other member states of the institution and thus it takes other member states under its influence. As the antithesis of CHT, there is also the possibility that a relatively strong regional state is drawn into an institutional trap and pacified by other member states. Both approaches are used to describe Indonesia's role within ASEAN (Nolte, 2010).

Nolte argues that regional institutionalization or integration is actually an instrument for power aggregation. A group of states can come together and increase their effectiveness, especially on a global scale. In this respect, especially "emerging regional powers" are eager for regional institutionalization and integration (Nolte, 2010). For an emerging regional power, the cooperative hegemony strategy has several advantages. The regional power, which normally has a limited effect especially in the surrounding regions and on the global scale, increases its effectiveness when it acts together with other regional states that are considerably weaker than itself under an institutional structure (Nolte, 2010). In this sense, it can be claimed that Indonesia to act together with ASEAN member states gives Jakarta a

leverage on a global scale. As a matter of fact, ASEAN Plus Processes, ARF etc. can be considered in this context.

In the CHT, there is an indirect and considerably soft dominion of the hegemon over the other member states. This dominion is mostly used to diffuse hegemon's norms and values to the region. On the other hand, unlike regional hegemony, the dominion established with cooperative hegemony has a legitimate character favored by other member states. This prevents the creation of rival alliances or counter-balance initiatives from within and outside the region (Pedersen, 2002). Indonesia's inclusion in ASEAN and its long-term norm diffusion in the region can be examined in this respect.

As in the HST, in CHT, the hegemon has to perform actions that other states can also benefit from. The only difference here is that these actions can be done together with other member state. Indonesia's efforts to diffuse values and norms such as human rights, democratization, or the initiation of the ASEAN Community can be evaluated within this framework.

The antithesis of cooperative hegemony, on the other hand, focuses on the advantage of other member states rather than the advantage of hegemon. In this sense, Leifer argues that it is insufficient to think that Indonesia only takes part in ASEAN to establish cooperative hegemony. According to Leifer, other member states use ASEAN institutionalism as a tool to curb Indonesia's possible hegemonic tendencies. In this sense, they created a regional balance against Indonesia by pulling Indonesia into ASEAN. However, on the Indonesian side, being in ASEAN was seen as an opportunity not to be perceived as a regional threat and to legitimize its regional leadership (Michael Leifer, 1996). Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that Indonesia has a low-profile within ASEAN. According to Anwar, this low-profile posture of Indonesia is very important for regional harmony. Any assertive behavior by Indonesia may cause Indonesia to be seen as a threat by other member states (Anwar, 1997).

CHT provides more grounded inferences compared to HST on the basis of ensuring peace and stability in ASEAN. However, CHT does not essentially assign Indonesia a foreign policy role. CHT can be rather considered as a balance of power theory

implementation on an institutional basis. In this sense, although CHT provides us some insights about some foreign policy behaviors of Indonesia in the ASEAN context, it does not give us a set of tools that we can assign a foreign policy role to Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism.

### **1.3.1.2. Constructivist Group**

Amitav Acharya considers the Indonesian role under the category of “emerging power”. Acharya emphasizes that the states in this category are "Third World" or "Global South" states that are developing primarily economically, then politically, and strategically. Acharya argues that Indonesia is also a regional leader among ASEAN states with this emerging power role. However, Indonesia is not in a superior position in ASEAN, although it has developed in terms of economy and politics. Acharya argues that the Indonesia's regional leadership is mostly based on its virtuous correlation consisting of democracy, development, and stability. Within the framework of this correlation, Indonesia is in active engagement with other states both in its region and on a global scale. In this respect, Acharya likens Indonesia to middle powers such as Sweden, Canada, and Australia. Acharya claims that there is an expectation from ASEAN member states for Indonesia to play mediator and facilitator roles in regional problems and conflicts. In the sense of this expectations, according to Acharya Indonesia assumes more responsibility both in its own region and in the wider Asia region than the great powers such as India and China (Acharya, 2014b).

Christopher Roberts and Widyaningsih examine the role of Indonesia in ASEAN through crisis/conflict management, mediation, and norms/values diffusion cases. In this sense, they suggest that Indonesia holds the leadership of ASEAN considering Jakarta's success as a middle power over some specific issues such as Indonesia's mediation role in the Corregidor Affair and 1979 Cambodian Conflict, its contributions based on human rights and democracy promotion, and its efforts to increase ASEAN's prestige on a global scale. In this regard, they even conclude that ASEAN could not be formed or be absurd without Indonesia. The reason for this inference is the harmony and unity-building positive activity of Indonesia in the above-mentioned regional problems. However, they also argue that the success of

Indonesia as a middle power in ASEAN has a negative effect for ASEAN. Since Indonesia is too successful in managing regional problems, ASEAN member states do not need to develop an institutional mechanism to solve regional problems (Roberts et al., 2015).

Another argument of Roberts and Widyaningsih is that Indonesia was already accepted as a natural leader by other regional states during the formation of ASEAN. In this sense, Indonesia was included in the group considering its economic, political, and military power to be responsible for the regional issues. In this sense, they let ASEAN's permanent General Secretariat to be established in Jakarta. Therefore, other member states made Indonesia responsible for the regional affairs (Roberts et al., 2015).

Agastia considers Indonesia's role in ASEAN as a middle power. However, according to Agastia, Indonesia began to practice its middlepowermanship out of ASEAN by declaring its Indo-Pacific vision. With this upgrade, Indonesia enacts the roles of "bridge-builder" and "regional leader" in ASEAN. Within the framework of Indonesia's Indo-Pacific vision, Jakarta projects a regionalism framework that covers not only Southeast Asia but also South Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific. This framework is constructed by the discourses and foreign policy behaviors of Indonesian leaders. In this sense, while Indonesia is the initiator of such a regionalism set-up, it indirectly puts ASEAN in the leading position Indo-Pacific vision. According to Agastia, this strategy of Indonesia has led to it being considered as the undisputed regional leader within ASEAN (Agastia, 2020).

One of the most comprehensive works on defining Indonesia's foreign policy role has been conducted by Jürgen Rüländ. Rüländ has examined Indonesia's foreign policy role since 1945 within the scope of Holsti's national role conception. In this sense, he argued that in addition to its permanent roles such as mediator, bridge-builder, Indonesia also activated new roles such as democracy promoter. Rüländ argues that Indonesia modified the foreign policy role it had adopted until then after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In this context, before *reformasi*, the role of Indonesia was formed within the framework of a "cognitive prior" guided by the collective memories of Indonesians. In this context, "cognitive prior" is based on traditional

cultural and historical norms that make up Indonesia's statecraft legacy. Rüländ emphasizes that after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and with the *reformasi*, Indonesia became democratized and assumed the role of democracy promoter in ASEAN (Rüländ, 2015, 2018).

Some foreign policy practices of Jakarta can let us consider Indonesia not as an ordinary middle power but something beyond. As in Acharya's assessment, Indonesia has performed above the capacity of a middle power both in its region and in wider Asia (Acharya, 2014b). Considering some of Indonesian foreign policy activities such as the formation of ASEAN, resolution of Corregidor Affair, ASEAN Plus processes, establishment of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, establishment of ASEAN Charter and South China Sea Workshops and establishing code of conduct on South China Sea, it can be claimed that Indonesia is indeed punching above the weight of an ordinary middle power.

Firstly, it is quite problematic to consider Indonesia as a middle power and then to define additional roles through specific cases. In that way, in the future, it would be possible to suggest that Indonesia is a neutral state, after investigating Indonesian neutrality on a specific foreign policy case. Besides, there we have a deep non-alignment history of Indonesia as well. However, enacting new roles over each foreign policy case makes the analysis rather shallow.

Secondly, in the construction of Indonesian foreign policy role, the ideational background of Indonesian policymakers which consist of Indonesia's history, the collective memory of its people and its culture is majorly ignored in the analyses. In this sense, the analyses are rather reductionist.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the analysis of Indonesia's role in ASEAN, the ASEAN Way is majorly ignored. Indonesia's role in this context is not independent of the ASEAN's *modus operandi*, which governs the relations between ASEAN member states. Neglecting such a framework and relying solely on conventional methodologies would result in very insufficient outcomes due to a lack of contextual information. In this way, the dissertation is inclined to produce knowledge by taking ASEAN Way as a point of inquiry (Varkkey et al., 2022).

All in all, although the dissertation has an inclination close to the works of constructivist scholars, it does differ for a certain degree in the light of the criticisms above. The dissertation takes basic agent-structure relations of constructivist school to the core of its inquiry in describing Indonesian role in ASEAN Way of regionalism. In this sense, the dissertation will conclude that the Indonesian role and the ASEAN Way are mutually constitutive entities.

### **1.3.1.3. National Role Conception Theory**

The foundations of the National Role Conception Theory (NRCT) approach that states have roles in international relations and that they adopt foreign policy behaviors within the framework of these roles were laid by Kalevi Jaakko Holsti within the framework of the NRCT. The theory has been influenced by the role theory of psychology, sociology and anthropology which aims to explain certain human behaviors in a related society (Adigbuo, 2007, p. 88). The main assumption of theory is that “.... states are actors who behave consistently with specific roles with which they identify” (Adigbuo, 2007) In the NRCT, individuals identify themselves within their related societies and determine the best patterns of act in accordance with their expectations and interests. NRCT implies that just like individuals, the states live in an international society of states and thus they determine specific patterns of foreign policy behaviors to survive within their region or international society (Adigbuo, 2007, p. 89). However, unlike the individuals determine their roles within the society, the national roles of states are determined by the policymakers of the related states. The national role conception of a specific state is determined in accordance with its policymakers’ perceptions about their states in the region or in the international society of states (Adigbuo, 2007; Holsti, 1970, p. 240).

To find out the initial categories of the national roles of states, Holsti examines the speeches of 71 different governments all over between 1965 – 1967 and singles out 17 different national roles of states; bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of faith, mediator- negotiator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate and protectee (Holsti, 1970, pp. 260–271). Holsti argues that it is not compulsory for

states to follow one of these national roles. States may adopt multiple national roles as well (Holsti, 1970, p. 277). The states with more active foreign policies can have many different roles in this regard (Holsti, 1970, p. 283). The national roles of states also are not eternal. They are prone to change, yet they often endure.

NRCT can be understood through two processes: role performance and role expectations. The role performance is about the state's determination of its foreign policy role according to its self-perception. The role expectation, in turn, is the effect of the other states' perception on a specific state to determine its foreign policy role. In other words, it is a collective expectation from the international system for a state how to act internationally. Both the performance and expectation parts of the role conception is about the perception of the policymakers of the related states (Agastia, 2020).

The analysis of Indonesian role in ASEAN in the framework of NRCT is scarce in the literature. The studies have generally been in the form of making definitions such as middle power, emerging power, emerging middle power for Indonesia by evaluating Indonesia's material and ideational power (Camroux, 2021). One of the biggest problems in analyzing Indonesia within the NRCT framework is that Indonesia's roles within ASEAN are in conflict with each other. This makes it difficult to analyze Indonesia's role in the ASEAN Way of regionalism. In this context, Moch Faisal Karim's work is invaluable.

A state can have multiple foreign policy roles within an international system. These roles can be created by the state's own foreign policy inclinations and systemic expectations. These distinct roles can coexist or contradict each other in some cases. Role conflict is the result of the latter situation. As a result of role conflict, one of the state's foreign policy roles may hinder the other (Karim, 2022).

In this context, Karim argues that Indonesia's foreign policy roles at both the international system level and within ASEAN could potentially be in conflict. Constructivist scholars assert that Indonesia's state identity was particularly shaped during the SBY period around democracy (Acharya, 2014b; Anwar, 1997; Rüländ, 2018). In this context, Karim argues that it is more accurate to see democracy not as Indonesia's state identity, but as a role conception. By means of this democracy-



promoting role, Indonesia has gained prestige, especially at the global level. However, Indonesia's democracy-promoting role can conflict with other roles it plays, especially within the region (Karim, 2017, p. 386).

According to Karim, Indonesia's role as a democracy promoter and bridge builder between the ASEAN and international system is helping to solidify its position as a regional leader within ASEAN. A good example of this is Myanmar that Indonesia has taken on the role of bridge-builder between the international community and Myanmar on the issue of the Rohingya. This has given Indonesia the chance to represent the region on this issue (Karim, 2017). However, within the framework of Indonesia's endeavor of supporting democracy in Myanmar, the role of democracy promoter has been dissolved with the role of bridge-builder it has displayed in the framework of the continuation of communication and reconciliation between Myanmar, ASEAN, and the international community. Indonesia continued its negotiations with the Myanmar government despite the Junta's violations of human rights, and thus suspended the democracy promoter role (Karim, 2017).

Karim's research on the potential conflicts within Indonesia's foreign policy roles has made it necessary to examine Indonesia's role within ASEAN Way regionalism from a different perspective. In this context, the thesis takes as its central focus a constructivist modification of national role conception theory.

### **1.3.2. The Position of Dissertation in the Literature: The Agent-Structure Relations**

Kirste and Maull present a constructivist re-arrangement of NRCT. In this constructivist modification, the actor's cognitive variables such as world views, values, commitments, and objectives are majorly included in the analysis. These cognitive variables arise both from the related state's self-perception and from other actors' expectations in the international system (Kirste & Maull, 1996; Wehner & Thies, 2014). Both the domestic role conception, the "ego", and the perception of others about the state, the "alter" part, play a role in the creation and recreation of a state's foreign policy role. Although Kirste and Maull emphasize that the ego part is more effective, they also argue that both the ego and alter parts are effective in the

role conception process. In brief, the role conception in constructivist understanding is an agent – structure mutual construction (Kirste & Maull, 1996; Rüländ, 2015).

It is important to think about how an actor's role is impacted by systemic expectations and, in turn, how the actor's role affects the system. This is especially relevant when considering Indonesia's role within the ASEAN Way of regionalism. Indonesia cannot be thought of as independent of the ASEAN Way and, similarly, the ASEAN Way cannot be seen without taking into account Indonesia's role within it.

In this sense, the role of Indonesia in ASEAN can be considered within both the perceptions of Indonesian policymaker and the expectations of the ASEAN Way of regionalism, which is the *modus operandi* of the Southeast Asia sub-system. Adopting such a perspective enables us to uncover that the foreign policy role of Indonesia and ASEAN Way of regionalism are mutually constitutive historical constructions. In this regard, the dissertation will first provide a detailed understanding of the ASEAN Way, its way of functioning, its historical origins and then its historical process and where it originated, and then what role has Indonesia adopted in this historical construct and how this role has evolved.

#### **1.3.2.1. The Structure – ASEAN Way**

ASEAN Way, with its simplest sense, can be defined as a unique and local regionalism *modus operandi* which aims to reduce differences, to lessen problems and increase cooperation among member states. Although the ASEAN Way governs the interstate relations of ASEAN member states since the establishment of the association (1967), the term had not been used formally until 1998 Hanoi Declaration (Ha Noi Declaration, 1998). Although there was no definition for ASEAN Way in the declaration, the member states agreed that the interstate relations have to be conducted through ASEAN Way and international law.

The ASEAN Way discussions in the literature since 1990's onwards (Acharya, 2014a; Antolik, 1990; Narine, 1997) are happened to be constantly busy. Although there are huge disagreements about the efficacy of the ASEAN Way in terms of ASEAN institutionalism, there is also a consensus in the literature that ASEAN Way

operates through a set of diplomatic norms and values in practice. In the latter, there are slight differences about the interpretation of specific norms and values forming ASEAN Way.

Amitav Acharya, one of the leading figures in the literature, suggests a distinction between the norms of ASEAN Way as legal rational norms and socio-cultural norms (Acharya, 2014a, pp. 47–79). Legal rational norms are stands for the internationally accepted norms which have their place in Charter of the United Nations such as non-use of force and non-interference. Acharya claims that although these legal rational norms are commonly adopted, they have rather important for the “third world countries” that had colonial backgrounds. Adherence to these norms can be considered as these state’s sensitivity to their sovereignty in this sense. On the other hand, the socio-cultural norms are unique and local set of principles carves out a system (Acharya, 1997) to foster regional cooperation by settlement of disputes among the members. These socio-cultural norms: consultation (*Musyawarah*), consensus (*Mufakat*) and informality which are claimed to be derived from Southeast Asia’s cultural heritage (Acharya, 1997). In a sense Acharya suggest considering ASEAN Way in narrower and broader terms. While in the regional level (Southeast Asia), it is an informal process of consensus building to reach consultation among the member states to take decisions, in global level it is a quest for regional autonomy (Acharya, 1997). Similarly, Rüländ examines ASEAN Way under two types of norms as primary and secondary norms. The primary norms as the core norms of ASEAN Way consist of legally binding ones, such as non-interference and secondary norms such as consensus informality (Rüländ, 2018).

Micheal Antonik argues that the norms of ASEAN Way can be investigated under 3R which are restraint, respect, and responsibility. Restraint stands for the non-interference principle which impede other member states and extra regional actors to interfere in domestic affairs. The restraint gives opportunity to the member states to deal freely with their domestic affairs and provide stability inside. Respect is important in the decision-making processes. The member states have to consider not to irritate other states in the negotiation process, especially in the formal meetings. Finally, responsibility is about a member states consideration of the effects of its domestic policies towards other member states. In other words, a member state needs

to take decisions even in domestic affairs by considering its possible negative effects to the other members of the organization (Antolik, 1990, pp. 156–157).

Khoo How San, by adding “good neighborliness” to norms of non-interference, consultation, and consensus, considers ASEAN Way of regionalism as a “neighborhood watching group”. The main idea here the member states share a mutual goodwill towards one another more than a state from outside the membership (Khoo How San, 2000, p. 280). In a similar line with good neighborliness, the unity can be considered as one of the main norms of ASEAN Way (Ba, 2009, pp. 71–98).

Although these norms, values and principles are considered to constitute the ASEAN Way, they are by no means limited. There are many other norms considered to be a part of ASEAN Way. However, to adopt the mainstream, this dissertation will embrace three most important norms which can be considered as the sources of the derivatives. These main norms are non-interference, consensus through consultation, and informality. There are different interpretations of these main norms in the literature.

#### **1.3.2.1.1. The principle of non-interference**

The majority of the literature takes non-interference at the core of the ASEAN Way norms. Although the non-interference is a principle exists in United Nations Charter, thus an acknowledged norm by many other regional organizations and states, it is rather central to ASEAN Way. It is argued that the adoption of non-interference principle by Southeast Asian states made the establishment and later extension of ASEAN. However, non-interference is not just brought Southeast Asian states together, but it is also highly effective to arrange inter-state relations within ASEAN even today. While there is a consensus in the literature about the importance of non-interference in ASEAN Way, the interpretations of it differs in this regard (Acharya, 2014a; Leifer, 2007).

The newly independent nation-states of the region, considering the Cold War atmosphere back then, were concerned about foreign interventions to their sovereignties. These states have several domestic problems such as disputed boundaries, communist insurgencies, separatist movements, and legitimacy

problems. In this sense, the adoption of non-interference would prevent interference to the sovereignty of these states by using these issues as an excuse by external powers, both within and outside of Southeast Asia (Tay, 2001). In the same vein, it is suggested that non-interference has made it possible to adopt a regional solution to regional problems approach. The member states embraced the principle of non-interference as the main norm of ASEAN Way and thus prevented the foreign intervention to regional problems. This created a basis for the regional states to solve the problems among themselves and with their own methods (Haas, 1989).

On the other hand, there are those who argue that the importance of non-interference stems from the distrust between member states in addition to preventing foreign interventions. These states, which especially have border problems with each other, have promised that they will not interfere with each other with the adoption of the non-interference principle, and this has made it possible for these countries to cooperate. The principle of non-interference enabled member states to avoid possible conflicts with each other and to focus on their own internal problems. Indeed, during the establishment of ASEAN, the problems between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines could only be resolved in this way and the establishment of ASEAN became possible (Soesastro, 2001).

While underlining that the principle of non-interference is one of the most important factors that ensures the solidarity of ASEAN, Kraft also argues that ASEAN weakens its hand in ensuring the social transformation of the countries in the region. An example of this is the human rights abuses that took place in Myanmar in the 1990s (Kraft, 2000). In this regard, it was thought that the sanctions to be applied to Myanmar would be against the non-interference principle of the organization and would open the region to the intervention of foreign powers. In other words, ASEAN member states are aware that an intervention in Myanmar today will pave the way for an intervention in them tomorrow (Shimada, 2013).

However, some other scholars suggest that the non-interference does not compulsorily impede ASEAN states to not interfere each other's internal affairs. The non-interference is only to keep extra regional interventions away. In this vein, Tay

argues ASEAN member states interfere other members internal affairs occasionally (Tay, 2001).

About the interpretation of the non-interference as a part of ASEAN Way, Acharya argues that the norm has been localized within the Southeast Asian contexts. In other words, the non-interference has a different meaning within ASEAN internal politics. Acharya argues the non-interference of ASEAN Way goes beyond the Westphalian understanding of the non-interference. While in Westphalian understanding, the non-interferences mean non-use of force to another state, in ASEAN Way it is considered as a diplomatic instrument to pave the way for a set of interstate relations governed by consensus through consultation conducted informally (Don Ramli et al., 2019, p. 467).

#### **1.3.2.1.2. Consensus-building through Consultation**

Another commonly adhered norm of the ASEAN Way is consensus building through consultation. To make a decision in ASEAN, the member states have to reach a consensus eventually. During the early years of the establishment of ASEAN, taking decision through lengthy consultation was helping member states to build trust and confidence towards one another. These constant interactions were helping the member states to be familiar with each other and provide a common ground to cooperate for solving their common problems. This was also enabling the member states to create common norms (Solidum, 1974, p. 205). On the contrary to the ones who consider consensus through consultation as new thing for Southeast Asia, some others argue that this tradition derives from the ancient history of the region. It is argued that ASEAN just employs the old Indo-Malay traditions of *mufakat* and *musyawarah* while making group decisions (Acharya, 1997, p. 330; Caballero-Anthony Mely, 1998, p. 58; Nischalke, 2000, p. 90).

Similar to the non-interference principle, consultation and consensus also have been criticized and praised. The main criticism in this regard is that the decision-making processes can sometimes take too long and even result in the inability to reach a consensus. However, on the other hand, it is not always expected that all members will agree in order to reach consensus. The consensus of the ASEAN Way is rather different than its original meaning. The fact that some member states do not express

an opinion on the decision taken or oppose the decision taken means that the consensus is provided. To reaching a consensus, the most important thing, rather than providing unanimity, is saving the member states dignity which are in disagreement with the rest of the group. Therefore, these states can be included in the decision-making process again whenever they are ready (Acharya, 2014a, p. 67). Although this process is formally conducted in ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) in theory (Antolik, 1990, p. 91), it is actually organized in informal meeting in practice.

#### **1.3.2.1.3. Informality**

Another important norm of the ASEAN Way is informality. ASEAN member states generally firstly contact to each other through elites (leaders, bureaucrats, diplomats, veterans etc.) in order to reach consensus on a subject. Discussions, which usually start in informal meetings (breakfast, golf) between the elites at the first stage, can then be moved to formal platforms such as AMM (Shimada, 2013).

There are several reasons for adopting such a way to achieve consensus among member states. First of all, it is much easier and inexpensive to initiate these dialogues through elites. On the other hand, in these countries where leaders are strong, only the technical parts of the decisions taken by the leaders are discussed and resolved at the next formal meetings. In other words, the elite interactions shorten the bargaining process (Shimada, 2013).

Another reason for informality is referred to as "face-saving" in the literature. No one is declared as a winner or loser as a result of interactions that are carried out informally behind the scenes. Thus, the reputation of any member will not be damaged. Although this situation does not contribute to the decision-making process, it is important for the continuity of the unity of the member states. If they cannot have an agreement, the issue is removed from the table before reaching more formal platforms. Allan Collins defines this situation as "adjournment of the problem" (Thambipillai & Saravanamuttu, 1985).

In addition to not damaging the reputation of an ASEAN member states, the informality provides to keep ASEAN unity strong in the eyes of the world opinion. ASEAN member states attach great importance to this issue. Behind the scenes,

although the member states have huge disagreements from time to time, they try to not reflect the situation outside the group (Thambipillai & Saravanamuttu, 1985).

Non-interference, consensus through consultation and informality constitute ASEAN Way and give it a unique way of functioning. First, in the light of the literature review about the norms of ASEAN Way, it can be claimed that the adherence to non-interference by ASEAN member states is directly related to protect their national sovereignties. However, unlike other states in the world, the adherence of non-interference has been utilized as a tool for ASEAN member states to do things with their own way which is basically making group decisions with consensus through formal and informal consultations. Non-interference, in this regard, provides a protection for these states to impede the extra-regional interventions to the regional affairs.

Second, non-interference also functions as a cover for ASEAN in terms of intra-regional threats. Any hegemonic tendencies of any member state are not welcomed in this regard. This results in the absence of a dominant power within the group. Similarly, the adherence to non-interference leads to the absence of a supranational institutional body with binding rules and regulations within ASEAN. However, although there are no dominant power and a supranational body, there are no major or unresolved issue thanks to the harmony and unity among the ASEAN member states (Heiduk, 2016, pp. 7–8). Yet to provide harmony and unity within the group, it is necessary to overcome differences on specific issues. To do that, the member states have to be sufficiently and effectively communicating with each other, bilaterally and multilaterally, formally and informally. In other words, while rejecting a dominant power or a supranational body, ASEAN Way demands productive communication among ASEAN member states.

All in all, it can be argued that the essence of ASEAN Way is consist of the norms of consensus through consultation and informality. Non-interference is a norm that functions as a cover for ASEAN Way. However, where does this essence comes from is a matter of debate in the literature.



#### 1.3.2.1.4. The origins of ASEAN Way

There are different opinions in the literature about the origins of ASEAN Way. There are two main groups in this regard. The first group considers ASEAN Way as an outcome of colonial legacies of the Southeast Asian states. Therefore, according to that group ASEAN Way is merely a post-colonial concept. This group claims that the bad memories of colonialism result in these states to be sensitive to their national sovereignties. In this sense, they adopted Westphalian principles such as non-interference. In this vein, Haacke argues that the conflict between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines resolved with the adoption of Westphalian norms such as non-interference and thus the establishment of ASEAN became possible. Later, these norms have become a tradition and regulate the interactions among ASEAN member states (Haacke, 2003, pp. 16–51).

However, although this view explains the adoption of the non-interference principle, it falls short of explaining where consultation, consensus and informality came from. On the other hand, Southeast Asia is not the only region with a colonial history. Such a view has to explain why similar regionalism types did not arise in other regions with colonial backgrounds.

Another view in the literature is that ASEAN Way comes from Indonesian-Malay culture (Katsumata, 2003; Nischalke, 2000). In this context, it is claimed that the consensus through consultation type decision making process of the ASEAN Way and the execution of these processes through informal meetings come from the traditional Indonesian village culture, *musyawarah*. *Musyawarah* literally means decision making process through consultation. In this process, the parties come together in informal meetings such as parties of meals and consult with each other on certain issues. If a disagreement is occurred, the parties would not offend each other and postpone the issue. If the consensus (*mufakat*) is met, they follow with the implementation plan of the decisions taken. In this way, the reputation of any party attending the meeting would not be damaged in the eyes of their own communities (Thambipillai & Saravanamuttu, 1985, pp. 11–13).

These traditions from Indonesian-Malay culture can be considered as the starting point of the culturally sensitive norms of the ASEAN Way. However, ASEAN does

not only include countries with Indonesian-Malay culture such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines. In this sense, it can be claimed that this culture does not belong to all ASEAN member states.

However, in the periods when *musyawarah* and *mufakat* organized relations between Southeast Asian regional actor, there was a functioning regional system in Southeast Asia that depends on geography and commercial relations. Within the framework of this regional system, the regional actors were periodical communication.

The center of Indonesia-Malay culture, which is the source of *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, can be considered as the area covers the Straits of Malacca. As a matter of fact, the three representatives of this culture; Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore share the shores of the Straits of Malacca even today. In the history, due to its geographic location, Malacca was on the crossroads of the intra and extra regional water-borne trade. Local voyagers (merchants, pilgrims, etc.) from all corners of Southeast Asia would visit the Strait of Malacca throughout the year and stay in Malacca until the next cycle of the monsoon winds and participate in regional meetings hosted by the powers ruling the Straits of Malacca. The negotiations held here could have covered many economic, political, religious, and cultural issues. In one sense, all the actors of the Southeast Asia were coming together in Malacca through their representatives and hold informal meetings on regional issues. The decisions taken or the information obtained in these meetings were being spread throughout the Southeast Asia region by local voyagers (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005; Tong, 2010).

By holding the Straits of Malacca in different periods, the Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom and Malacca Sultanate were actually able to control the general agenda of Southeast Asia's economic, political and cultural developments. The Straits of Malacca served as the center of the system, giving its rulers an upper hand to become the de facto leader of the region. (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005). All the information carried by international and local traders was being exchanged in the Straits and then distributed to the farthest corners of the region via local traders. Above-mentioned three powers had maintained the security and stability of this

system with formal and informal diplomatic relations with the ruling elites of Southeast Asia, India, and China.

Although these powers were not in a far superior position compared to the other regional actors in terms of power, they were respected by the other regional actors thanks to their role in being the host for regional meetings. Today, Indonesia considers Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom and Malacca Sultanate as its ancestors. In this sense, Indonesia's policymakers construct and reconstruct Indonesia's foreign policy role on the legacy of these powers at varying degrees, since the establishment of the Republic.

### **1.3.2.2. The Agent - Indonesia**

Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom and Malacca Sultanate, considered to be the ancestors of Indonesia. They were by governing the Straits of Malacca, were actually holding the heart of ancient Southeast Asia regional system. In today's Indonesia, it is possible to sort out the legacy of these powers in the references of Indonesian policymakers, state symbols, and foreign policy activities.

In this sense, many symbols adopted during the reign of Indonesia's founding leader, Sukarno, can be given examples (L. C. Sebastian, 2006). This situation continued in the period of Suharto. Concentric circles, the foreign policy doctrine adopted during the Suharto period, can be cited as another example. During the Majapahit Kingdom, the concentric circles of the existing *mandala* system were adapted to Indonesia's foreign policy. According to this adaptation, the first circle was designated as Indonesia's domestic politics, the second circle as Southeast Asia and therefore ASEAN, and the second circle as globe (L. C. Sebastian & Swandi, 2011). "*Nusantara*" as the concept that Indonesia bases its territorial claim, is also one of the legacies from the Majapahit Kingdom. First announced in 1957, this concept was adopted on the basis of delineating Indonesia's borders (Leifer, 2014, p. 48).

Jokowi's maritime vision, declared in 2014, can also be considered in this context. Jokowi emphasized that Indonesia is essentially an archipelagic state and that the maritime identity it had in the past should be revived. In his post-election speech, Jokowi got on a "*pinisi* boat" as a podium to give their speech (Rosyidin, 2021).

Jokowi used the motto "Jalesveva Jamayah" (in the sea we triumph) to emphasize the new foreign policy attitude they would adopt. He promised to revive the historical maritime memories of Srivijaya Empire and Majapahit Kingdom and that Indonesia would enter a new golden age. In this sense, he emphasized that Indonesia should demonstrate this in its foreign policy and diplomacy (Firdaus, 2020).

It can be argued that Indonesian policymakers have constructed Indonesia's policy on the legacy of Indonesia's ancestors. The emphasis on the glory and pride leads to domestic support. It is about reminding the people of Indonesia that they were a very powerful maritime empire in the past. In the third chapter of this dissertation, the ideational background of Indonesia for the conceptualization of its foreign policy role in ASEAN is examined in detail and demonstrated over several foreign policy cases.

### **1.3.2.3. The Relation between the Structure and the Agent**

Before the advent of colonialism, Southeast Asia had a specific way of interaction among regional powers. That regional way of interaction which is called as Southeast Asia regional system in this dissertation, derived from the geographically oriented trade relations. ASEAN Way of regionalism shares functional similarities with this system.

Southeast Asia is geographically diverse region. The diverse pieces of the region are connected to each other not by land but by sea routes. Therefore, it is very difficult for the regional powers to communicate with each other frequently. To voyage from one point to another within the region, they had to catch the seasonal monsoon winds which finally directs them to the Straits of Malacca and from the Straits of Malacca they had to chance to go some other parts of the region or back to their homeland (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005). Thus, a communication between A to B was conducted via the communication hub, the Straits of Malacca. In turn, in ASEAN, the hub can be considered as General Secretariat of ASEAN in Jakarta. In this sense, while Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca host representatives from regional actors in the Straits throughout the year, under the surveillance of the Secretariat ASEAN member states organize their meetings throughout the year. Before the establishment of ASEAN, Southeast Asian states had major regional problems with each other. They

have managed or at least lessened the regional problems since they had a chance to sit at a table regularly thanks to ASEAN. Metaphorically speaking, ASEAN became their monsoon winds to bring them together.

In both systems, communication is carried out through formal and informal meetings. In Southeast Asia regional system in addition to formal visits to the Straits, there were also *kenduri* type of informal meetings. In ASEAN, the member states interact with each other through informal channels as well as formal ones such as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). While the communication can be carried out by the leaders, traders, monks, etc. in Southeast Asia regional system, it can be carried out by leaders, bureaucrats, veterans, NGO's etc. in ASEAN. Finally, *musyawarah* and *mufakat* in the Southeast Asia regional system corresponds to consultation and consensus in ASEAN (Leinbach, 2022a).

Today's Indonesia constructs its foreign policy role on the legacy of Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca. These powers were maritime powers which had strong naval capabilities. However, they were not the undisputed leaders of the Southeast Asia region. The main reason for these powers to have an upper hand and become the hub of Southeast Asia regional system was the Straits of Malacca which was the heart of regional and to some extent global trade. Because of the trade, the power governing the Straits was holding communication network of the whole Southeast Asia. This system worked until the advent of colonialism. However, with the establishment of ASEAN and ASEAN Way of regionalism, Southeast Asia began to present a similar communication network among regional powers.

#### **1.3.2.3.1. The Role of Communication Hub**

Indonesia, by constructing its foreign policy role over the legacies of Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca, actually acting as the communication hub of Southeast Asia. In the third chapter of this dissertation, it is examined in detail how Indonesia constructed its communication hub role over the legacy of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca, through the speeches of Indonesian leaders and their specific foreign policy cases.

Indonesia to construct its role as a communication hub of ASEAN, there are some ideational and material requirements that Jakarta has to meet.

There has to be a structural demand for the role. As it is argued formerly, the norm-based nature of ASEAN Way demands the provision of communication among the member states for reaching a consensus through consultation. Since the ASEAN's institutional structure is relatively weak and there are no binding rules, consultation processes need to be governed by individual states which is not powerful to become a hegemon yet capable enough to reconcile the ASEAN member states.

There has to be an ideational background to construct the role. In the Southeast Asia regional system, Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca, which Indonesia considered as its ancestors, were the central maritime powers holding the communication network of the whole region. The ideational background of Indonesia derives from the legacy of these powers.

There has to be required diplomatic capabilities for the role. The leaders, bureaucrats and diplomats of the state that carries out this role must be successful in their diplomatic relations. Over several examples Jakarta can be considered as a diplomatically capable state.

The state has to be a respected, trusted member and must have proven its worth in various cases. Indonesia has been successful in almost all regional initiatives for ASEAN that it has been involved in.

Communication hub role of Indonesia entails three fundamental layers. The first and most important of these layers is to ensure the maintenance of ASEAN unity. The second is to provide communication between the region and the rest of the world by representing ASEAN outside the Southeast Asian region. Third, in the light of global course of events and the demands from the region, initiating the creation of a group vision and agenda for the development and advancement of ASEAN and encouraging the member states for the implementation of taken decisions accordingly.

Maintaining the group unity: To maintain the ASEAN unity, ASEAN member states have to follow compatible policies or share similar concerns over regional issues.

However, it is not always the case. Possible disputes may arise among the members and that can have negative effects for the unity of the group. To overcome this issue ASEAN member states, have to be in effective communication with each other and resolve their differences. In this sense, Indonesia acts to unite all the members on the best possible level. While doing that, Indonesia may directly and generally informally interact with the actors bilaterally or multilaterally or Indonesia provides communication platforms such as workshops for the members to talk with each other informally. Reconciliation is of utmost importance to ASEAN. Since there is no set of rules that binds the ASEAN member states, it can be argued that ASEAN is actually quite fragile in providing and protecting unity and stability. The conflict management, mediation, or bridge-building cases are all related to maintaining the unity of ASEAN.

Representing the group in extra-regional scales: Indonesia represents ASEAN in wider Asia and on a global scale. It brings the developments emerging at the extra-regional level to ASEAN and together with other member states, it ensures that these developments are interpreted according to the region and localized if appropriate.

Setting the group vision and agenda: Indonesia initiates the setting of a vision and agenda for the benefit of all members towards the development of ASEAN and follows its implementation. Indonesia provides a vision of progress that will benefit the group according to the course of world events and the demand of the member states in the region. In this sense, Indonesia must have a vision of the world and be able to adequately analyze the local needs. Establishment of ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Plus Processes, ASEAN Community Vision which consists of Political-Security Community, Economic Community, Socio-Cultural Community, Bali Democracy Forum, raising awareness about human rights through the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights, (AICHR) can be considered among the activities in this context. In all this sense, communication hub organizes formal and informal meetings, workshops, etc., ensuring that the vision and agenda are acknowledged and subsequently implemented.

Communication hub provides formal or informal communication between members through bilateral or multilateral channels in case of disagreement between members.

As a result of this communication, it provides a consensus among the members. Similarly, in the case of being a communication bridge between the region and the globe, it collects the demands of the region and represents it in the world public opinion, in the same way, it collects the developments at the global level and ensures that they are diffused in ASEAN. It allows determining a vision and agenda according to the needs of the region and in the course of world events. This vision and agenda are presented to ASEAN members to be discussed, adopted, and implemented.

Indonesia works to establish relationships and hold workshops within ASEAN in order to bring member countries together. When additional effort is needed, Indonesia applies a shuttle diplomacy approach, sending individual delegations to ASEAN member states to gather ideas, interpret those ideas, and then distribute them back to ASEAN member states. This ultimately leads to decisions being made.

There are no written agreements or binding rules that hold ASEAN member states together. Thus, the only way these states can make decisions as a group and act in harmony and unity is to maintain communication between each other. In this sense, the dissertation argues that the most important reason why ASEAN member states can act together since the establishment of ASEAN is the communication hub role of Indonesia.

Communication hub role encumbers heavy responsibilities on Indonesia. In this sense, it may be asked why Indonesia has adopted this role. In this regard, opinions differ on why Indonesia takes responsibility within ASEAN. However, according to this dissertation, Southeast Asian states, despite all their differences, have to work together for the stability and prosperity of the region. Since the beginning of the Southeast Asian to function as a region, it has been tried to be influenced by civilizations such as India and China. This situation still exists today, with the inclusion of the United States in the equation. Therefore, Southeast Asian states have to work together to protect their sovereignty and ensure the stability and prosperity of the region. Indonesia is the best candidate to hold this team together. After all, strong ASEAN means strong Indonesia.



The way of functioning of the ASEAN Way of regionalism is related to the norms adopted by the ASEAN Way. Within the framework of these norms, it has been maintained with considerable success since 1967. However, it cannot be claimed that this system is ideal or perfect. Firstly, and most importantly, this communication-based consensus through consultation processes between member states is carried out through the leaders and elites of the member states. When these leaders and elites change, previous decisions may be questioned, or new consensus may not be achieved. A government change that may occur in Indonesia, which is the communication hub of the system, is much more critical in this sense. It is always possible that the new leader and his / her team will not reconstruct Indonesia's communication hub role and adopt different paths in their foreign policy. In such a case, disagreements that may arise in various events among ASEAN member states may lead to inability to reach consensus, and ultimately disunity. This may mean questioning the significance of ASEAN.

It is possible to see the government changes in Indonesia and its negative effects on ASEAN unity from time to time. The most recent is experienced during the last President Jokowi period. Although the Jokowi administration does not follow a completely different path from Indonesia's communication hub role, it exhibits a nationalistic tone stemming from domestic politics. This has the potential to have negative consequences for ASEAN's unity. There are studies in this context in the literature. In this sense, in the third chapter of this dissertation, Indonesia's communication hub role will be examined on the basis of leaders and their periods.

#### **1.4. Methodology and Research Design**

The methodological preferences of this dissertation are designed to produce the best possible knowledge considering the addressed research question. In this sense, the following parts are organized as ontological and epistemological assumptions, research strategy, data collection and analysis, and dissertation outline.

##### **1.4.1. Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions**

Designing research on research questions such as “What is the role of Indonesia in ASEAN Way of Regionalism?” and “To what extent the role of Indonesia in the

ASEAN Way of regionalism has changed in the 21st century?” requires adopting specific ontological and epistemological prerequisites. Embracing social constructivist ontology, the dissertation has the assumption that states have foreign policy roles, and these roles are constructed and reconstructed by the values, norms, and principles of policymakers. In this sense, the dissertation adheres to the existence of socially constructed reality unlike objective reality which is independent from the minds of individuals. The states or institutions cannot be considered separately from the people who govern them according to their perceptions constituted by their socio-cultural background. Foreign policy behavior of states is constructed according to how its policymakers perceive themselves and other actors in the international system (Finnemore, 2003). In the sense of this ontological background, the dissertation rejects positivist epistemology since the way of producing information based on quantitative data and hypothesis testing will be insufficient to study a socially constructed reality. Therefore, by adopting interpretive epistemology, the dissertation aims to produce knowledge by taking the ideational backgrounds of the policymakers into account and analyzing the foreign policy behaviors of states.

#### **1.4.2. Research Strategy**

The research questions of the dissertation are both “what” questions. In this sense, the dissertation is basically a descriptive study. However, a highly interpretive approach should be adopted in order to define the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism. This interpretive approach enables us to examine the concepts entailing historical, cultural, social background that make up the ASEAN Way, and the ideational background that triggers the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way. In this sense, adopting an inductive research strategy would be insufficient.

On the other hand, describing Indonesian “role” in the ASEAN Way of regionalism requires the recognition that states have certain foreign policy roles in the international system. In sense, this dissertation takes the national role conception theory as its starting point. However, this dissertation does not aim to test any theory in Indonesia- ASEAN sample or to construct a new theory based on Indonesia-ASEAN sample. In this vein, the dissertation does not adopt the deductive research strategy either. The dissertation intends to make a pure definition of a social reality

constructed by the actors, by commuting between theoretical knowledge and empirical knowledge. This necessitated the adoption of abductive research strategy.

The abductive research strategy, unlike inductive and deductive research strategies, is suitable for the interpretivist style of the dissertation in that it gives the opportunity to examine the meanings, interpretations, motives, and intentions underlying the causes of the actors' behavior (Norman, 2006, pp. 89–92).

### **1.4.3. Data Collection and Analysis**

The dissertation conducts qualitative research in accordance with context-sensitive interpretive analysis. The communication hub role, which is constructed according to expectation derived from ASEAN Way and ideational background of Indonesia, is a socially constructed concept. In this context, a qualitative in-depth analysis will be carried out on Indonesia's ASEAN-based foreign policy cases in order to examine this role.

On the other hand, this dissertation adopts historicism. The historical approach examines where social phenomena originate and how they become their final version through certain processes in time. Historicism adopts the assumption that all human thoughts, cultures, and values are fundamentally historically oriented. In this sense, it is essential to recapture the meanings, events and ideas that existed in the past and to focus on how they shaped the present (Berg & Lune, 2016, p. 305). By focusing on change over time, specific phenomena are tried to be comprehended.

The dissertation denies that the ASEAN Way of regionalism is merely a product of post-colonialism. Instead, it considers the ASEAN Way as an extension of ancient Southeast Asia regional system that was formed through geographical conditions in the historical process. In this sense, the dissertation examines the “ASEAN Way” phenomenon in the historical spectrum under changing conditions. Such a perspective ensures that the ASEAN Way cannot be reduced to being a result of the post-colonial period or the cold war.

The final chapter of the dissertation organized as a case study of South China Sea (SCS) disputes to analyze the communication hub role of Indonesia in ASEAN Way of regionalism. In this regard, SCS disputes can be considered as a fully-fledged case

because of several reasons. First of all, the SCS case is actually one of the most difficult cases for Indonesia to implement its communication hub role as it involves major powers such as China and the USA. This makes the SCS case even more valuable in analyzing Indonesia's communication hub role. As will be seen in the conclusion of this thesis, even though Indonesia is unable to resolve disputes in the SCS case, it is able to keep all actors at the same table, set a vision, and most importantly, ensure the unity of ASEAN member states. This makes the SCS case an important litmus paper for this thesis. Secondly, SCS issue is a situation that affects all ASEAN member states in varying degrees. In this respect, it is literally a regional issue. Thirdly, SCS issue has existed before the establishment of ASEAN to the present day. Thus, it will enable us to analyze the communication hub role of Indonesia from a broad spectrum. Finally, during the administration of all Indonesian leaders, Jakarta has conducted policies in SCS issue. This enables us to examine the differences in the implementation of the communication hub role of Indonesia according to the leader's different foreign policy inclinations.

The dissertation conducts a qualitative content analysis. The main sources of data are gathered from foreign policy statements of the states, letter of agreements, meeting reports, speeches of the policymakers, autobiographies of policymakers and related archive records. The secondary sources are the relevant journal articles, books, media reports and commentaries, published in English and Indonesian, and articles and various web sources.

### **1.5. The Thesis Outline**

The second chapter examines the "structure" of agent-structure relations in the analysis of Indonesia's role in the ASEAN Way of regionalism. The aim of this chapter is while tracing back the generation and evolution of the structure, demonstrate the structural expectation from an agent for the construction of a specific role. In this sense, this chapter examines the Southeast Asia regional system and the ASEAN Way of regionalism historically. The chapter begins with the definition of Southeast Asia as a region and continues with foundations and the historical evolution of Southeast Asia regional system within three main periods: pre-

colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. In the post-colonial period, ASEAN Way of regionalism and its way of functioning are examined.

In the third chapter, the construction and reconstructing of Indonesia's communication hub role through policymakers' speeches and state symbols will be examined, respectively, in the periods of Sukarno, Suharto, the Reformasi Governments, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo. In this background, a number of foreign policy cases will be examined through "maintaining the group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales" which are the three layers of the communication hub role specified in this dissertation. These cases are Corregidor Affair, Cambodia Vietnam Conflict (1978-1992), Myanmar Rohingya Crisis, ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Community Vision, Bali Democracy Forum, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and ASEAN Regional Forum.

The fourth and the final chapter is a case study of South China Sea Issue to examine the communication hub role of Indonesia in ASEAN Way of regionalism. The chapter begins with the overview and the history of SCS issue. In the light of this background, after examining the perceptual differences between China and the claimant states of ASEAN, the dissertation argues Indonesian policies and initiatives on the SCS issue in terms of its communication hub role. In this sense three important initiatives are examined in detail: 1- The Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS Workshops), 2- The Code of Conduct on South China Sea (COC) and 3- Joint Communique failure in 2012.

## CHAPTER 2

### A GENEALOGY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA REGIONAL SYSTEM

The Southeast Asian region can be evaluated differently than other world regions due to its geographical features. The region's fragmented geography leads to high levels of cultural diversity, which in turn leads to intense intra-regional trade interactions. As such, Southeast Asia presents itself as a region despite its cultural diversity.

Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean, in the West, connects the region as far as to Madagascar in Eastern Africa and through the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Middle East; in the East, South China Sea connects the region to Korean Peninsula and Japan and further stretches it out to Americas over the Pacific Ocean (Leinbach, 2022b). There are two main parts of the region: the mainland and the maritime. Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam are located in the mainland which is commonly known as Indochina. The maritime part, in turn, consists of Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei and East Timor. The Malay Peninsula is located between these two parts. The peninsula functions as a passing road and shares ecological similarities with both parts of the region. Malaysia and Singapore are located in Malay Peninsula and considered generally within the territories of both the mainland and the maritime (William H. Frederick, 2018).

The mainland and maritime parts have some differences in their physical environment which leads to the formation of different types of societies and politics. The mainland has long rivers separating the area in the highlands from India and China. These rivers generate fertile river valleys towards the inner-sides of the mainland (Andaya & Andaya, 2018, pp. 1–5). The peoples of the mainland developed a wet-rice cultivation system attuned to the cycle of the prevailing monsoon in these valleys. Consequently, the mainland had witnessed the

establishment of the earliest agrarian kingdoms such as the Mon-Khmer Kingdom of Funan, the Khmer civilization of Angkor, Champa in present-day Vietnam, Pagan in Burma, Ayutthaya in southern Thailand (Tarling, 2001, pp. 10–15). The rivers, at the same time, were the reason for the big coastal cities to emerge in the mainland. Irrawaddy River passes through Myanmar and flows into the sea near Yangon, Chao Phraya near Bangkok, Mekong through Thailand-Cambodia near Ho Chi Minh and finally Red River to Gulf of Tonkin. These coastal areas functioned as the gates of the mainland by providing communication *via* water-borne trade with the rest of Southeast Asia and beyond (Leinbach, 2022b).

The maritime, in turn, consists of numerous islands such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, Java or Luzon among the biggest ones and many other smaller ones. The maritime part has shallow oceans between the islands in addition to a few trenches (Andaya, 2017). As it is in the mainland, wet-rice farming was also one of the main sources of life in the maritime. However, because of the fragmented and island-based geography of the maritime; peoples of that area, mostly in the coastal cities, dealt with fishing and water-borne trade. Since the water was a more energy efficient way of transportation than the land, the peoples of the maritime generally settled in coastal sites, confluences, or estuaries. In Malay, Indonesian, and Philippine archipelagos, between 95-100 percent of the total population live 100 km close to coastal areas (Andaya, 2017). As a result of living in coastal areas and dealing with water-borne trade, the peoples of the maritime had developed different types of polities. Miksic argues that during the first millennium BCE, the hierarchies of settlements had emerged in the mainland, however similar differentiation were absent in the maritime at least for another thousand years. Miksic further emphasizes, in the maritime, since the people enjoy a high level of maritime skills causing from geographical features, they were mobile and had no need for living in big communities (Miksic, 1990). The biggest kingdoms of the maritime (generally known as thalassocracies), unlike the ones in the mainland, had characteristics to be open to external influences and they were cosmopolitan by nature. Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom, and Malacca Sultanate are examples of these polities (Gaynor, 2014).

Rather than the physical differences between the mainland and the maritime, the “hill and valley” based dualism was another reason which causes diversity in Southeast Asia. While the rugged terrains and hills were hosting small chiefdoms and tribes, the great kingdoms were established in the river valleys and estuaries. The hill people (high landers) mainly practiced dry rice farming, lived in less permanent settlements, had local/tribal political organization, and generally adhered to animistic religious practices. On the other hand, the valley people (low landers) generally dealt with wet rice farming and lived in permanent towns and villages, had a state type of political organizations, and adhere to Hinduism, Buddhism and later Islam (Winzeler, 2011, p. 7). Since the high landers lived in considerably isolated areas, they were able to preserve their way of life, languages, and their indigenous religions. In turn, low landers were in constant interaction with the intra and extra-regional actors mainly because of being trade focused. Therefore, low landers were culturally tolerant and more open for external influences and change *vis a vis* high landers (Winzeler, 2011, p. 7). The interaction between the high landers and the low landers was generally conducted through commerce or a wax and wane type of conflicts (Ismail et al., 2009, p. 2).

Finally, the location of the whole region is decisive for diversity. Because of the territorial proximity to Indian and Chinese civilizations and being on the world-wide trade routes, Southeast Asia had been exposed to external influences primarily of Indian and Chinese, then Arabic, Western European and finally American (Meilink-Roelofs, 1964; Mishra, 2021; Stuart-Fox, 2004). In all this sense, the peoples of the region share a huge diversity in many aspects. Just to mention linguistics difference, the region alone constitutes %17 of the world’s languages today (Fuller et al., 2002). The mainland encompasses three major ethno-linguistic groups and the maritime has distinct Austronesian languages. Furthermore, only in Indonesia there are approximately 300 ethnic groups with over 250 distinct languages. All these languages accompany distinct ethnicities. In addition, the region embraces Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Animism, and others apart from the sectarian differences (Mohamad, 2022).

Although it has a great deal of cultural diversity, Southeast Asia is generally considered to be one region because of the inter-state interactions pattern that was



present in the pre-colonial era. This pattern is guided by the regional system that exists because of the geography of the area. The Southeast Asian regional system can be broken down into three periods: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial.

### **2.1. The Pre-Colonial Period: Southeast Asia Regional System**

The Southeast Asian regional system is a communication system that consists of inter-state interaction patterns stemming from the geography of Southeast Asia. The foundation of this system is water-borne trade relations and the exchange of information, values and ideas that results from these trade relations. Although the system is based on commercial relations, social and cultural interaction, and political influence have also been achieved through this channel. In one-way, commercial relations and social-cultural interactions have been intertwined. The Southeast Asian regional system consists of a center and other parts that make up the region. The center acts as a communication hub, allowing all parts to interact with each other. After mutual information is obtained through interactions, it is transferred from the center to the periphery and localized. As a result, although the parties forming the region differ from each other in terms of culture, they act as parts of the same system operating economically and politically.

The Straits of Malacca, situated in a central position within the Southeast Asian regional system, is extremely important. The Straits of Malacca has been the shortest route for east-west sea trade (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005, p. 1). Additionally, when taking into consideration the monsoon winds and their direction and timing, the Straits of Malacca also serve as an ideal waiting port for voyagers traveling along the sea route (Sutherland, 2007, p. 29; Vann, 2014, pp. 21–25). The geography of this region has had a significant impact on the development of the Southeast Asian regional system. The fragmented geography and the monsoon winds, which played a key role in the pre-colonial trade relations of this region, have been central to the evolution of this system (Tong, 2010).

The regional system of Southeast Asia has been the main factor in the spread of political, economic, and socio-cultural influence in the region. However, for the system to work properly, the central powers must perform its functions well. Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom and Malacca Sultanate were the central

powers of the Southeast Asia regional system. Through these powers, the mandala system, the tribute system, and finally Islam had an impact on the region during the pre-colonial period.

### **2.1.1. Pre-Colonial Influences: Mandala, Tribute, and Islam**

In the pre-colonial period, Southeast Asia generally is argued through the politic, economic, and cultural influences flow into the region from several fronts such as India, China and later the Middle East. The region is tended to be considered as an extension of these three fronts, thus not a unique region with a unique regional system. Therefore, from time to time, the inter-state relations of Southeast Asia are argued through Indian *mandala* system, Chinese *chaogong tizhi* (tribute system) or part of Islamic World (Lee, 2002; Manggala, 2013a; Zhang, 2012).

The region, with no doubt, has been influenced by India and China since it has been located between them and function as an interconnector considering sea-passages. Therefore, many reaches to the conclusion that the region is the background of India and China in the pre-colonial era, thus not a region of its own right (Acharya, 2001). However, the region has the power of localizing the external influence. Besides, one should understand the motive behind this immense influence. Southeast Asian ruling elites always favored trade benefits and seek close relationships with the neighboring areas. To benefit from the new markets, the ruling elites were eager to adopt foreign cultures and systems (Lockard, 2009).

The importance of India and China to the Southeast Asian regional system is nothing to be ignored. The geographical proximity causes inevitable contact between these entities. The influence and constant contact with India and China are essential for the very existence of the region. Both civilizations cause a balance in Southeast Asia. Once one of these civilizations in turmoil, the other one becomes more influential in the region. For example, after the fall of Han Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD) until the rise of Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD), Chinese influence was limited to Southeast Asia. This was a time of growth for Indianized kingdoms in the region (Lockard, 2009, pp. 34–52; Tong, 2010).

Firstly, Indian influence was prevailing in the region. As a result, the region witnessed many Indianized kingdoms during the first 800 years AD. Religious influence results in adopting religion based political system; the *mandala*. While the mandala system organized inter-state relations within the region, at the same time attract Hindu and Buddhist traders to the region. Secondly, Chinese influence prevailed in the region which was generally political rather than religious. The ruling elites of Southeast Asian region paid tributes to China, to benefit from huge trade gains from Chinese market. Finally, the adoption of Islam in the region basically was for tapping into Arab market which was increasing at the time.

The mandala system is basically a value-driven hierarchy. The system works as concentric sacred circles which governed by the cosmic power. The central power; *Vijigisu*, friends; *Mitra*, enemies; *Ari*. The classification of the powers as such; the medium powers; *Madhyama* and the major powers; the *Udasina*. The universal emperor who is the leader of the *Vijigisu* is the *Chakravartin*. The leaders at the central powers, enjoy a holy legitimacy and therefore the loyalty of the *Mitra* in the system. The dependent powers pay tributes to the central power for symbolizing loyalty to the central power and the mission of sending supportive troops when called upon. In turn, the dependent powers earn recognition by the central power and an access to commercial network (Manggala, 2013b, p. 7).

The system works on the basic principle that advises “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Therefore, in the mandala system, the central power aims to gain as many friends as possible to provide stability and security to the system. Moreover, to remain at the center, *Vijigisu* needs to maintain its cooperation with allies through constant diplomatic contacts. These contacts provide a flow of intelligence to the center (Muljana, 1976, pp. 144–146). As Wolters argues the greatest ruler of the mandalas gathers intelligence from the mandala fringes to foresee the threats and be aware of the wider trade developments. In addition to diplomatic contacts, the ruler conducts personal relationships with the leaders and ruling elites of the other powers in the system in order to prevent disharmony among the group and further develop collective initiatives. The central power in return defends the system towards the enemies and try to establish good relations with great power in the surrounding areas such as Chinese and Indian kingdoms (Wolters, 1999, pp. 28–29).

The Chinese tribute system, known as *chaogong tizhi*, dates back to Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE). The system was prominent and stable nearly two millennia and terminated with the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 right after the Opium War in 1840 (Kang, 2007). The loss of the Opium Wars resulted in the alteration of the system in the favor of Western international rules (Gunn, 2011; Hamashita, 2003).

Similar to the mandala system, the tribute system is a value-driven hierarchy in which China resides at the political and spiritual center of the whole lands under the *tianxia* (heaven). The role of the Chinese Emperor is to provide harmony and order of the system (Hamashita, 2003). The area that the system covers, stretches from Japan and Korea, including most of the mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, to the western corner of Sumatra and Java.

The system works basically as a center periphery mechanism (Zhang, 2012). The diplomatic relations between the center and the periphery are conducted through exchange of gifts and tributes. The tributes presented to the Chinese emperor generally have symbolic meaning and low in value. The tribute symbolizes the recognition of China as the middle kingdom and superior. In turn, Chinese emperor gives gifts high in value and recognize the related power as his vassal state. This recognition provides privileges of improving trade relations with China by entering the Chinese market (Hamashita, 2003).

Shu argues the tribute system offers three crucial mechanisms for explaining pre-colonial interstate relations: imperial recognition, tributary trade, and external arbitration and protection (Shu, 2011). Southeast Asian powers by recognizing China as superior and the center was gaining political legitimacy, meet their commercial interests, and seeking China's arbitration and protection in intra-regional disputes. Shu takes a middle way and suggest that the Southeast Asia internally was a mandala system yet externally was an extension of Chinese tributary system. In other words, the inter-state relation was an anarchy within hierarchy (Shu, 2011).

Kang by arguing Chinese tribute system, suggests that the pre-colonial East Asian system was a hierarchy rather than anarchy, which is as well a rather peaceful one. The China at the center was providing political and economic stability to the regional system, resulting in prosperity (Kang, 2010).

However, it should be well examined that whether China was ruling the Southeast Asian regional system in the pre-colonial era. While Chinese influence and dominance is well known in Vietnam, it is also known the resistance of Vietnam towards China (Duiker, 2022). In the history of the region, there is not a certainty that the China had the political dominance over Southeast Asia. The tribute relations were symbolic and important to enter Chinese market. The tribute paid to the Chinese emperor was rather small than the Southeast Asian tributaries received in return. Rather than politics, Chinese dominance was economic to the region and reciprocally beneficial. For China to trade its goods over land routes were always dangerous since the central Asian powers' raids were common. Maritime routes passing through the Straits were considerably safer and easier to reach the Middle Eastern and European markets (Gunn, 2011; Hamashita, 2003; Zhang, 2012).

While in terms of political governance there are differences between the Indian mandala and the Chinese tribute, in the sense of depending on similar moral values, they resemble one another. Both systems are governed by a divine power above all and by its representative in the earth.

Another pre-colonial influence on the Southeast Asia came from the Middle East. The first relations between Islam and Southeast Asia are exactly not known. However, one of the theories suggest that the Islam has been carried to the China and India first, then affected Southeast Asia by Muslim traders. There are records suggest that Muslim traders sailed to Chinese trading ports and establish Muslim communities by marrying locals especially in Zaitun and Canton. These Muslim communities had established links between Vietnam, Borneo and the southern Philippines and the Javanese port cities by trade relations. These incidents generally regarded as the first phase of spreading Islam to Southeast Asia (Lee, 2002).

These Muslim colonies in the Chinese ports enjoyed privileges from erstwhile Chinese emperor to practice their Islamic law. The reason behind this could be Chinese thinking of gaining economic benefits from the Muslims traders (*Fan Feng*) who was wealthy and had great sea-borne trade abilities and sailing technologies. According to the records, the total population of the Muslims reside in Canton, Zaitun and Hang-chou reaches over 100.000 in the first millennium (Lee, 2002).

However, in 878 a great massacre of Muslims in Canton initiated by a Chinese rebel leader Huang Ch'ao caused collective migration of the Muslims to Kalah (Kedah or Klang) in the western cost of Malay Peninsula. The Muslims established trading ports near Palembang, Borneo, and Sulu. Therefore, the places such as Champa and Leran are begun to be known to Muslim traders (Majul, 1976, p. 2).

In the late 13<sup>th</sup> century, the first Islamic polity in the Southeast Asia establish in the northern tip of Sumatra known as Samudra- Pasai which also known as the gateway to holly Mecca. In the following years, Hindu-Buddhist rulers of especially coastal areas of Indo-Malay world become interested in Islam to attract Muslim traders. The chiefs of Trengganu and Patane converted to Islam (Majul, 1976, p. 2). In this period the reach of Islam and influence in the world was immense and Muslim traders' abilities in water-borne trade made them so important for the world trade from Spain and Morocco to China and Philippines (Lockard, 2009, p. 65).

However, the all-out spread of Islam to Southeast Asia originated from the Straits of Malacca (Hazmi, 2012; Tarling, 1992). As it is argued above, Islam had already begun to influence Southeast Asia. The Malacca Straits was not an exception. Arab traders were in common sight in the Malacca Straits who loads their goods in important entrepots in the Middle East such as Muslat and by catching the monsoon and go to India, Ceylon and through Malacca Straits to China (Lee, 2002, p. 60). Yet, the systematic spread of the religion to Southeast Asia begins with the conversion of Malacca Kingdom to Islam (Lee, 2002). The sultan by marrying a princess from Pasai gathered more power. Eventually the Malacca Sultanate because of having the Malacca Straits which provides a huge commercial advantage became the favored entrepot for the Muslim traders in general. In this period the activities and frequency of Muslim traders were immense. In a way, the decision of the Sultan to embrace Islam and let the conversion of its people to Islam was a logical choice. Malacca, soon after became a center of Islamic teaching and studies as well, just like it was once the center for Hindu and Buddhist teachings. Later, the Muslim clerics of Malacca mostly Arabic origin sailed to Java and rest of Southeast Asia (mostly coastal areas because the main aim was trade) to spread Islam. The reasons behind the Malacca Sultan to choose Islam is mostly based on trade benefits and about to

align itself with erstwhile huge powers such as Mamluks, then Ottomans and more importantly Mughals (Majul, 1976).

The mandala system, tribute system, and Islam played significant roles in shaping pre-colonial interactions within and beyond Southeast Asia. However, the spread of these influences was largely due to the region's geography, specifically the location of Straits of Malacca. Since the Straits located along the major trade routes, the region was particularly susceptible to outside impact of especial form India and China, later from the Middle East. The Straits of Malacca have been controlled by the powers that have been at the center of the Southeast Asia regional system. In the pre-colonial period, the powers that have been at the center of the regional system were the Srivijaya Empire, the Majapahit Kingdom, and the Malacca Sultanate respectively.

### **2.1.2. The Hubs of the System: Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom and Malacca Sultanate**

Although the Southeast Asia regional system had existed long before, it became a formal mechanism with the rise of the Srivijaya Empire. There are two primary reasons for the rise of Srivijaya and its emergence as the "hub" of the Southeast Asian regional system. First and most importantly, Srivijaya held control of the Straits of Malacca, giving them a significant geostrategic advantage. Secondly, Srivijaya maintained good relations with both India and China.

Srivijaya Empire did not control the same kind of land as the fertile inner lands of Java Island. Srivijaya was a thalassocracy with its center in Palembang. Most of its land was in coastal areas. Therefore, the people living under the Srivijaya Empire were mostly merchants, rather than farmers. The people living in the inland areas would transport their goods via rivers, like the Musi River and Batang Hari River, to the coast, and from there they would trade with the other coastal cities and sell their goods to the rest of the world (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005).

People who have lived on the coast have been directly involved in trade. Srivijaya's possession of the Straits of Malacca and its location at one of the most important east-west trade routes has made it possible for Srivijaya to earn great commercial

revenues and enable its people to live in prosperity. With The Straits of Malacca becoming a safe trading hub under Srivijaya's rule, Srivijaya's port cities have attracted many traders from both the Southeast Asian region and the world to visit Srivijaya and spend time in Srivijaya's port cities (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005).

Another reason for Srivijaya's rise is that Srivijaya was religiously influenced by India and became a center for religions originating in India, especially Hinduism and Buddhism. This was mainly because the Straits was one of the ports of call for pilgrims on their journey from China to India. The arrival of pilgrims in the Straits of Malacca not only increased commercial revenues but also made Srivijaya a respected empire in the eyes of peoples who shared similar beliefs. Srivijaya is also the center of Southeast Asian mandalas. In this respect, the Srivijaya king is seen and respected as the representative of cosmic power (Dellios & Ferguson, 2005).

Srivijaya's rise to power was greatly influenced by the economic and political partnership developed with China, in addition to religious factors. When China was reunified under the Tang Dynasty, they became interested in finding an alternative to the Silk Road and began to focus on the Straits of Malacca as a maritime route. In this context, they improved their relationship with Srivijaya. Srivijaya had tributary relations with China, which gave them economic and political advantages granted by China. This made Srivijaya the center of trade between China in the east, and India, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe in the west (Chu & Liu, 1994; Tong, 2010).

Srivijaya Empire made the Straits of Malacca a religious, economic, and political center during its reign. Many people from both within and outside of the empire visited and settled in the Straits. The empire's language, Bahasa Melayu, became a lingua franca particularly in the Straits and other coastal cities in the region. The Srivijaya Empire was destroyed by the Chola kingdom, a Hindu empire, in 1205 (Wolters, 1999, p. 32).

The Majapahit Kingdom, one of the largest kingdoms in Southeast Asian history, existed from 1293 to 1527. Unlike the Srivijaya Empire, the Majapahit Kingdom was centered in Java. However, because it controlled the Straits of Malacca, it served as the hub of the Southeast Asia regional system. The Majapahit Kingdom continued



the mandala and tribute systems that existed during the Srivijaya period (Muljana, 1976).

We don't have a lot of information about the Majapahit Kingdom. One of the most important sources we have for Majapahit history is the Nagarakrtagama poem, written by Prapanca in 1365 (Pigeaud, 1963). The Majapahit Empire was not only the center of the mandala but also one of the leading maritime powers because of the tributary relations it developed with China. As a result of the tributes it paid to China, it was able to benefit from the commercial privileges granted by China (Peng Er & Teo, 2012). Majapahit had 98 tributary states under its control, stretching from Sumatra to New Guinea. In this sense, it can be said that tributary relations were a kind of hierarchical order during this period (Sardesai, 2010).

The golden age of Majapahit was during the reign of Hayam Wuruk and Prime Minister Gadjah Mada. Almost all of present-day Indonesia was conquered and ruled during this period, and these lands were called Nusantara (Sardesai, 2010). The contribution of Majapahit Kingdom to the Southeast Asian regional system was the integration of Javanese philosophy into the system. The concepts of harmony and unity, which are part of Javanese philosophy, are still used today by both Indonesia and ASEAN (Hall, 2001).

The collapse of the Majapahit Kingdom was mainly attributed to two reasons. These can be listed as internal and external reasons. Especially with the end of the Hayam Wuruk and Gadjah Mada period, Majapahit was mismanaged, and internal disturbances emerged within the kingdom (Noorduyn, 1978). On the other hand, the rise of the Malacca Sultanate, the entry of Islam into the region, and the active participation of Muslims in maritime trade also accelerated the decline of Majapahit. Majapahit no longer held the same value in China's eyes, which led to China communicating with other powers in Southeast Asia instead of going through Majapahit. As a result of all these factors, Majapahit collapsed, and the Malacca Sultanate became the leading power in the region before the colonial period (Noorduyn, 1978).

Although the Malacca Sultanate continued the tribute system politically, it accepted Islam religiously. After the collapse of the Majapahit Empire, the Malacca Sultanate

dominated the Straits of Malacca and allowed China to use it as a naval base. There are also records of Malacca paying tribute to China. (Lockard, 2009, p. 47).

The Malacca Sultanate's adoption of Islam had a great impact on the Muslim traders who visited the area. The Malacca Sultanate accepted Islam in order to attract more traders from the Islamic world to the Straits. The king of Malacca, Paramesvara, married a Muslim princess and took the title of Sultan by changing his name to Iskandar Shah (Majul, 1976).

After the Malacca Sultanate accepted Islam, many kingdoms affiliated with Malacca in Southeast Asia also began to convert to Islam, especially the coastal people who were interested in trade. In this way, the process of Southeast Asia becoming a part of the Islamic world began. (Lockard, 2009, p. 71). Although the people of the region have adopted Islam, other belief systems that have existed for many years have not vanished. Due to the high level of localization in Southeast Asia, Islam has mixed with local beliefs. Therefore, it cannot be said that Hinduism, Buddhism, and animist beliefs have suddenly disappeared (Laffan, n.d.).

The population of the Straits increased during the Malacca Sultanate period. During this time, many foreigners came to the Straits from the Islamic world and settled there. The Bahasa Melayu language of the Malacca Sultanate spread even further throughout the region during this period (Lockard, 2009, pp. 68–69). The Bahasa Melayu borrowed many Arabic words from the Arab traders who dominated the region at that time. Many of the Arabic words in Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia today can be traced back to this period (Lieberman, 1993).

The Malacca Sultanate's loss of power led to the colonization of Southeast Asia by the West. The regional system in Southeast Asia, which functioned under the mandala system, tribute system, and later Islam, was changed in favor of the colonizers with the arrival of colonialism.

### **2.3. The Colonial Period: The Impact of Western Powers to Southeast Asia Regional System**

In pre-colonial times, the Southeast Asia regional system was primarily a communication system centered around the Straits of Malacca. The Srivijaya,

Majapahit and Malacca powers that controlled the Straits occupied a central position in the system and, as a result, were able to spread the influence of the mandala system, tribute system and Islam throughout the region.

This system was based on water-borne trade relations. This system lasted for approximately 800 years until the Straits of Malacca were taken over by Western colonial powers. The control of the Straits passed from the hands of the Portuguese to the Dutch, and then to the British. The Spaniards and the French also had a significant presence in Southeast Asia, although they never directly controlled the Straits. They held colonies in important parts of the regional system, such as the Philippines and Indochina.

In 1511, the Portuguese seized the Straits of Malacca, after which the Southeast Asia regional system began to gradually disappear. This gradual disappearance was directly related to two main policies adopted by the Portuguese: First, to monopolize the Spice trade in Maluku; and second, to try to eliminate Islam's influence, especially in the Straits region (Lockard, 2009; Nawani, 2013).

The Portuguese took complete control of the Spice trade by monopolizing the sea route to Europe from the region, which resulted in a decline of influence and earnings for local traders who did business there. This also caused a decrease of local interaction within the region, harming the water-borne trade relations and communication network that formed the foundation of the Southeast Asian regional system. The Portuguese also tried to eliminate Islam's influence in the Straits of Malacca. They prevented the local people from practicing Islam and tried to convert them to Roman Catholicism. Therefore, Muslim traders sought to find alternative routes that bypassed the Straits of Malacca (Lockard, 2009; Nawani, 2013).

Portuguese activities in the region ultimately led to the collapse of the mandala system, tribute system, and Islamic relations, leaving Southeast Asia in a state of chaos. As a result, the Southeast Asia regional system gradually collapsed. Previously, the voyagers coming from all over the world such as pilgrims, traders, and envoys began to change their routes as Portugal's grip on the region tightened. The Straits of Malacca's importance has diminished over time, which has resulted in the Southeast Asia regional system not functioning as it should. This is due to the

Portugal's lack of knowledge about the area and poor administration strategies (Lockard, 2009; Sardesai, 1969).

After the Portuguese, the Dutch gained control of the Straits of Malacca in 1641. Unlike the Portuguese, however, the Dutch tried to revive Malacca's lost commercial potential but were unsuccessful and instead began to build a port city today known as Jakarta (formerly Batavia). While sea trade was not as profitable for them, the Dutch took an interest in agriculture on the island of Java and were able to make significant profits from coffee production and trade (Lockard, 2009, p. 85; Majul, 1976, p. 8).

The Dutch have used the cultivation system to grow coffee, sugar, and rice in Java, among other products. The cultivation system relied on the principle of employing the local population to work the land in exchange for money. The resulting crops were then collected and sold in a market that extended all the way to Europe (Lockard, 2009, p. 93). The Dutch weren't content to just rule the Straits of Malacca and the surrounding areas. They also pursued a policy of expansionism, forming temporary alliances with local rulers and fighting other kingdoms. As a result of this policy, they came to control almost all of present-day Indonesia (de Jong, 2013).

The Dutch also pursued a transmigration policy in order to change the demographics of the people living in the areas they ruled. The main idea behind transmigration was to relocate people from densely populated areas like Java to other less populated regions and then establish cultivation systems in these new settlements. Therefore, the Dutch could also generate agricultural revenue from other areas over which they ruled (Nugroho, 2013, p. 5).

On the other hand, the people living under Dutch rule are very different from each other culturally, so it is also difficult to govern them together. The Dutch also aimed to create a homogeneous society with transmigration (Hardjono, 1977) The Dutch colonial policies were not aimed at reviving the Southeast Asia regional system. The Dutch adopted strategies to make it easier to govern the region and to generate maximum profits.

The British began to shape their policies in the Straits of Malacca in 1824 as a result of the agreement they made with the Dutch. With this agreement, the two colonial

powers decided not to conflict over the Straits. According to the agreement, the British took control of the mainland part of the Straits while the maritime part remained under Dutch control. In this way, the Straits of Malacca were formally divided into two (Harrison, 1966).

The British, unlike previous colonists, encouraged merchants from different geographical areas to be present in the Straits of Malacca. During this period, especially in the port of Singapore, there were Malay, Chinese, and Indian merchants. To some extent, the current demographic structure of Singapore and Malaysia can be considered a product of British colonialism. The British also governed several local kingdoms under its rule. Although these kingdoms have autonomous governance, they were dependent on the British for their external affairs. This type of governance allowed the British to control the region more easily (Lockard, 2009, p. 100).

The importance of the Straits of Malacca began to increase under the British colonial administration. The British had 3 port cities constructed in the Straits which are called as the Strait settlements. These were, in order: Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824). These port cities became very important after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 since they were located on the shortest route between East and West for maritime trade (Bogaars, 1955). Through these port cities, the British became the monopoly that transported commodities to Europe through its colonies.

While the British administration in the Straits of Malacca appears to have returned to its former glory days, this time extra-regional Powers have started to benefit from the wealth of the region. The British have been present in the region almost until the formation of nation-states in Southeast Asia. The Spanish and French were some of the other Western powers that were effective in colonizing Southeast Asia, but their effects on Southeast Asia's regional system were not very significant.

The Spanish had a great deal of power and authority in the Philippines. They conquered and colonized many of the islands, but they were never able to take complete control of the southern Philippines. That area was mostly populated by Muslims, who the Spanish called Moros (Makol-Abdul, 2007). The Spanish culture

was forced upon the Philippines, which changed many aspects of Filipino society. For example, before the Spanish arrived, women held high positions in society. However, the Spanish arrival and subsequent imposition of Roman Catholic values led to a deterioration of women's importance in society. Female priestesses were replaced by male Roman Catholic priests, which was a significant change for animism in the Philippines (Lockard, 2009, p. 83).

The Spanish influence never reached beyond the islands of the Philippines because of the marginal position of the Philippines in the system. A system-altering change that occurred under Spanish rule was in 1571 when, for the first time in history, the Spanish made Manila a port for Asia-America trade. Some believe this to be the first global trade route (Ruescas & Wrana, 2009). The ships called Manila Galleons were packed with Chinese silk, porcelain, and other agricultural items from Manila destined for Mexico. There, the goods would be distributed to Spanish colonies in the Americas and Europe. These galleons would then make the return voyage to Manila laden with European wares, mail, personnel, and silver to pay for the Asian goods. Though this trade route was used more effectively than ever before, it never became part of the Southeast Asia regional system of customary trade routes (Lockard, 2009).

The French were trying to increase their influence in mainland Southeast Asia. The French want to convert the Siamese King into Roman Catholicism. The Siamese monarch sent a letter back to the French king, arguing that God does not prefer religious uniformity but in theological diversities, preferring to be honored by different worships and ceremonies. By sending this letter, the Siamese King was showing his desire for religious freedom and tolerance. The French had intentions to be successful in Vietnam by replacing the Confucian influence with French influence. In order to do this, the French created a Romanized Vietnamese alphabet. Their conquest of Vietnam began in 1858, however it took three decades of battling and Vietnamese resistance before they were successful (Lockard, 2009, pp. 90–93). Although the French had a presence in Indochina, they never expanded to the Straits of Malacca, which was the center of the Southeast Asia regional system.

The Portuguese disrupted the tradition of interaction when they colonized the Straits of Malacca. The Dutch attempted to revive this system when they arrived, but they were unsuccessful. However, they did manage to change the economic and demographic structure of maritime Southeast Asia through strategies like cultivation and transmigration. The British had a much bigger impact on the regional system when they arrived, and their influence led to the system being revived. However, this revival benefited the colonial powers more than the people of the region. Although it may not seem like it at first, Spanish and French have had a direct impact on the Southeast Asia regional system by leaving behind a colonial legacy in constituent parts of the region like the Philippines and Indochina (Lockard, 2009).

Western colonialism disrupted Southeast Asian political and economic systems dramatically. The economic and political center of the region moved from the Golden Age empires of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca to the Western colonial powers. The colonial period caused the Southeast Asia regional system to collapse because the channels of interaction were cut off.

#### **2.4. The Post-Colonial Period: ASEAN Way of Regionalism**

By the 20th century, it was observed that the nation state system had spread throughout the world as a result of Western colonialism. While the concept of the nation state was not new to Western countries, the process of transitioning to a nation state was fraught with challenges in colonized regions of the world. One of the most significant reasons for this is that these nation states were established as entities in which people of many different cultures would have to live together, rather than having a homogeneous cultural background. When these nation states were formed, they often had a variety of cultural differences. Many nation-states are currently facing many problems such as ethnic conflict, religious discrimination, and poverty (Ayoob, 1995, p. 5). On the other hand, the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War created new challenges for these newly established nation-states. Already sensitive to outside intervention due to their colonial history, the Cold War created an atmosphere of insecurity for these nation-states.

In the 20th century, there were many examples of regionalism arising from different backgrounds. Some of these were security-based regionalisms, while others were

economic-based regionalisms aiming to create cooperative relationships. Examples of these regionalisms include the Arab League, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Organization of African Unity, and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was also established in this context.

SEATO was founded in 1954 with the signing of the Manila pact. SEATO has two main objectives. The first is to provide economic assistance and support to Southeast Asian states in internal disputes. The second is to prevent the spread of Communism from Indochina to Southeast Asia. Although this regionalism was established under the conditions of the time, it lost its effect by the late 1970s and disintegrated. (Buszynski, 1981, p. 287). SEATO Southeast Asia is not a regionalism initiated by the states of the region. It is rather a product of US presence in the region. In this context, the first regionalization initiatives in the region are the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO. ASA was established in 1961 by Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. However, it was dissolved due to the sovereignty dispute over Sabah region between Malaysia and Philippines (Keling et al., 2011, p. 171). MAPHILINDO was founded in 1963 by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This time, however, disagreements have arisen between Malaysia and Indonesia over the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysian Federation, causing the organization to break up (Anwar, 1997, p. 20).

ASEAN's establishment was possible during the Suharto administration in Indonesia. The Suharto administration had previously tried to improve Indonesia's image in order to reduce tension and establish a cooperative environment between Indonesia and other countries in the region. As a result, the establishment of ASEAN became possible (Putra, 2015, p. 190).

ASEAN has a unique *modus operandi* compared to other regionalisms established in other regions. Later to be known as the "ASEAN Way", this approach foresees the achievement of consensus among ASEAN member states in decision-making processes. The way for member states to reach consensus is through bilateral and multilateral consultations with each other. The most sensitive issue for member states throughout all of these processes is non-interference in domestic affairs, that is, not



meddling in each other's internal affairs. The organizational structure of ASEAN was designed against this background.

From the Bangkok Declaration (1967) to the Bali Conference (1976), ASEAN did not have a proper organizational structure. During this period, multilateral negotiations among ASEAN member states took place at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). Decisions taken by the Ad-hoc and permanent committees under the supervision of the Standing Committee were forwarded to the AMM where they were finalized (Feraru, 2016). AMM is ASEAN's top-level meeting which is held annually in one of the member states. The structure was elaborated at the 1976 Bali conference where 5 committees were established. These are the ASEAN Head of States Meeting, ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, ASEAN Economic Ministers Meetings, ASEAN other Ministers Meeting and ASEAN Secretariats (Keling et al., 2011, pp. 172–173).

In 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted, which once again changed the organizational structure of ASEAN. With the efforts of Indonesia, the following structures were added to the ASEAN organizational scheme: ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC), three ASEAN Community Councils, thirty-seven ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies; the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR); an ASEAN Regional Human Rights Body (established in 2009 as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights, AICHR); the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat; ASEAN National Secretariats; and the ASEAN Foundation (Feraru, 2016).

However, within this new structure, almost all meetings and committees other than the ASEAN Summit and the AMM can be considered as meetings where more consensus through consultation processes is carried out among ASEAN member states in accordance with the ASEAN Way structure. The decisions taken in these meetings are conveyed to the ASEAN Summit or the AMM for discussion and decision-making (Feraru, 2016).

ASEAN decision-making processes are mostly rooted in the pre-colonial traditions of the Southeast Asian region. Particularly during the Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca periods, the concepts of *mufakat* (consensus) and *musyawarah*

(consultation) were present in the decision-making processes of the local kingdoms or the kingdom to which they paid a central mandala or tribute. In this context, a series of formal and informal meetings are held before final decisions are taken. ASEAN's decision-making mechanism is built in accordance with this pre-colonial structure within the ASEAN Way (Kim & Lee, 2011). An example of an informal meeting in this context is the Senior Officials Meeting.

SOM was gathered in 1975 Singapore for the first time (First ASEAN Pre-Summit Senior Officials' Meeting, Singapore, 15-17 September 1975, 1975). 1990s saw the rise of SOM (Senior Officials' Meeting) as the key platform for discussing regional matters. What made SOM attractive was that it was out of ASEAN frameworks, meaning that the highly sensitive issues could be discussed without disturbing any local audiences. The meetings were not transparent and thus did not put any leader's domestic credibility at risk (Antolik, 1990). ASEAN's decision-making processes are similar to those of pre-colonial times, with the elite class on top of the system. In pre-colonial times, information was gathered by traders, pilgrims, and envoys. Today, this duty is taken in a more systematic way by senior bureaucrats. Then, interaction mostly occurred in the Malacca Straits because of the Monsoon waiting; today, it is determined by scheduled meeting programs.

## **2.5. Chapter Conclusion**

Southeast Asia has always had a "hub" that is responsible for the communication of the region. This centrality is usually geographic, as seen in the history when the geostrategic position of the Straits of Malacca granted power to those who controlled it. The Straits have been a strategically important waterway for centuries, and it played a key role in the region's history. With its location at the crossroads of maritime trade routes between India and China, the Straits were a conduit for the flow of people, ideas, and goods into Southeast Asia. After centuries of colonialism, many things have changed in the region and the system was interrupted. However, with the formation of ASEAN and its following success in a way Southeast Asia regional system has been revived.

ASEAN was established in 1967 by five countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Although ASEAN has been criticized by some for a

lack of institutionalized structure and binding rules, it has been successful in creating a sense of community and economic cooperation among its members (Simon, 2008). Despite criticisms, ASEAN has made progress and diversified its interests from economics to security, promotion of democracy, and conflict mediation. This immediate success was governed by a unique modus operandi which is inherited from the ancient Southeast Asia regional system.

The Straits of Malacca was historically important as a way for the central powers to coordinate the communication in Southeast Asia. Although the Straits no longer holds the same importance it once did, with today's technology, people no longer have to wait for the monsoon winds to sail. There is no mandala system or tribute system. Even though the Straits are not as important as they used to be, the existence of ASEAN and its structures provide a similar platform for Southeast Asian states to communicate with each other.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE COMMUNICATION HUB: THE ROLE OF INDONESIA

In this chapter, the dissertation aims to demonstrate how Indonesia constructs the communication hub role in light of the demand of ASEAN Way of regionalism which has developed as the successor of ancient Southeast Asia regional system. As ASEAN Way inherits its principles from Southeast Asia regional system such as consensus through consultation and informality, Indonesia constructs its foreign policy role over the legacies of former hubs of Southeast Asia regional system; Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca.

This chapter firstly argues *Tanah Air*, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, *Pancasila* and *Nusantara* as the concepts accepted by modern Indonesia's state, then it focuses on Indonesian leaders references to Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca through leaders' speeches from archives, media reports and autobiographies. Then the communication hub role is examined through its three main layers: maintaining the group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales over a series of selected foreign policy cases.

#### **3.1. The Concepts of Indonesian Ideational Background**

The construction of Indonesia as a nation state is based on the nationalist youth movements in the country's founding phase. In order to build a nation, the leading young leaders got inspired by Indonesia's pre-colonial legacy especially inherited from Srivijaya and Majapahit periods (Jones, 2013). There are some important symbols and concepts that were inherited from the past during the establishment of Indonesia. Indonesian leaders have built the modern Indonesia over these symbols and concepts.

The generally accepted view among the youth nationalism movements in the establishment phase of Indonesia is the belief that Indonesia is the third *nationale staat* or *nusantara* after Srivijaya Empire and Majapahit Kingdom. These youth nationalism movements leaders, the founding fathers of Indonesia, argued that Indonesia could continue the legacy of Srivijaya and Majapahit and adopt the maritime identity, freeing itself from colonialism and returning to its pre-colonial glorious past (Alverdian, 2022).

Leaders of the youth nationalism movements, such as Mohammad Yamin and Sukarno, were important in shaping the modern Indonesian state. These leaders drew on the cultural heritage of Majapahit in formulating the concept of *Tanah Air* and *Nusantara*. This work resulted in a clear understanding of the territorial boundaries of Indonesia. The phrase "*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*" which translates to "Unity in Diversity" was adopted as the official motto of the newly founded state of Indonesia. This phrase comes from the poem "Kakawin Sutasoma" written by the Majapahit era poet, Mpu Tantular. In his poem, Mpu Tantular expresses the idea that unity is achievable despite differences. The Pancasila, inspired from the Srivijaya and Majapahit periods, were later adopted as the guideline of the newly established state.

Tanah Air is a term used to describe the national territory of Indonesia, which is made up of the land and water. The Tanah Air poem was written in 1922 by Mohammad Yamin, one of the leaders of the Indonesian youth nationalism movements and was written to celebrate the 5th anniversary of the founding of the Jong-Sumatranen-Bond association. The poem emphasizes the unity of the land and water of Indonesia, which is considered the fatherland (Alverdian, 2022).

The Tanah Air concept envisions the seas as a unifier, emphasizing the land unity of the Indonesian archipelago consisting of many islands. In this way, modern Indonesia would be perceived as a unified whole and a maritime nation both by its own citizens and by the world. In other words, looking at the map, it is aimed to see a unified entity united by sea routes instead of a fragmented territories consisting of separate islands (Alverdian, 2022).

The Tanah Air concept was created based on the maritime legacy of the Srivijaya and Majapahit, which controlled extensive maritime territory that was referred to as

Tanah Air. The idea for Tanah Air came from the leaders of youth nationalism movement in Indonesia. Its goal was to unite the diverse lands of what is now Indonesia as one nation state. The Tanah Air concept was followed by the adoption of the *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* motto, Pancasila, and Nusantara, which had similar purposes (Alverdian, 2022).

*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* means unity in diversity. The *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* phrase has been adopted as a political unity slogan in the context of Tanah Air concept. The term *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* first appeared in the Old Javanese language *Kakawin Sutasoma* poem written by Mpu Tantular in the 14th century Majapahit Kingdom period. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* highlights that even though Buddha and Shiva are appeared to be different entities, their true value is singular. In this context, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was used during the founding stage of the Majapahit Kingdom in order to overcome existing religious differences and provide religious tolerance (Nurhayati et al., 2021).

*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was later proposed by Mohammad Yamin to Sukarno as a motto in order to prevent the existing socio-cultural diversity during the founding stage of modern Indonesia. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was officially adopted as the national motto of the Republic of Indonesia in 1951, appearing on the state emblem in which it is written on the coat held by the Garuda's claws. In 2002, it was recognized as one of the four national pillars by the People's Consultative Assembly (Nurhayati et al., 2021).

Pancasila can be translated as "five principles" in Sanskrit. Pancasila is a set of five principles that modern Indonesia has adopted. They are: 1. *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* – Blief in One God, *Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* - Just and civilized humanity, 3. *Persatuan Indonesia* – The Unity of Indonesia, 4. *Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan* - Democracy led by wisdom in representative deliberation, 5. *Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* - Social justice for all Indonesian people (Pusdatin, 2021a).

Pancasila was formed by Mohammad Yamin and Sukarno to unite all Indonesian people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. It was proposed by Sukarno in 1945 as a guideline to achieve this goal for unifying the people who would create

modern Indonesia. In Sukarno's proposal, as the principles of Pancasila, he stated that the foundation of the Indonesian state should be based on "nationalism, internationalism, government by consent, social justice and belief in one god". Sukarno believed that these 5 pillars have to be based on *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation), which would unite the rich and the poor, Muslims and Christians (Taylor, 2003, pp. 340–385).

Pancasila was first established in 1945 and became a permanent in the political sphere in 1975 when Indonesian political parties added it to their charters. In 1985, it became mandatory for every organization in Indonesia to be founded on Pancasila principles, and Pancasila training courses were organized for all state employees (Soge & Munthe, 2018).

The five principles that make up Pancasila can be interpreted as: believing in one God, one Indonesian identity, one unitary place for Indonesia in the world, a homegrown solution to political problems, and a just and prosperous society (Taylor, 2003, p. 2). When looking at the Srivijaya and Majapahit periods, there are those who argue that the 5 principles of Indonesia were formulated based on the legacy of Srivijaya and Majapahit.

According to sources, there was religious tolerance between the two dominant religions, Buddhism and Hinduism in the lands ruled by the Srivijaya Kingdom. The Srivijaya Empire was an archipelagic state with a maritime identity and its territories were reaching from today's Indonesia to Thailand and Myanmar, including the coastal areas of the Malay Peninsula. Meanwhile, the peoples of Srivijaya were living prosperously since Srivijaya holds the Straits of Malacca which provides economic wealth to the peoples of Srivijaya since the Straits are the center of regional trade. Because of the Straits, Srivijaya was the center of trade in the region, and it had cosmopolitan population (Arianda, 2019).

According to one view, Pancasila's political, social, and religious values were also present in Majapahit. Majapahit saw the king as the center of divine power in the world. With this power, he ruled. In Majapahit, almost all of the lands that make up today's Indonesia were united. Trade was also central to society and economy. The heart of Majapahit, Malacca Straits, was the gateway for all trade-related people to

reach the world, as well as the source of economic prosperity. In a way, Pancasila is a recipe with 5 principles to rebuild the glorious past made possible by Srivijaya and Majapahit (Pusdatin, 2021b; Welianto, 2020).

Nusantara essentially refers to the archipelago of Indonesia and the maritime routes connecting those islands - in other words, a portrayal of the nation. "Nusa" refers to Java, where the population is densest, while "*antara*" refers to the outer islands under the kingdom's sovereignty. Nusantara has been mentioned in ancient Javanese texts, but the term gained popularity and its current meaning in the 14th century when it was used by Gadjah Mada, the chief minister of the Majapahit Kingdom and a national hero of Indonesia, to refer to the maritime fringes under the Majapahit Kingdom's rule (Evers, 2016).

The term 'nusantara' was originally used by young nationalists in Indonesia as a geopolitical construct to define the boundaries of modern Indonesia. In addition to this, it was also used to promote the unity of different people living on various islands across the seas, in order to bring them together under one national identity. Sukarno, the founding leader of Indonesia, stressed the importance of unifying all people living on the islands of Indonesia under one entity, in a sense repeating Indonesia's vision from the Srivijaya and Majapahit periods (Elson, 2005). Muhammad Yamin assesses the nusantara concept similarly to emphasize the connective character of the seas as a national unifier, and he traces the nusantara concept back to the Srivijaya period. According to Yamin, the nusantara was first proclaimed in Srivijaya in the 7th century and then in Majapahit by Gadjah Mada in the 14th century. In the Youth Pledge in 1928, the founders of Indonesia by getting inspired by the first two nusantara, Indonesia was announced as the 3<sup>rd</sup> nusantara (Alverdian, 2022). In a sense, Indonesia's adoption of Srivijaya and Majapahit as its ancestors has been formally acknowledged.

During the establishment phase of modern Indonesia, the founding fathers' references to Srivijaya and Majapahit are obvious. Yet it is hardly possible to detect a direct reference to the Malacca Sultanate in spite of the sultanate was basically acting as communication hub similar to its ancestors Srivijaya and Majapahit. One of the reasons for that especially during the establishment phase of Indonesia, the



Indonesian people is needed to be reminded of their glorious pre-colonial past. While Srivijaya and Majapahit stand for clear examples in this case, the Malacca Sultanate, although being big power of its time, coincides with the advent of colonials to Southeast Asia. Therefore, in a way, Malacca Sultanate might symbolize the downfall of Indonesia. Yet, considering it was the Malacca Sultanate to let Islam to spread to Indonesia and Southeast Asia, in the state level, there is a huge respect to the Sultanate. Even today, a part of Indonesian foreign policy is directed by Islam. It is obvious over the policies of Indonesia in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

### **3.2. Indonesian Leader's Ideational Background and Foreign Policy Leanings**

The legacies of Srivijaya and Majapahit were used as a foundation by the youth nationalist movements during the formation of the modern Indonesia. The youth nationalist movements during this period led the new state to seek out an identity. In the following years, the Indonesian state has undergone an evolution. After the initial phase of the establishment of the state in Sukarno period, Indonesia has made economic and politic progress in domestic affairs and became a part of ASEAN in foreign affair in Suharto period. The Reformasi Governments period was about the democratization process of the state, and it led to the first direct elections of Indonesia. Indonesia's foreign policy became increasingly active during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono period, the state reached an economic and political peak. In the Joko Widodo period, the mature state has become capable of conducting its domestic and foreign affairs hand in hand.

#### **3.2.1. Sukarno Period (1945-1967)**

*Tanah Air*, *Pancasila*, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and *Nusantara* became symbols adopted by modern Indonesia during the Sukarno period. Sukarno was one of the leaders of nationalist youth movements during the formation of modern Indonesia. He became the first president of the country in 1945. Sukarno ideologically embraced the neo-Marxist-Leninist view, which guided the early years of the newly established state's foreign policy. In this regard, the world was seen as a platform for the confrontation of capitalist and socialist forces. Sukarno felt a sense of humiliation against the Western powers, which drove his foreign policy decisions. Sukarno was

focused on global issues and ways to revive his country's past glory. Therefore, the ultimate foreign policy goal of the country was to break free from Indonesia's colonial history (Bunnell, 1966, p. 38). In this context, Sukarno argued that it was important to focus on Indonesia's past in order to build a modern nation. He believed that by erasing the traces of colonization, Indonesia would be able to reclaim its pre-colonial glory.

Sukarno's speech in his 1930 trial represents how he was linking Indonesia's past, present and future:

What about activating nationalism? How do you bring it to life? There are three steps. First, we show the people that the life they led long ago was a good life; second, we intensify the realization that theirs is a dismal life today; third, we turn their gaze to the bright and shining rays of a future day, and we show them ways to reach that promised-filled hour (Paget, 1975, p. 79).

Sukarno in "*lahirnya Pancasila*" speech (the birth of Pancasila) on 1 June 1945 referred to Srivijaya and Majapahit were only free *nationale staats* before Indonesia to rule *nusantara* (Sukarno, 1945). In his speech, he mentioned the Mataram of Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo, Prabu Siliwangi's kingdom in Pajajaran, Prabu Sultan Agung Tirtayasa's kingdom in Banten and Sultan Hasanuddin's kingdom in Sulawesi. However according to Sukarno, before the Republic of Indonesia, non-of them were *nationale staat* but Srivijaya and Majapahit since they were ruling whole the *nusantara* freely. (Sukarno, 1945). In this sense, Sukarno also considers Indonesia as the 3rd *nationale staat* after Srivijaya and Majapahit.

In his speech on June 1, 1945, Sukarno proposed to identify 5 basic principles. These 5 basic principles will keep the peoples that are part of Indonesia together, despite all cultural diversity. The Sukarno 5 principle was symbolically related to the 5 pillars of Islam, the 5 sense organs. He determined these five principles as *kebangsaan* (nationality), *internationalism* (internationalism), *consent* (consensus), *kesejahteraan* (welfare) and *ketuhanan* (divinity) (Sukarno, 1945).

In another speech in the National Awakening Day commemorations, 20 May 1964, Sukarno compared the current situation in Indonesia with the Srivijaya and Majapahit periods, emphasizing the unity of the people living in Srivijaya and

Majapahit. He stated that the ethnic and cultural conflicts of a nation are extremely effective to divide and rule a nation (Erdianto, 2017).

There are references to Srivijaya and Majapahit in Sukarno's autobiography. During the Srivijaya and Majapahit periods, Indonesia was a prosperous country with a high level of scientific knowledge. Thanks to this, they had a detailed understanding of the world around them. (Sukarno, 1965, p. 32).

In another anecdote about women, Sukarno emphasized that they brought freedom to all genders with the revolution achieved after Indonesia's struggle against colonialism. With the new Indonesia, the Muslim woman's shrinking came to an end. Just as women could be Commanders-in Chief in the Srivijaya and Majapahit periods in Indonesia's past, so in Indonesia today, women can be anything they want. They could even be President of the Republic (Sukarno, 1965, p. 249).

Sukarno also created his own way of understanding democracy: the guided democracy. He was against the Western type of liberal democracy because it was not suitable to Indonesian context. The democracy is needed to be guided in Indonesia and it has to be performed in indigenous ways. In this regard, he embraced *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus) which is actually an adaptation of Majapahit way of decision-making (Kim & Lee, 2011). He designated four main parties in addition to a national council with some distinct groups: urban workers, rural farmers, intelligentsia, national entrepreneurs, religious organizations, armed services, youth organizations, women's organizations, etc. These groups would gather together under the auspices of presidential guidance and would reach a national consensus (Mohamad et al., 2019).

It is clear from all this narrative that the founding leader of modern Indonesia, Sukarno, sees Indonesia as the continuation of the Srivijaya and Majapahit kingdoms and builds modern Indonesia on the legacy of these powers. It should not be understood here that Sukarno only treats Srivijaya and Majapahit as ancestors. Srivijaya and Majapahit have been evaluated as a continuation of today's Indonesia in terms of their compatibility with the nusantara concept.

During Sukarno period, Indonesia was a member of Non-Alignment Movement which was formed by the countries that do not want to take part in the US – Soviet Union cold war. In fact, Sukarno was one of the founder and leader of the organization. The Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) has been established in 1955 at the Bandung Conference, Indonesia. However, in the early years of 1960s, Sukarno, although not taking sides in the Cold War created his own side and enemy (Mohamad et al., 2019).

During 1960s, Sukarno was seeing the world as consisting of two warring sides; “the old established forces”; these forces were colonialists and they had to be confronted and “new emerging forces”; these forces were newly liberated countries from colonialism, and they had to be united in the same front against the old established forces. Sukarno’s Indonesia was the leader of the new emerging forces, at least one of the leaders (Guan, 2006). Region wide confrontation was against the formation of Malaysia in 1963. As a protest to including Malaysia to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Indonesia withdraws from the UN in 1965 (Mohamad et al., 2019).

Sukarno’s policies were the reflection of perceiving his own country as an important international force. Although this view was gaining the pride of the Indonesians, the view was rather unrealistic (Weinstein, 1972, p. 372). Sukarno wished to be seemed powerful, however during the early years of Indonesia, the country was lack of some material capabilities to carry its perceived duties.

### **3.2.2. Suharto Period (1967-1998)**

The rule of Suharto in Indonesia began in 1968 and lasted until 1998. It is possible to see the traces of Majapahit especially during the Suharto period. For example, Indonesia's telecommunications satellite was named "Palapa" during the Suharto period. This was in honor of Majapahit's prime Minister, Gadjah Mada, who was known to love this fruit. There are legends that Gadjah Mada swore that he would not eat this fruit without first uniting all nusantara. In this context, Suharto's naming of the satellite as "Palapa" may have been meant to convey the message that all nusantara had been reunited under Indonesia. Indonesia is recognized as an archipelagic state by UNCLOS during this period (Dwipayana & Ramadhan K.H., 1989, p. 323).

In his speech during his visit to Australia on February 9, 1972, Suharto stated that Indonesia would be considered a young country considering its establishment date, but it should be known that Indonesia's history and culture date back to Srivijaya, Majapahit and Mataram. As a matter of fact, after the sufferings during the colonial period, Indonesia declared its sovereignty again in 1945 (Tukiran Taniredja & Suyahmo, 2020, p. 39). It could be said that Suharto saw modern Indonesia as a continuation of pre-colonial Southeast Asian empires such as Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Mataram.

Suharto determined some fundamental policies. Firstly, curbing the influence of communism in Indonesia and Southeast Asia in general. In this context, the policies implemented during the Suharto regime were so effective that they still prevent left-leaning parties from being represented in Indonesia's political landscape today, let alone communist parties (Kılıçdaroğlu, 2022). Suharto's clear stance on this matter was to completely erase any trace of communism and, with the intention he aimed to form a new regional and global image. In this sense, the formation of ASEAN often considered as an extension of Suharto's strategy for curbing the spread of communism to Southeast Asia (Beeson, 2009).

Secondly, Suharto aimed to improve Indonesia's economy, which had collapsed under Sukarno's administration (Panglaykim & Thomas, 1967). For this reason, he tried to attract foreign investments to the country. Getting along with the developed western block was important to attract foreign investments in this regard. Finally, he was aware that to accomplish first two purposes, he had to provide political stability in the domestic affairs of the country (Aplianta, 2015, p. 3). In all this sense, Indonesia was rather becoming an inward-looking country to solve fundamental problems and had a relatively low-key international and regional policy (Anwar, 1994, p. 147).

Suharto rather take a low profile in regional affairs although he was one of the founders of ASEAN. Suharto mainly focused on domestic improvements of the country in terms of economics and politics. There were mainly two reasons behind such a policy; Indonesia after Sukarno was a collapsed country economically and politically; an assertive Indonesia in Southeast Asia would trigger other members of

ASEAN to perceive Indonesia as a threat and that would ruin the unity of the organization. In this respect, the Suharto period can be considered as the period in which Indonesia's image was renewed in the eyes of other ASEAN member states (Putra, 2015).

The foreign policy doctrine known as concentric circles, which was adopted during the Suharto period, is an example of how the mandala system of the Majapahit Kingdom was adapted to Indonesia's foreign policy. President Suharto's foreign policy, which has been focused on supporting Indonesia's economic development, has been extremely successful. For over twenty years, Indonesia has maintained relations with major industrialized non-communist countries that can assist the country's development efforts directly, as well as with other developing countries that share its perspective. In line with the New Order leaders' view of a world divided into concentric circles, the Southeast Asian region has been regarded as the first priority, with ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. This foreign policy has benefited Indonesia, contributing to its rapid economic development and the establishment of a peaceful and stable regional order (Anwar, 1994, p. 148).

In this regard, Suharto adopted rather a complementary role within ASEAN unlike its free and active foreign policy (Anwar, 1994, pp. 147–148). Indonesia during these years never tried to dominate the ASEAN states. Indonesia was rather giving huge importance to the unity of ASEAN states. According to Anwar, Indonesia's commitment to regional peace and security was necessary for ASEAN's unity (Anwar, 1994, p. 148). However, this regional policy of Jakarta, on the other hand, was a reason for criticism. Such a policy was impeding Indonesia for performing its full capacity in the regional affairs. In other words, ASEAN was a golden cage for Indonesia. Jakarta was not able to perform its free and active foreign policy within its own region (Anwar, 1994, p. 148).

### **3.2.3. Reformasi Governments (1998 – 2004)**

Suharto resigned in 1998. In the following 6 years, Indonesia had three presidents: Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri. These years are also known as reformation (*reformasi*) years. Although there were no sudden or large-scale changes in Indonesia's foreign policy, there were significant

steps taken during this period to democratize the state. Right after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia began to change its state identity to a “democratic” one and thus gain a good reputation in the eyes of international society (Andaya, 2006). First governments with democratic leanings lived rather shortly because of the chaotic atmosphere of the state. However, with Megawati, democracy, and its entailed values such as human rights sensitivity placed in the main rhetoric of the government.

During this period, Indonesian history and vision remained unchanged from the previous leaders' view of the legacies of Srivijaya and Majapahit. Additionally, with the proclamation of *Hari Nusantara* (The Nusantara Day), one of the greatest references to pre-colonial Indonesia was made.

The Djunda Declaration of 13 December 1957 was an important moment in Indonesia's history, as it was the first time that the country was officially recognized as an archipelagic state. This decision by Prime Minister Djunda Kartawidjaja and his cabinet meant that Indonesia had sovereignty over its outermost islands and the waters between them. Indonesia's attempts to become an archipelagic state in this regard were later approved by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Butcher & Elson, 2017). The recognition of Indonesia as an archipelagic state was first declared on 13 December 1999 during the administration of Abdurrahman Wahid. Later, during Megawati Sukarnoputri administration, 13<sup>th</sup> of December has formally announced as *Hari Nusantara* (Debora, 2020).

The 4 objectives of *Hari Nusantara* were determined as follows. Indoctrinating the perception of the Indonesian people that their country is an entity consisting of land and water, making the marine sector an important part of national development, creating an integrated development model including remote islands, and finally, being able to use the potential of marine natural sources as archipelagic state for the welfare of the society (Debora, 2020).

Indonesia made important strides in democratization during the Reformasi governments, even though it was a very short period. Although there was no significant development in Indonesian foreign policy during this time, it set the stage for the first direct elections and the SBY period, during which Indonesia would take a further step economically and politically.

### **3.2.4. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) Period (2004 – 2014)**

SBY is Indonesia's first directly elected president. When SBY came into power, Indonesia began a process of economic and political development. This can be seen as the time when Indonesia started to really make progress. While the Sukarno period was focused on establishing the country, and the Suharto era was focused on developing it and finding solutions to its problems, the reformasi period brought about democratic transformation. With SBY, Indonesia is finally in a position to reach its full potential economically and politically.

Like its predecessors in SBY, references are made to Indonesia's pre-colonial past. SBY's interest in Majapahit can be understood from the names he gave to his grandchildren. The name of SBY's first grandchild is Almira Tungga Dewi Yudhoyono. Tribhuwana Tunggadewi is the first female king of Majapahit and is the mother of Hayam Wuruk, who brought Majapahit a golden age. The name of SBY's second grandchild is Airlangga Satriadhi Yudhoyono. Airlangga is the name of the founder of the Kahuripan Kingdom. Although this kingdom was later divided into the Kediri and Jenggala kingdoms, they were later united under Majapahit during the Raden Wijaya period. The name of Pancasakti Maharajasa Yudhoyono, the third grandchild of SBY, is reminiscent of Kertarajasa Jayawardhana, the founder of Majapahit. The fourth grandchild, Gayatri Idalia Yudhoyono, is named after Gayatri, the wife of Raden Wijaya, king of Majapahit (BBC, 2018).

SBY, at a press conference held in Jakarta on October 30, 2017, together with the DPP management board, announced that his party would enter the 2019 elections with ballot number 14, associated with the 14th century, the golden age of Majapahit, and said that his own lineage also went back to the Majapahit kings. In response, Andi Arief, Deputy Secretary-General of the Democratic Party, published SBY's genealogy on Twitter. According to the list, SBY's lineage goes back to Raden Wijaya, the founder of Majapahit (BBC, 2018). A leader's lineage can certainly help to legitimize their claim to the power. This is something that SBY possibly capitalized upon. However, on the other hand, his reference to Majapahit also symbolizes his belief that Indonesia is the continuation of Majapahit. In this sense, in another example, at the press conference held during his visit to Mongolia on



September 6, 2012, SBY said that Srivijaya had their golden age in the 7th century and Majapahit in the 14th century, hopefully Indonesia will also experience its golden age in the 21st century (Kompasiana, 2012).

During the period 2004-2014, SBY used international and multilateral platforms very actively and boosted the effectiveness of Indonesia both in Southeast Asia and the world. During that period, Indonesia mostly tried to upgrade its international posture as a democratic Muslim country which promotes the democratic values and human rights regionally and globally. “Thousand friends and zero enemies” rhetoric and “shuttle diplomacy” of SBY resulted in more effective Indonesia. According to Rizal Sukma, that embracement and promotion of democracy began for the fixing of its bad image in international atmosphere yet after Indonesia began to see Southeast Asia through the lenses of democracy and become a promoter of democracy within and beyond Southeast Asia (Sutherland, 2007).

SBY took office with the first real elections of Indonesian history in 2004. SBY taken a rather politically stable and economically developed Indonesia compared to the Cold War years or the turbulence during reformation period. With SBY, relatively mature state began to adopt a more regional oriented foreign policy alongside a domestic development plan.

In this regard SBY’s Master Plan for Long Term Development (MP3EI) is decisive. MP3EI was promulgated in 2011. The main plan was to keep economic growth between 6.4 – 7.5 percent. There were mainly three pillars of the plan; the development of economic corridors or growth centers, strengthening connectivity and, development of human resource and, national science and technology (Damuri et al., 2014, p. 20).

In this sense, Indonesia divided into six economic corridors; 1- Sumatra; production, natural resources, energy reserves, 2- Java; industry, service provision, 3- Kalimantan; mining and energy resources, 4- Sulawesi; agriculture, plantation, fishery, oil, gas, mining, 5- Bali and Nusa Tenggara; tourism, 6- Papua and Maluku Islands; food, fishery, energy, mining (Damuri et al., 2014, p. 20).

During SBY period, Indonesia became very active within G20. SBY administration-initiated ASEAN - G20 Contact Group to increase the communication between ASEAN and G20 countries. Before the G20 meetings 10 finance ministers of ASEAN were gathering around to discuss the ways of best representing ASEAN in G20 meeting through Indonesia. (Hermawan, 2011 p.80-84) In this sense, Natalegawa states “This is, how to enhance the capacity all together, so we can use ASEAN in G20 and G20 in ASEAN” (Hermawan 2011 p.82).

### **3.2.5. Joko Widodo (Jokowi) Period (2014 -)**

Jokowi's ascent to the presidency was atypical compared to his predecessor SBY. Unlike SBY, who benefited from extensive experience in foreign affairs, Jokowi gained his political experience gradually, starting as mayor of Surakarta before eventually becoming the mayor of Jakarta. This lack of understanding when it comes to foreign affairs means that Jokowi is heavily reliant on the advice of those around him (Connelly, 2014). However, despite these differences, Jokowi shares a similar perception of Indonesia's past as SBY and other previous Indonesian leaders. This can be seen through a few examples.

In his declaration of Indonesia's maritime vision, Jokowi stated that the country is essentially an archipelagic state and that its maritime identity from the past should be revived. In his post-election victory speech, Jokowi and vice-president Jusuf Kalla used a "*pinisi* boat" as a podium to give their speech (Rosyidin, 2021). In his speech, Jokowi said that Indonesia has long ignored the seas, oceans, bays, and straits, whereas Indonesia's future is here. Jokowi underlined that by working through *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation) from now on, they will restore Indonesia's maritime identity in the past, and he said that the slogan of our forefathers "*jalesveva jayamahe*" (in the sea we will triumph) will echo again (Firdaus, 2020). Jokowi promised to revive the historical maritime memories of Srivijaya Empire and Majapahit Kingdom and that Indonesia would enter a new golden age. In this sense, he emphasized that Indonesia should demonstrate this in its foreign policy and diplomacy. By looking to its past, Indonesia can move towards a more prosperous future by capitalizing on its maritime heritage (Firdaus, 2020). Indeed, in light of these developments, the Global Maritime Fulcrum Project has been announced.

GMF foresees the development of sea highway and made Indonesia is a maritime based economy. Developing ports and modernizing shipping industry. Building and repairing boats, focusing on fishing, offshore oil extraction, use of maritime tourism, marine environment management etc. Such a project would facilitate the movements of goods, services, and people across the country. GMF even if seems like a global first of all focus on national connectivity (Damuri et al., 2014). There are 5 pillars of Global Maritime Nexus policy.

1. A revival of Indonesia's maritime culture, recognizing the link between the country's archipelagic geography, identity, and livelihood; 2. Improved management of Indonesia's oceans and fisheries through the development of the country's fishing industry and building maritime "food sovereignty" and security; 3. Boosting Indonesia's maritime economy by improving the country's port infrastructure, shipping industry, and maritime tourism; 4. Maritime diplomacy that encourages Indonesia's partners to work together to eliminate conflict arising over illegal fishing, breaches of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy, and environmental concerns like marine pollution; 5. Bolstering Indonesia's maritime defences, both to support the country's maritime sovereignty and wealth, and to fulfil its role in maintaining safety of navigation and maritime security (Laksamana TNI, 2018; Neary, 2014).

Indonesia, in that issue, is willing to utilize its geo-strategic position, thus securing trade routes. However, there are some material limitations to carve out such as policy. Indonesia's ports are inadequate and naval army is quite tiny to patrol the area. Besides, other great powers close to region such as India and China have interests in the region, and they are not happy an ambiguous Indonesian act. To implement its policies, Indonesia as a middle power, tends to use multilateral institutions such as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in which Indonesia is current chair (Damuri et al., 2014; Neary, 2014).

Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) as a new vision of Indonesia has started with Jokowi administration. Main aim of this project is to revive "maritime identity" of Indonesia by improving ports and enhancing maritime security (Neary, 2014). Damuri states GMF is essentially a "rediscovery" of Indonesia's identity as a maritime state (Damuri et al., 2014). With GMF and reviving its maritime identity, Indonesia tries to revive and secure its 2000 years old place in the route between India and China (B. L. C. Sebastian & Syailendra, 2014, p. 207).

In previous section of this chapter, it is examined how Indonesia constructed its state identity, in terms of the ideational backgrounds and foreign policy leanings of

Indonesian leaders. In the next section this chapter, it will be investigated how Indonesia has implemented its foreign policy role, within the framework of the ASEAN Way of regionalism. In doing so, it will be seen that Indonesia's ASEAN focused foreign policy role was primarily about facilitating communication amongst the ASEAN member states and between ASEAN member states and extra-regional powers. In this sense, a set of Indonesia's foreign policy cases that facilitate communication will be examined in light of Indonesia's communication hub role as it is as metaphorized by this dissertation. The cases are categorized under the layers of the communication hub role, maintaining the group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales.

### **3.3. Foreign Policy Cases of Indonesia**

In this section, the thesis examines specific foreign policy cases Indonesia through the three main layers of communication hub role of Indonesia: maintaining group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales.

#### **3.3.1. Maintaining the Group Unity**

The three foreign policy cases chosen as examples of Indonesia's communication hub role in maintaining the group unity layer were selected mainly because of two reasons. First the selected cases represent different periods of times in Indonesian foreign policy history. Thus, it gives us a wider perspective for examination. Secondly, the selected cases are prominent in terms of their direct effects to the unity of ASEAN.

##### **3.3.1.1. Corregidor Affair**

In 1967, one year after the founding of ASEAN, tensions again flared up between Malaysia and the Philippines over the sovereignty of the region of Sabah. This posed a big problem for the unity of the still-new organization. The two countries had gone for a rapprochement regarding the sovereignty of Sabah in 1966, which made the founding of ASEAN possible. However, killings on the small Philippine Island of Corregidor, and subsequent media coverage, caused the disagreement over Sabah to resurface (Anh Tuan, 1996, p. 66; San, 2000, pp. 284–285).

ASEAN member states immediately held Bangkok talks in an attempt to resolve the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines and prevent an ASEAN-sized crisis. However, ASEAN member states, especially Thailand, which hosted the talks, stated that they would not be directly involved in the dispute. The Bangkok Talks, organized by Thailand on 17 June 1968, and lasted for more than a month. However, the talks failed to produce any results because neither side made any concessions (Anwar, 1997, p. 169).

The second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) was held in Jakarta in August 1968. During these meetings, to make up for the Bangkok talks failure, Indonesia held secret bilateral meetings where Malaysia and the Philippines could meet (Anwar, 1997, p. 169). Although it is known that Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik organized the talks, it is not certain whether he participated in them. After reducing the tension between the two countries, the parties resumed negotiations on Sabah. However, this situation was reversed when the Philippines began to re-examine the Base Line Act of 1961 in line with the Annexation Law of the Philippines. As a result, Malaysia suspended diplomatic relations with the Philippines (Shimada, 2013).

The Philippines proposed that a country outside of ASEAN be designated as the mediator for the settlement of the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines, and the negotiations started again. In this context, the talks started on September 24, 1968, in Tokyo, hosted by the Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki. However, these negotiations were also short-lived and ended with Malaysia's unilateral withdrawal from the Tokyo talks. Malaysia has declared that it will not come together with the Philippines on any ASEAN platform unless its sovereignty over Sabah is recognized by the Philippines. In this case, there was the danger of ASEAN being dissolved (Shimada, 2013). On October 1968, General Ali Murtopo was sent to Manila by President Suharto. In November 1968, Imron Rosjadi, the chairman of the Indonesian Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security, consulted with ASEAN member states about restoring the Jakarta accord. Rosjadi later went to Manila to meet with Philippine Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos. During their meeting, Rosjadi asked the Philippines to withdraw its claim on Sabah so that Malaysia and the Philippines could be re-established as members of ASEAN.

The Philippines agreed to postpone its claim until after the general elections in Malaysia in March. As a result of the steps taken by Malaysia and the Philippines led to them meeting on December 13th in Bangsen, Thailand, and the Jakarta Agreement was restored. The Philippines also de facto accepted Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah (Tang & Cheong, 1975).

The Corregidor Affair was a serious territorial dispute that emerged right after the formation of ASEAN and could be considered a case that directly damages ASEAN unity. Indonesia's successful shuttle diplomacy at the time managed to bring the situation under control and the two countries were brought into a position of cooperation under the ASEAN umbrella.

### **3.3.1.2. Cambodian Vietnam Conflict (1979- 1992)**

The Cambodian-Vietnam conflict in 1979-1992 stands for a good example of testing the efforts of Indonesia to convince belligerent sides to the common good. The conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam took place between 1979 and 1992. The conflict has been a major threat to both mainland southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia in the context of instability. Cambodia Vietnam conflict is a multidimensional conflict that takes place in 3 phases. The first phase is the ongoing internal conflicts between the government and opposition in Cambodia. These conflicts have supporters from abroad. The second phase is regional. Cambodia Vietnam conflict has the potential to spread the conflict between these two countries to other countries in the region. Finally, considering the interest in the conflict in the USA, China and the Soviet Union, there is also the potential to turn into a global crisis. This conflict peaked when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 (Sudrajat et al., 2019).

The first step taken by Indonesia in finding a solution to the Cambodia- Vietnam conflict was taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. Kusumaatmadja invited ASEAN member states to meet at a special meeting in Bangkok on 12-13 January 1979. As a result of this meeting, ASEAN member states reached a consensus and decided to condemn Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia. In this context, they requested Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia (Sudrajat et al., 2019).

Later, the Cambodia-Vietnam issue was frequently brought up in ASEAN Ministerial Meetings, but no resolution was reached. Subsequently, on January 29, 1987, Indonesian minister of foreign affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja held a meeting with Vietnam minister of foreign affairs, Nguyen Co Thach in the capital of Vietnam. As a result of this meeting, Indonesia convinced Vietnam to participate in an informal meeting where all parties involved in the conflict would attend. To confirm this commitment, they signed an agreement, which would later be known as "Chi Minh City Understanding" (Sudrajat et al., 2019).

This informal meeting was held in two parts in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, with the participation of all countries related to the conflict. These meetings are referred to as Jakarta Informal Meeting I (JIM I) (25-28 July 1988) and Jakarta Informal Meeting II (JIM II) (16-18 February 1989) (1989). As a result of JIM I, the parties decided to withdraw Vietnam's troops from Cambodia, to hold elections in Cambodia, and to establish the sovereignty of Cambodia. As a result of JIM II, chaired by Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, after the decisions taken in JIM I were reconfirmed, ceasefire was declared across Cambodia, it was decided to withdraw all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia until 30 September 1989, and the troops would withdraw. It has been decided to go to international supervision during the process. After JIM I and JIM II, the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam was officially ended with the signing of the Paris Treaty on 23 October 1991 (Anwar, 1994, p. 149).

The Cambodia Vietnam conflict case provides a good example of understanding Indonesia's role as a communication hub. Indonesia's establishment of peace between these two countries is beyond the case of holding talks between the two states within the framework of a classical mediator mission which generally entails holding a passive neutrality. Indonesia, to overcome a possible instability spread to ASEAN, intervened in the situation. First of all, Jakarta created consensus with ASEAN member states and ensured that they had a support the peaceful settlement of Cambodia -Vietnam conflict. Jakarta communicated with Cambodia and Vietnam in separate informal meetings in order to persuade them to peacefully resolve the conflict. By doing this, Indonesia was able to successfully end the conflict without any violence.

As a result, Jakarta convinced Vietnam, which is the aggressor side, to participate in informal meetings to be held in Jakarta, to which all parties related to the conflict would participate, and as a result, it was instrumental in establishing an environment for reconciliation and ending the conflict (Sudrajat et al., 2019). In this case, Indonesia through shuttle diplomacy have been interacted with each side of the conflict with consulting ASEAN member states. The information gathered by Indonesia again distributed to all sides and as a result Indonesia convinced all the parties to meet around the same table since all the sensitive subjects had already been argued through the interpretations of Indonesian representatives. This method, which Indonesia used in the Cambodia Vietnam conflict, resulted in the cooperation of these two countries, which were arc enemies until that day. These two countries also became ASEAN members in following years (Vietnam in 1995- Cambodia in 1999).

### **3.3.1.3. Myanmar Rohingya Crisis**

Myanmar's Rohingya problem is a domestic one, and due to ASEAN's non-interference principle, its member states are reluctant to intervene in the situation. However, Indonesia has tried to involve ASEAN in this event without irritating Myanmar. The main reason for this is that a large-scale civil war that could crack Myanmar would cause instability in the region. On the other hand, refugee problems of Rohingya who fled Myanmar were starting to become more and more problematic day by day. In this sense, Indonesia makes an effort to solve the problem.

It can be said that the emergence of the Rohingya crisis started with the 1962 coup and the Ne Win administration, which was then known as Burma. The new government did not accept that the Rohingya were citizens of Myanmar. Ne Win said that the Rohingya were Bengals who had illegally migrated to Myanmar from Bangladesh (Kipgen, 2019). The Rohingya crisis can be traced back to when Bangladesh and Myanmar were British colonies (Hindustan Times, 2017). In Myanmar's citizenship law in 1982, Rohingyas are not granted citizenship once again (Kipgen, 2019).

The violence against the Rohingya community in Myanmar has lasted for several years with no radical solution from the Myanmar government. This has led to many members of the Rohingya community fleeing to surrounding countries as refugees in



order to escape the violence. At the same time, The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army was established by the Rohingyas against these human right violations of the Myanmar government, and they sought to defend themselves against the Myanmar military (Kipgen, 2019). This can be interpreted as a kind of civil war, although the Rohingya are not seen as citizens.

Against the human right violations committed by the Myanmar government, Malaysia directly condemned Myanmar and the relations between these two states became immediately tense since the condemnation of Malaysia was a challenge against non-interference principle of ASEAN (Agerholm, 2016). Indonesia started to find a solution to this situation with the 2015- 2017 Strategic Plan published by the Jokowi government in 2017. Within this plan, it is underlined that Southeast Asia is the closest concentric circle and that Indonesia should intervene in case of instability that may arise (Setiawan & Hamka, 2020).

On October 12th, 2017, there was a riot in Rakhine state which caused many Rohingya victims to need humanitarian support. After this event, Indonesia requested that their foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, be allowed to meet with the Myanmar government in order to provide this support. Although Myanmar had not accepted anyone on this issue until this date, they responded positively to Indonesia's request. Retno Marsudi was then able to visit the Sitte region and provide the support that was needed. The acceptance of Retno Marsudi can be considered as a symbol of Myanmar's respect towards Indonesia (Reuters, 2021).

During her visit to Myanmar, Retno Marsudi's offered a proposal to initiate a humanitarian aid plan for Rohingya people. As a result of this proposal, the Myanmar government allowed the support of the international community and a group of countries to provide humanitarian aid to the Rohingya (Setiawan & Hamka, 2020) In this context, Indonesia invites ASEAN member states to help humanitarian aid. In this context, Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar was established on 31 August 2017. The purpose of this organization is to provide humanitarian aid to the Rohingya in fields such as education, health, and economy. AKIM continued its activities in Myanmar under the guarantee of Indonesia as a result of the reconciliation between Myanmar and Indonesia (Setiawan & Hamka, 2020).

After Indonesia managed to provide humanitarian aid to the Rohingya in the first stage and prevented the situation from getting worse to a certain extent, it first tried to persuade the ASEAN member state to solve the Rohingya crisis radically. In this context, Jakarta uttered the Rohingya crisis at the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) on August 2, 2018. However, Indonesia's initiative did not find enough repercussions in AMM, one of ASEAN's most formal platforms. The reason for this is that the Rohingya crisis is the subject of Myanmar's domestic affairs within the scope of the non-interference principle, which is one of the main principles of the ASEAN Way, and ASEAN member states do not want to be involved in this issue (Kipgen, 2019).

Under the leadership of Retno Marsudi, Indonesia also sought support from the world community outside of ASEAN within the scope of resolving the Rohingya crisis. In this context, Indonesia has become the authority where worldwide organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM) can directly contact the Rohingya (Kipgen, 2019).

Despite all the efforts of Indonesia, the Rohingya crisis has not been fully resolved. However, the policy followed by Indonesia in the context of the Rohingya crisis prevented the crisis from growing and the emergence of a bigger crisis both regionally and globally. However, Jakarta succeeded to convince ASEAN member states to participate in humanitarian aid campaign. On the other hand, since the Indonesia did not irritate the Myanmar government by interfering their domestic affairs, and therefore Jakarta kept the Myanmar around the table (Kipgen, 2019).

On the other hand, as a result of Indonesia's bilateral interaction with Myanmar, the Myanmar government, which was completely opposed to contacting any country about the problem before, allowed Indonesia to a certain extent and then other countries and actors to be involved in the issue (IPAC, 2018). In this sense, Indonesia had a special position though. Other countries or organizations wish to contact with Myanmar began to contact with Indonesia first. It was rather a precaution to not annoy Myanmar government and worsen the crisis.

The Rohingya crisis case constitutes a very problematic situation in terms of ASEAN unity. Intervention in the Rohingya crisis can easily be interpreted as a direct interference with the sovereignty of Myanmar. However, even in such a sensitive issue, in order to prevent further instability arising from the crisis, Indonesia has at least managed to bring the ASEAN member state together within the scope of providing humanitarian aid to Myanmar.

### **3.3.2. Setting The Group Vision and Agenda**

It is possible to give many examples of the cases that Indonesia has initiated to set the vision and agenda of ASEAN. However, the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Community vision, and Bali Democracy Forum stand for rather important cases since they, to an extent, challenge especially the non-interference principle of ASEAN Way. Therefore, the cases demonstrate that Indonesia may even be effective to set group vision and agenda in sensitive issue.

#### **3.3.2.1. ASEAN Charter**

ASEAN member states have established an ASEAN Charter in 2005 which was aiming to strengthening regional cooperation in a more broad and institutionalized way (Rüland, 2014, p. 11).

The ASEAN member states created an Eminent Persons Group in order to draft the ASEAN Charter. The group is made up of representatives from each ASEAN state. In the blueprint of the ASEAN Charter (also known as the Alatas Paper), the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG) set the priorities of the Charter. Two specific objectives were noteworthy to mention; 1- Strengthening of democratic values and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, 2- Cultivating ASEAN as a people-centered organization by raising the level of participation of, inter alia, civil society representatives as well as human rights groups in ASEAN's activities (Koh, 2009, p. 51).

The creation of the ASEAN Charter was a difficult process because many of the ASEAN member countries were unwilling to accept the democracy and human rights provisions. For that, Wirajuda, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia followed the consensus-building method for collective decision-making which was not annoying

ASEAN Members. Indonesia was eager to promote democracy and human rights to the rest of ASEAN (Volkman, 2008, p. 78). In order for Indonesia to be successful in this endeavor, they had to reassure each ASEAN member that the implementation of these new values would not threaten their sovereignty, but instead would strengthen the cooperation among all ASEAN member states. However, Indonesia was demanding a more legally binding structure within ASEAN to ensure the applicability of the new values. In this sense, Indonesia initiated the creation of the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).

The ASEAN Charter was approved by all ASEAN members at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) in July 2009. The member states agreed on the draft of the terms of reference (ToR) for the creation of a human rights body within ASEAN (Currie, 2010). However, Indonesia was actually trying to convince each state since the apart from Indonesia, other member states were not eager to the creation of such an institution. Many ASEAN member states were initially concerned that the creation of AICHR would be an intrusion into their domestic affairs. However, Indonesia was decisive for the creation of AICHR (Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, 2009). Eventually, AICHR created. The creation of AICHR has been seen by some as a sign of ASEAN states' commitment to human rights (Munro, 2011), and indeed it has been a success for Indonesia in terms of promoting its values.

### **3.3.2.2. ASEAN Community vision**

The initiation of ASEAN Community Vision represents a structural upgrade for ASEAN. ASEAN Community is a 3-pronged vision where it is planned to create a community among ASEAN member states in economic, political and socio-cultural fields. Establishing the ASEAN community means gradually moving away from the 3 basic principles of the ASEAN Way, which are non-interference, consensus through consultation and informality. As a result, the creation of a community means that ASEAN member states can act as a single entity in economic, political, and socio-cultural fields (Artner, 2017).

It can be said that the ASEAN Community vision is partly the product of terrorist attacks carried out worldwide in the early 2000s. As a result of the terrorist attack in Bali, Indonesia in October 2002, 202 people lost their lives. As a result of this

situation, along with the significant decrease in Indonesia's tourism revenues, the existence of a country-wide security gap has also emerged. As a result, it is understood that economic integration cannot be achieved without the provision of security region-wide (Acharya, 2014b). In this context, Indonesia made a proposal to establish the ASEAN Security Community in 2003. This proposal was positively received by the ASEAN member states. As a result of the negotiations after the Indonesian proposal, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord) was announced in October 2003. In Bali Concord, the ASEAN member states have decided to create an ASEAN community in the fields of security, economy, and culture (Artner, 2017). The 12th ASEAN Summit held in January 2007, ASEAN member states signed the Cebu Declaration, in which they approved the establishment of the ASEAN Community until 2015. In the context of the declaration, it has been decided that the ASEAN Community will be built on three pillars, namely ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (Widiyana & Djatmiko, 2019) is worth to emphasize, by its very nature, that the initiation of the ASEAN Community means a gradual departure from ASEAN Way principles since it aims to build up a supranational body that is over national sovereignties. To set a vision like that, especially would threaten authoritarian regimes of some of ASEAN member states. However, there is no considerable repercussion in this regard. Although, as of 2022, it is safe to say that ASEAN is far from envisioned plans. Besides the issues of security, economy and culture, ASEAN member states are still relatively immature in cooperating in regional environmental problems in their wider ASEAN Community vision. In general, ASEAN member states' different level of commitment to these issues seems to generate disaccord (Varkkey et al., 2022).

#### **3.3.2.3. Bali Democracy Forum**

One of Indonesia's missions to set the vision and agenda of ASEAN is the Bali Democracy Forum initiatives, which were launched during the SBY period in the field of democratization.

The first Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) was held in 2008 as a platform to share ideas about democracy and human rights beyond ASEAN member states. Indonesia saw

BDF as a way to promote democracy in Asia (Sukma, 2011). The BDF enables governmental participants to discuss their ideas, experiences and practices related to democracy and democratic transition (Wirajuda, 2008). The BDF was created as a platform to allow governmental participants to discuss their ideas, experiences, and practices related to democracy and democratic transition. Such an inclusive forum was the first of its kind in Asia and provided a valuable opportunity for stakeholders to learn from each other.

The main purpose of the BDFs, according to Hadi, was to increase democratic cooperation on a regional level, which would eventually lead to a national-level democratic transition. Not only were the BDFs meant for ASEAN member states, but they were also inclusive for and beyond Southeast Asia. BDF's dialogue method and inclusive character were successful in attracting many non-democratic countries, including China and Myanmar (Hadi, 2009).

In addition to BDF, Indonesia initiated another platform which functions more informally. The Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD) was created as a way to continue the work of the BDF in a more informal setting. IPD is a university-based institution that includes public and civil society groups. This makes it more suitable for countries that are skeptical of discussing sensitive topics in a formal, inter-state platform (Halans & Nassy, 2013b).

Indonesian foreign policy with democracy and human rights promotion activities was not imposing its own values to the rest of Southeast Asia. In this regard, one might rightfully suggest that Indonesia itself was still on the process of democratization and have many gaps to fulfil providing human rights to its own domestic affairs. However, as history suggests the central powers of Southeast Asia distributed the new values from extra regional civilization with a manner of adaptation and then indigenization. Jakarta's purpose here to make other members of ASEAN to know about dominant leanings of the world. In this sense, the intention of Indonesia is to practice the democratic transition period with the rest of the region to reach a maximum gain. In this regard, the democracy and human rights promotion of Indonesia can be resembled to the Srivijaya's promotion of multiculturalism, Buddhism values or Majapahit's harmony and unity or Malacca's rather moderate

Islam. Intra or extra regional ideas and values influenced these central powers were quickly finding ground in the rest of the region, just as today.

All 3 initiatives contradict the principle of non-interference. ASEAN Charter also establishes boards for the interaction of ASEAN member states with each other, ASEAN Community envisages a supranationally in political, economic and socio-cultural fields, therefore, it envisages eradication of sovereignties, Bali Democracy Forum, on the other hand, provides for the eradication of ASEAN's authoritarian regimes. It challenges the direct management methods of the ASEAN member states and thus poses a threat to the ASEAN member states. However, it is an important achievement for Indonesia to bring together ASEAN member states, even in such sensitive issues, although no visible progress has been made so far.

### **3.3.3. Representing the Group in Extra-Regional Scales**

In these cases, examined under the layer of representing the group in extra-regional, the main aim of Indonesia is to establish communication between ASEAN member states and non-regional power. Such initiatives of Indonesia enable ASEAN to be represented outside Southeast Asia. In the cases examined under this layer, it can be observed successful implementation of Indonesia's dynamic equilibrium strategy as well (Laksmana, 2018; Poling, 2013a; L. C. Sebastian, 2013). In this vein, this section of this chapter will focus on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

#### **3.3.3.1. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)**

After the establishment of ASEAN and immediate break out of Corregidor Affair, Indonesia made two basic proposals to take measures to protect ASEAN unity in similar incidents. These proposals were about the establishment of the Zone for Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The main purpose of ZOPFAN is to prevent any power from outside the Southeast Asian region from interfering in ASEAN's internal affairs. In this context, ASEAN member states reached a consensus by signing ZOPFAN in 1971. TAC was signed by the ASEAN member states at the Bali Summit, Indonesia in February 1976 (Putra, 2015).

TAC is a guideline created to ensure the peaceful settlement of possible conflicts between an ASEAN member states (Putra, 2015). TAC's main principles are 1- mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations, 2- the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, 3- non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, 4- settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means, 5- renunciation of the threat or use of force, and 6- effective co-operation among themselves (AIPR, 1976).

TAC was initiated as a trust building measure among ASEAN member states in its first phase, but later formed the first phase of ASEAN member states contacting actors outside the Southeast Asian region. Thus, within the framework of the principles underlined by TAC, ASEAN member states communicate with non-regional actors. This situation strengthens ASEAN's hand in relations with non-regional actors from the very beginning. In this context, TAC in a way ensures that actors from outside the region are familiarized with the principles of the ASEAN Way and that the relations to be carried out afterward are continued in line with the principles of the ASEAN Way. In other words, TAC is the first phase of establishing communication between ASEAN countries with actors from outside the region.

In this context, actors from the regions around Southeast Asia started to sign the TAC. China and India signed the TAC in 2003, Japan, Pakistan, Korea and Russia in 2004, and Australia and New Zealand in 2005. Later, many countries from different regions signed the TAC. Most recently, TAC has even been proposed by then the Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa as a first phase of establishing Indonesian Indo- Pacific vision (Weatherbee, 2019).

Thus, ASEAN laid the foundations of the communication network, through which ASEAN will communicate with actors both within and outside the region, with TAC. A series of initiatives followed TAC. These initiatives include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).



### **3.3.3.2. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)**

APEC is a regional organization established on the scale of Asia-Pacific with the goal of trade liberalization. The establishment of an Asia-Pacific focused organization such as APEC was realized with the initiatives of non-ASEAN states. In fact, APEC is a continuation and development of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), which was previously run by non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations. Although the proposal for the establishment of APEC was mainly carried out by non-ASEAN states, it would not be wrong to say that it was shaped by Indonesia and ASEAN member states (Elek, 1991; Rudner, 1995).

Indonesia and ASEAN member states consider APEC not only as an organization that would provide economic benefits through trade liberalization, but also as an opportunity to assert ASEAN's central role in the wider Asia-Pacific region. In the frame of APEC, “the Bogor Goals” was announced at the APEC meeting held in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, to encompass practical technical cooperation and a road map to the development of APEC (RSIS, 2013, p. 4).

The Bogor Declaration was a document released in 1994 that provided guidance to member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on how to best lower trade barriers between member nations. The Declaration did not establish any mandatory requirements, but rather proposed that member economies pursue unilateral policies, or negotiate bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements. All of these actions were to be taken with the understanding that they must be compatible with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as with those of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which superseded the GATT (APEC, 2021). As one of the main goals of APEC, the Bogor Goals was projected to launch before 2020.

The 2018 Bogor Goals Progress Report shows that while there has been progress in lowering tariffs, reforming customs, and creating free trade agreements, there is still more work to be done. In particular, the report highlights the need for lower tariffs on agricultural products, less accumulation of non-tariff measures, and fewer sectoral restrictions for foreign companies in services and investment (Kuriyama et al., 2018).

The Bogor Goals in the Bogor Declaration were a significant breakthrough for Indonesia in APEC, as it gave guidance for long-term economic cooperation within the organization (RSIS, 2013, p. 4). Indonesia considers APEC as an opportunity to connect Indonesia and ASEAN with the rest of the world. Connectivity is an important factor in promoting economic integration and growth. It highlights both internal and external interconnectedness, and for Indonesia, it is a prerequisite to foster effective and sustainable regional integration. In terms of connectivity, Indonesia aims to overcome its infrastructure problems causing from the fragmented geography of the country (RSIS, 2013, p. 6).

### **3.3.3.3. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**

ARF is a regional security forum envisage multilateral security cooperation (Katsumata, 2006). As an ASEAN initiative, ARF embraces consensus through consultation approach as a decision-making way. Similar to APEC, the establishment of ARF was proposed by non-ASEAN countries. The first step towards the establishment of ARF was taken at the AMM held in Jakarta in July 1990. At the meeting, Australia proposed a security cooperation initiation based on Asia-Pacific. At the same meeting, Canada proposed the creation of a European-style conference on security and cooperation. However, although these proposals were not welcomed by the ASEAN member states, the proposals motivated Indonesia in the context of establishing such an initiative that could benefit ASEAN member states (Antolik, 1990).

The first ARF convened in Bangkok in July 1994, with the initiatives of ASEAN under the leadership of Indonesia. The code of conduct of treaty in the context of ARF has been determined as measures for providing consensus, diplomacy for avoiding conflicts, and regional security cooperation. ASEAN centrality within the organization was brought to the forefront by deciding to convene ARF annual meetings in one of ASEAN member states (ASEAN, 1994).

Since the ARF designed to work in accordance with the ASEAN Way, ARF's confidence-building measures are mostly non-binding and non-legalistic measures and are essentially voluntary. In other words, although the issues discussed in the

ARF are decided, they may not be realized in practice. In this context, criticism has been directed towards ARF as it is only a "talk shop" (Simon, 2013).

With the initiation of the ARF, ASEAN member states found themselves in a central position within a large security-based regional organization. Thus, ASEAN member states had the power to influence the decision-making mechanism in Asia-Pacific security-based events. In this context, ARF provides the representation of ASEAN on security-based issues in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, the initiation of the ARF and the inclusion of other regional major powers into the ARF can be considered as the success of Indonesia's dynamic equilibrium strategy.

### **3.4. Chapter Conclusion**

This chapter concludes that Indonesia has constructed its foreign policy role as a communication hub over the legacies of the pre-colonial central powers. The normative character of ASEAN Way of regionalism constitutes a platform for Indonesia to perform this role. Over the selected foreign policy cases, it is seen that Indonesia firstly undertakes the mission of ensuring the unity of ASEAN member states, then determining the vision and agenda of the group, and finally having ASEAN represented in the organizations in the Southeast Asian region.

As a result of the cases examined in the title of maintaining the group unity layer, it can be concluded that the role of Indonesia is almost indispensable for ASEAN unity. The Corregidor Affair and the Cambodia – Vietnam conflict are events had huge potential to question the unity of ASEAN. However, with Indonesia's timely and effective policies, these cases were closed without harming ASEAN's unity. On the other hand, keeping Myanmar in ASEAN during the Rohingya Crisis and manage to provide humanitarian aid-based consensus between other ASEAN member states and Myanmar can also be considered as a result of Indonesia's capabilities to maintain ASEAN unity. In all these cases, Indonesia extensively used the "shuttle diplomacy", which is an important element of its foreign policy. Informal contacts with ASEAN member states were made with through shuttle diplomacy bilaterally and multilaterally, and it was ensured that the disagreements between the members were brought to a consensus.

In terms of setting the group vision and agenda, it is demonstrated that Indonesia can unite ASEAN member states around common goals. However, from time to time, some policies implemented by Indonesia within the framework of this layer of the communication hub role can be observed to pose challenge to the basic principles of the ASEAN Way, especially the non-interference. In this sense while ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Community, in a way can be considered as steps to supranationality that eventually demands transfer of national sovereignties, Bali Democracy Forums, in its very essence, foresees gradual transformation of authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia into democracies. Although Indonesia was obviously challenging the non-interference principle, there was not a discernable repercussion from the ASEAN member states though. To some extent, it can be considered as the high level of respect and trust shown to Indonesia from ASEAN member states. This idea can be supported by the elder image of Indonesia portrayed since the beginning of Suharto era. However, although these initiatives challenging the non-interference principle are accepted by ASEAN member states, it would be wrong to suggest that in practice they caused any radical change in the normative character of ASEAN Way. Indonesia carried out these initiatives mainly by setting meeting, new ASEAN platforms and workshops to discuss new values and ideas with ASEAN member states.

Finally, in the representing the group in extra-regional scales layer, it is concluded that the establishment of TAC serves in line with the concerns to build communication within ASEAN and with extra-regional actors in terms of ASEAN Way principles. In the latter, ASEAN states have upper hand in their representation in extra-regional platforms since the other actors pre-accepted that they interact with ASEAN member states in terms ASEAN Way principles. In APEC and ARF cases, although Indonesia or any ASEAN member states did not propose for the initiation of these regional organizations, with the proactive foreign policy practices by Indonesia, ASEAN had a central position within them, and it was able to impose ASEAN Way principles into these regional organizations. Despite the efforts of non-ASEAN states, these two organizations established Asia-Pacific wide have been transformed into being working through ASEAN Way of regionalism principles: consensus through consultation and informality. Additionally, the initiation of ASEAN- G20 Contact Group can also be examined under the layer of the

representing the group in extra-regional scales. The SBY administration initiated the ASEAN-G20 Contact Group to increase communication between ASEAN and G20 countries. Prior to the G20 meetings, finance ministers from ASEAN had gathered to deliberate on the best ways to represent ASEAN at the G20 meeting with Indonesia (Hermawan et al., 2011, pp. 80–84).

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE CASE OF SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE**

This chapter will examine how Indonesia implements the role of "communication hub" in the South China Sea (SCS) case, one of the longest-running problems of Southeast Asia. The SCS case provides an opportunity to see if Indonesia is moving away from its role as a communications hub in a possible foreign policy change. The case has been a part of Indonesia's foreign policy since its establishment. The SCS case is significant not only because it is a long-standing dispute, but also because it involves great power such as China and the United States of America. This makes it an important test of Indonesia's ability to facilitate communication which is the main aim of its role as a communication hub.

This chapter will provide an overview of the SCS disputes, with a focus on the history and complexity of the SCS case. Then the communication hub role will be examined through a set of Indonesian foreign policy initiatives such as the initiation of the workshops on managing potential conflicts in the SCS, the establishment of Code of Conduct on SCS, and the Joint Communique failure in 2012.

Today, China bears huge importance for the prosperity of Southeast Asia just as it did in the pre-colonial Southeast Asia regional system. In this sense, unsteady conditions in the SCS such as conflicts would pose negative effects on the ASEAN states, at least economically. Therefore, the interaction between China and ASEAN has the utmost importance in terms of the resolution of the SCS issue or at best decreasing the tension.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, has paid his first Southeast Asia visit to Indonesia in 2013, just a year after he took office. During his visit, he announced the "New Maritime Silk Road" project (MSR) for the first

time. In his statement, Jinping emphasized the good and connected relations between China and Southeast Asia throughout history. Xi Jinping underline the “shared destiny” between China and ASEAN member states and China is willing to help for the property of the Southeast Asian nations (Jiao & Yunbi, 2013). In this regard, the implementation of the MSR project would mean the reconstruction of these historic relations between China and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, China is willing to finance the infrastructure expenditures of the Southeast Asia part of the project through the funds of the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (Cheng, 2018; China.org, 2017).

Jinping’s emphasis on the shared destiny between China and Southeast Asia was actually a reference to the win-win relations in the pre-colonial period in which China had central and the Southeast Asia powers have a peripheric position. However, in the Chinese periphery, there was always a vassal state which was managing the interaction between China and Southeast Asia.

Curiously enough, just after a year later of Jinping’s visit to Indonesia, the newly elected President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo (“Jokowi” as generally been referred) announced the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” (GMF) project of Indonesia. GMF embraces a series of infrastructure projects to establish the maritime connectivity and the security of Southeast Asia. Similar to Jinping’s references to history, Jokowi also underlined the “maritime culture” of Indonesia which derives from its historical role in Southeast Asia performed by its ancestors; the Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom, and Malacca Sultanate (Hudaya et al., 2017; X. Song, 2016; Witular, 2014). It seems there was a connection between MSR and GMF.

The Chinese MSR and Indonesian GMF have similar goals in Southeast Asia. In this sense, it would be expected that for the implementation of their projects, the two states would compete in the region. However, their attitudes were quite positive, in spite of minor bargaining (Mustapa et al., 2019). While China considers GMF as an opportunity of burden-sharing to establish maritime connectivity, Indonesia inclines to consider MSR as a source of financial support from China (Alie, 2019). However, there is still a large obstacle to be overcome in order for China and ASEAN member

states to have good relations; SCS disputes. In this sense, it could be said that Indonesia was playing a constructive role for a while.

However, several points need to be clarified at this stage. First of all, the Indonesian role is not definitely the resolution of the SCS disputes but rather providing a proper atmosphere for the parties of the issue to enable them for creating a common understanding. As it is argued in the third chapter of this dissertation, Indonesia performs the same role within the ASEAN affairs. In the SCS case, in this sense, Indonesia just upgrades its communication hub role to a bigger stage. The SCS disputes case displays many challenges for Indonesia to perform its role.

The SCS issue includes China which is an extremely powerful state in terms of economy and military. Furthermore, China is quite insistent in its claims of the SCS which derives from its historical rights. Therefore, dealing with China alone is rather a hard endeavor in its own right. On the other hand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei as the other claimant-states have disputes among themselves on the SCS issue. In addition to China, the unilateral acts of these claimant-states and their quarrels with one another make it more difficult for Indonesia to find common ground among them.

To understand this background, this chapter, first of all, begins with an overview of the SCS disputes and later it gives a chronology of the activities that the claimant-states performed since the 1940s to the present. Then, the chapter argues the perceptions and foreign policy orientations of the claimant-states regarding the SCS disputes. Finally, the communication hub role of Indonesia will be examined through specific initiatives taken by Jakarta in SCS disputes.

#### **4.1. An Overview of the South China Sea Issue**

The SCS is located at the junction of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as a semi-enclosed sea. The SCS contains numerous islands and islets. Although in some parts, the sandbanks and shoals are seen, it has a maximum depth of up to 1212 meters. The countries such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia have coastlines to SCS which covers an area of 3685000 square meters (LaFond, 2020).



The SCS has geostrategic and economic importance. Since the region is at the intersection point of the East-West maritime trade of the world, the total 21% of world trade passes through the SCS each year. It comprises 39% Chinese, 85% Indonesian, 86% Vietnamese, 74% Thai, 58% Malay, and 66% Singaporean total trade (Panda, 2017). Besides, a great deal of regional countries' energy need is met from the ships coming from the Middle East through the SCS. In this respect, 30% of oil transported through maritime roads is conveyed through the SCS. This number includes 42% Chinese, 20% Japanese, 18% South Korean crude oil transfers each year (Dunn & Barden, 2018). The SCS also has rich hydrocarbon and fishing resources which is one of the main reasons for the disputes in the area (Vagg, 2012). Therefore, apart from the ASEAN member states, especially China and the USA have a considerable military presence in the region to balance one another (CFR, 2020).

The importance of the SCS naturally led the regional states to have disputes on the SCS in terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction. These disputes remain unsolved from the early 1940s to the present and pose a significant risk to the region's stability. The disputes in this case revolve around the Spratly Islands, made up of more than 100 islets, and the Paracel Islands, comprising 30 islands. The Spratly Islands cover 410000 square kilometers while the Paracel Islands only cover 15000 square kilometers. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all have claims over the Spratly Islands while China, Taiwan, and Vietnam dispute ownership of the Paracel Islands. The claimant-states are those who have occupied many of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, including construction of ports and airports, as well as deploying military presence on the occupied assets- except for Brunei (R. C. Beckman, 2014).

While ASEAN member states generally base their claims to the South China Sea on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which was signed in 1982, China and Taiwan base their claim on their historical rights (Peter Dutton, 2011).

According to UNCLOS, the area that 12 nautical miles away from the coasts of littoral states is the territorial sea in which the related state has sovereignty.

Additionally, the area that 188 nautical miles away from the continental margins (which corresponds to a depth of 2000 meters) is the EEZ of the related state in which it can carry out underwater exploration and exploitation activities. In this sense, Malaysia claims 12 of the southern Spratly Islands by emphasizing that these islands remain within its continental shelf. Vietnam claims "indisputable sovereignty" on the Spratly and Paracel Islands (Peter Dutton, 2011, p. 4). Vietnam claims that the French had invaded the islands in 1929, and when Vietnam gained its independence, naturally these islands have to belong to Vietnam (Cossa, 1998, p. B-3). The Philippines claims the islands in the eastern part of the Spratlys. These islands are called the Kalayaan Island Group in the Philippines. Finally, Brunei claims Louisa Reef in the Spratlys (Peter Dutton, 2011, p. 3).

In turn, China and Taiwan base their claims on the nine-dash line/U-shaped line area which almost covers 80% of the whole SCS. Although being one of the UNCLOS signatories, China denies the UNCLOS on the SCS issue. As Chinese governments occasionally stated, China discovered the SCS islands during the Han Dynasty (Cossa, 1998, p. 2). Taiwan, on the other hand, has confirmed to act by the "ASEAN Declaration on the SCS" signed in 1992, which takes the UNCLOS as a legal basis (Cossa, 1998, p. 6). In other words, although having similar claims with China, Taiwan embraces a rather acquiescent attitude in the issue.

Set aside the conflicting claims on the SCS issue, the UNCLOS, which was signed by all the SCS claimant-states, provides clear-cut regulations related to the SCS issue. Being considered as a semi-enclosed sea, in the SCS, the littoral states have to establish a maritime regime in the common areas outside their EEZs for cooperation, according to the UNCLOS Article 123" (*United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 1982) prescribes;

States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end, they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization: (a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; (b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article." (*United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 1982)

While the UNCLOS is quite clear about the procedure that the claimant-states have to follow, the solution of the issue is not that easy in the practice and the SCS issue remains unsolved since the 1940s to the present.

#### **4.2. The Chronology of the South China Sea Disputes: 1940s-2020s**

Although the first official claim on the SCS was made by China in 1887 which based on the agreement between France and China in 1887 (Thomas, 1990), the SCS issue has begun with the establishment of independent nation-states in the region. In this regard, the SCS issue can be traced back to the late 1940s and the early 1950s.

In 1947, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of China (the People's Republic of China was not established at that time) announced the "eleven-dash line" map. Later in 1949, after the Chinese Communist Party took office, China adopted the "nine-dash line" map and it recapitulated its claims in 1951 (Beukel, 2010, p. 11; Setiabudi, 2018).

In response, Vietnam announced that it has sovereignty over all Spratlys in 1951 and 1956 (Cossa, 1998, p. B-3). In 1958, China announced the "Declaration of Territorial Sea". According to the declaration, the area that 12 nautical miles away from the coasts of Taiwan, the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and the Pescadores is claimed as the Chinese territorial sea (Cossa, 1998, p. B-2).

In 1971, the Philippines announced that 8 of the Spratly Islands are affiliated to the Palawan Province of the Philippines (Setiabudi, 2018, p. 158). In 1974, China carried out a military operation to invade the Paracels. During that time, China was already governing the eastern part of the islands and Vietnam was governing the western part. Conflict was concluded by Chinese invasion of the whole Paracels. Although Vietnam tried to take back the Paracels, it eventually failed (Beukel, 2010, p. 11).

In 1979, Malaysia announced an official map and claimed the south and east parts of the Spratlys since the area remains in its continental shelf. In 1983, Malaysia built a small military garrison and conducted fishery patrols on the Swallow Reef. In 1991, Malaysia also added a small tourist center and bird sanctuary to the Reef. In 1986, Malaysia deployed military assets on the Mariveles and Ardasier Reefs (Cossa, 1998, p. B-2).

One of the important turning points of the SCS issue came in the 1980s. In 1982, China and all the Southeast Asian states signed the UNCLOS (*United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 1994). This new development is resulted in a revision of the claimant-states position on the SCS issue, at least for Southeast Asian states. After the convention, the main anchor for Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei became the rules of the convention. Therefore, these states had the chance to refer to an official document to support their claims. However, although being a signatory as well, China has never recognized UNCLOS in almost any SCS disputes. According to China, the disputed islands on the SCS already belong to it. Therefore, other claimant-states have to respect Chinese EEZ attached to these islands including Taiwan itself (Malik, 2013).

In the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War, the claimant-states have begun to express their claims rather insistently. Taking advantage of the power gap left with the diminishing control of the Soviets and the USA, the claimant-states have intensified their invasion of the islands and hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation activities in SCS. In this regard, they have also begun to increase their naval and air capabilities to secure their assets in SCS as a measure for a possible conflict. Expected quarrels began with China-Vietnam conflict in 1988 and resulted in the removal of Vietnam from Johnson South Reef of the Spratlys (Bradley, 2019).

In 1992, China approved "Law on the Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas" at the National People's Congress. With this law, China has renewed its claims of the 1958 Declaration, and it expanded its claimed area by adopting the 24 nautical miles contiguous zones. On the other hand, the law was legitimizing China to use force if considered necessary (Cossa, 1998, p. B-2). That was a clear message to other claimant-states who were already quite annoyed by the law.

In response, on 22 July 1992, the ASEAN states collectively announced the "ASEAN Declaration on the SCS" in the light of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The declaration was signed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (*1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea*, 1992).

The purpose of the declaration was to decrease the tension, work to ensure that the disputes are solved by peaceful methods and prevent claimant-states to act unilaterally (Roberts, 2016, p. 5). The absence of China in the declaration can be perceived as a response from ASEAN states to Chinese Law on the Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone. Besides, the declaration has the importance of being the first collective action taken by ASEAN states as a community on the SCS issue.

In February 1995, China occupied the Mischief Reef, which also belonged to the Philippines according to their claim. The Filipino people reacted to this by demanding an immediate agreement on a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. After the Mischief Reef incident, China and the Philippines made a joint statement in which they agreed that the problems should be solved peacefully and within the framework of mutual respect (Beukel, 2010, p. B-12). However, towards the end of 1998, China began to build constructions on the Mischief Reef. The Philippines considered this act as a violation of the joint statement in 1995 (Beukel, 2010, p. 13).

As a result of the Chinese assertive acts, the ASEAN states agreed on a draft of the Code of Conduct in the SCS (COC) by the end of 1999. Then, the draft was exchanged with the Chinese draft and tried to be converted into a single text (Thayer, 2012).

However, the parties involved held different opinions on some aspects of the drafts, such as the geographic scope, restrictions on construction on already occupied and unoccupied features, military activities permissible in waters near the Spratly islands, and whether or not fishermen found in these areas might be arrested. Consequently, the COC process ultimately failed. Though, that failure did result in the eventual creation of a less constrictive document known as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) in later years (Thayer, 2012, p. 2).

In 2002, the DOC was signed by ASEAN and China. The DOC can be considered as the first concrete step toward an eventual COC. The main purpose of the DOC is to work for creating some consensus-building measures among the claimant-states to prevent further deterioration of SCS disputes and to promote peace and stability in

the region (Chung, 2008, p. 95; “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” 2003).

In November 2007, China announced the construction of a new city in Hainan Province which is responsible for the government of the Spratlys, Paracels, and Macclesfield Bank (Elleman, 2008, p. 42).

On 10 March 2009, by signing the Archipelagic Baselines Act, the president of the Philippines, Gloria Arroyo has announced that the Kalayaan Island Group, which is a part of the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, is the “regime of islands” and it was included in the territories of the Philippines (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 254).

In 2009, Vietnam criticized China for allowing a company to organize a tour to the Phu Lam Island in the Paracels and it stated that this act would have a negative impact on the bilateral relations between the two states. Vietnam has appointed a government official to the Paracels and sent a group that consists of high-ranking officials from the Communist Party of Vietnam's Central Committee for Education and Propagation to pay a visit to the islands. China protested this act and emphasized that it was illegal and invalid (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 255).

On 6 May 2009 Malaysia and Vietnam issued a joint submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to globally claim the islands within their EEZs. Besides, Vietnam also made another submission on 7 May 2009 (R. Beckman, 2020).

In response, on 7 May 2009, China submitted its a nine-dash line map to the UNA as a *note verbale* and it stated that China has a indisputable sovereignty over the SCS islands and adjacent waters (*Note Verbale*, 2009).

China has been intensifying its actions in recent years, and the arrest of 37 Vietnamese fishermen in the waters near the Paracels in mid-June 2009 showed its determination to assert its claims. Additionally, at the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's Standing Committee, Chinese officials have considered establishing an airport and a naval dock in Mischief Reef to defend Chinese interests in the Spratlys (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 255).

In November 2009, Vietnam held an international conference on SCS for the first time. This was interpreted as a support gathering maneuver for the SCS issue before Vietnam to become ASEAN Chair in 2010 (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 255).

In 2016, the Philippines is proved to be right the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) at Hague and it proved that its claims on the SCS disputes are valid. However, this has not been considered valid by China. As emphasized earlier, although being one of the UNCLOS signatories, China rejects to recognize the decisions taken by the UNCLOS especially in the SCS issue (Guardian, 2016).

The 2010s have also witnessed the unilateral acts of the claimant-states related to the SCS issue. At first glance, the SCS issue seems like a dead-end considering its history of nearly eight decades in which there are no worthy improvements except the initiation of the DOC/COC process. Normally, the UNCLOS as a convention signed by all the parties regulates all the procedures and determines the individual states' EEZs. However, the claimant-states deny acting accordingly with the UNCLOS and they generally seek unilateral solutions toward their causes. In this sense, the SCS issue does not seem like a pure jurisdiction problem. To understand the roots of the SCS issue, the chapter focuses on the perceptions and foreign policy orientations of the claimant-states on the SCS issue.

### **4.3. The Perception of China on South China Sea Issue**

To understand the SCS issue, one has to focus on the Chinese perception of the SCS since China is one of the most powerful states not just in Asia but also in the world. As mentioned earlier, China's references to the SCS have historical leanings. In the pre-colonial period which corresponds between 2000 BCE and 18th century, although not having a direct hegemony, China enjoyed a privileged position among the regional powers especially in terms of regional water-borne trade relations. Within this period, it can be argued that the Southeast Asian powers had economic dependence on China. Although this dependence is not quite the same with the intensive economic interdependence of today, these Southeast Asian powers had to cooperate with China for their economic interests since they are happened to be located in the passing road in which traders carry the goods from or to China. As it is

argued in the second chapter of this dissertation, within the tributary relations between China and Southeast Asian powers in the pre-colonial period, the ancestors of China had performed the role of being the “middle kingdom” of the system. In this regard, China, today, considers the SCS as the lost territories (Beukel, 2010, p. 7) , or at least the lost sphere of influence.

Additionally, the name of the SCS comes from the centrality of China in history. The name actually is a legacy of the Western colonial powers. The Westerners named the SCS by taking erstwhile China as a focal point (Tønnesson, 2005). In the literature, this semi-enclosed sea still majorly referred as such. However, there are also some critics which find the name rather orientalist. They prefer to use the term “the South Sea” (Roberts, 2016). Yet considering the sea is in the “south” of China still, it is clearly not a remedy to escape the orientalist perspective. In the Chinese records, the SCS and also all Southeast Asia region referred as “*Nanyang*” (the Southern Ocean) (Reid, 1988, p. 6). Currently, China calls the SCS as “*Nan Hai*” (South Sea) (LaFond, 2020). In a way, similar to the Westerners, China locates the SCS by centering itself.

Apart from the references to history, the economic and strategic importance of the SCS is nothing to be dismissed by Chinese authorities. Chinese interests in the SCS also derives from the hydrocarbon and fishing resources in addition to the region's strategic importance as being one of the transit passages of the world trade. Especially considering the region's strategic importance, China cannot let any other power to dominate the region to ensure its own security. In this regard, China attempts to increase its military presence in the SCS islands. Given the history, China barely had permanent military existence in the SCS, it can be inferred that China gives rather more importance to the SCS currently. Naturally, the presence of a power like the USA in the SCS is also helpful in explaining this military intensification of China in the SCS (*Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea*, 2022).

Considering the historical attachment and the current interests, the main purpose of China in the SCS is to be interpreted as the re-establishment of the privileges taken from China during the colonial period. In this regard, especially with the beginning



of its rise in the 1970s, China has paid huge importance to strengthen its economic relations with its periphery. Observing the Chinese portion of the trade volumes of East and Southeast Asian states, it becomes more discernable that China has already established economic asymmetrical relations with its periphery today. China holds the capability of economically attract or blackmail these states in order to reach its cause (ASEAN, 2022). Indeed, as it is argued in the next part of this chapter, the "love and hate" relationship of Southeast Asia claimant-states towards China stems from this asymmetric economic relationship. Although these states cannot compromise with China in the context of territorial sovereignty in the SCS, they have to compromise in the economic context. With the "One Belt One Road" project, in this regard, China is willing to reconstruct its trade network in a more systematic way. The MSR project is the part of this plan related to the Southeast Asia and naturally the SCS.

Chinese efforts to influence the powers within its periphery and prevent extra-regional powers to penetrate are compared to America's policies on all the Americas in the framework of the Monroe Doctrine. However, the main difference is that China's claims are historical, on the other hand, America's claim was rather geographical and derives from its natural leadership considering its material capabilities in the region (Hideshi, 2013, p. 4).

On the other hand, as a necessity of its historical role, China considers itself as the responsible power for the maintenance of order and stability in its periphery (Beukel, 2010, p. 7). In this regard, as an example, China tried to establish a posture of providing financial support to the states in need against the "weakening West" in the 2008 financial crisis (Vaswani, 2017). While these efforts can be interpreted either Chinese bit of removing its "assertive rising power" image and as an indicator of its divine role for its periphery.

The SCS issue has the utmost importance for China. This background leads China to perform a multi-layered and multi-sourced foreign policy on the SCS in order to obtain certain gains. These policies should be emphasized to understand the complexity of China's approach to the SCS.

### **4.3.1. The Chinese Policies on South China Sea**

The Chinese foreign policy on the SCS is multi-layered and multi-sourced. China interacts with other SCS claimant-states in unilateral, bilateral, multilateral (ASEAN Platforms) and global (UN) platforms. Although China has given more weight to one of these layers from time to time, it has also performed coordinated actions in these layers. Within the layers, China uses both its hard power and soft power means according to the circumstances.

#### **4.3.1.1. The Layers of Chinese Policies on South China Sea**

Since the 1940s when the SCS issue first emerged, China has been asserting that the SCS disputes have to be discussed bilaterally. However, due to the efforts of the other SCS claimant-states to draw China to ASEAN platforms, China also had to carry out policies in the multilaterally. On the other hand, China performs global policies to defend its interests about the SCS in the framework of the submission issued to the UN. Rather than the approval of the UN decisions, China's purpose with the submissions is to convey a message to its opponents whom China keeps its hard-liner position in the issue. Finally, it is worthy to underline that if China gets no results in bilateral, multilateral, or global platforms, it does not hesitate to act unilaterally (Beukel, 2010).

First of all, it should be emphasized that China has an indisputable militaristic and economic superiority compared to other SCS claimant-states. Therefore, the bilateral interactions between the claimant-states give China an upper hand. If the states cannot reach a consensus bilaterally, China always has the chance to act unilaterally and get easy gains (Cai, 2016; *Military Strength Comparisons for 2022*, 2022).

SCS claimant states, in turn, generally do not wish to interact with China bilaterally. These states' tendencies are generally trying to pull China to multilateral platforms or simply bandwagon to the USA against China. The second choice is generally chosen if the states cannot find support from ASEAN. For example, after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, the Philippines signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the USA on 10 February 1998 (Buszynski, 2003). In this example, although China had relative gains against the Philippines, as a result, it has led the USA to

perform military exercises in the SCS on a legal basis. On the other hand, according to Buszynski, this was not beneficial for the Philippines either. The Philippines earlier tried to end the existence of the USA in Subic Bay in 1992 and now it invited the USA to its own country willingly just because of the Chinese threat (Buszynski, 2003, pp. 352–353). Similar acts of China resulted in similar outcomes with the other SCS claimant-states. China does not wish these states to bandwagon to the USA. Therefore, China occasionally states that it is willing to discuss the SCS issue on a multilateral atmosphere in order to attemper the SCS claimant-states and prevent them to get any closer to the USA.

Apart from the USA threat, one of the reasons for China to go multilaterally is the awareness that China has not to be seen as an assertive power in the eyes of the Southeast Asian states. After all, the historical China-Southeast Asia tributary relations, which China tries to re-establish, were not a system of exploitation but rather a win-win order. In this regard, China also intends to keep good relations with all Southeast Asian states. Therefore, China occasionally is present in the multilateral platforms as well. However, the fact that China is also discussing the SCS issue on the multilateral platforms should not be understood as China genuinely embrace multilateralism. China emphasizes that its presence in multilateral platforms should be perceived as a sign of goodwill towards ASEAN states. The SCS issue still has to be discussed bilaterally between the claimant-states (Shaohua, 2006).

China does not want the SCS issue to be discussed on multilateral platforms for several reasons. First of all, it is more appropriate for China to keep the discussions minimal since internationalization of the issue would attract more attention globally and according to UNCLOS, China's claims are already unfounded. A second reason is that China does not want to encounter a unified ASEAN on the SCS issue. To discuss especially sovereignty and jurisdiction issues about the SCS issue in ASEAN platforms would lead to the loneliness of China within the group. In addition, China does not want to lose its effectiveness as a result of ASEAN's omni-enmeshment strategy. In this strategy, ASEAN countries, mostly Indonesia, draw great powers to as many organizations as possible and try to achieve a balance among them. In organizations that include powers such as the USA, India, and Japan, it does not seem possible for China to have easy achievements. On the other hand, non-regional

powers should not be involved in Southeast Asia, which China considers as its own periphery (Press & Security, 2013; Tagotra, 2016).

For all these reasons, although China does not wish to argue the SCS issue multilaterally, it can be inferred that for some of the reasons mentioned earlier, it is obliged to do so. Within this dilemma, China implements the policy referred as the “talk and take” strategy in the literature (Beukel, 2010, p. 12). While China is active on ASEAN platforms, on the one hand, it also continues its activities in the SCS unilaterally such as invading, inhabiting, militarizing the islands, or establishing new artificial ones. Thus, although other SCS claimant-states give a short-term negative response, China can calm these states on multilateral platforms by emphasizing the importance of cooperation and solving problems in peaceful ways. China even occasionally criticized other SCS claimant-states unilateral acts in these multilateral organizations. Thus, by removing the crime from itself, China accuses other SCS claimant-states and tries to form public opinion (Beukel, 2010; Hideshi, 2013).

Finally, China carries out policies on the SCS issue on a global scale. However, China is aware that its claims are unfounded according to the UNCLOS. Therefore, China generally uses its submission to the UN as a message of emphasizing that China is rather insistent in its claims. On the other hand, the timing of Chinese submission to the UN coincidence with the other claimant-states submissions. In this sense, China uses its submission as a reflection to its opponents’ submissions.

China supports its multi-layered foreign policy on the SCS issue with its multi-sourced foreign policy tools. This is one of the privileges that differentiates China from other SCS claimant-states and places it in a superior position. Other SCS claimant-states do not have the capabilities that China has.

#### **4.3.1.2. The Sources of Chinese Policies on South China Sea**

China is a deterrent power in the region in terms of its militaristic and economic capabilities. Between the 1940s and 1980s, China predominantly preferred to use its hard power means to support its claims in the SCS issue. In this period, there was a race of invading the SCS islands among the claimant-states in which China was a triumph. With the announcement of the “Law on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous

Zone” in 1992 (Hideshi, 2013, p. 3), China has legitimized the method of using force when necessary.

On the other hand, considering Chinese hard power only with the lenses of military capabilities would be misleading. The economic dependencies of other claimant-states to China are one of the Chinese hard power means. China is the most important partner of Southeast Asian states in their foreign trade volumes. In other words, China has a chance to economically blackmail these states to reach its cause in the SCS issue. China has occasionally used this as an advantage to disrupt the ASEAN unity in the SCS issue (le Thu, 2019).

However, China also has difficulties due to the use of hard power from time to time. As a result of using hard power, China is perceived as an assertive and aggressive power in the eyes of the Southeast Asian states and the world. In this regard, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, China has adopted the way of using soft power elements in its foreign policy coordinately with its presence on the multilateral platforms (Kurlantzick, 2007).

In his work, "The Art of War", Sun Tzu said that attacking the enemy's minds is better than attacking their sheltered cities (Beukel, 2010, p. 8). In this sense, China, to prove its rise is rather embracing instead of being assertive, tries to attract Southeast Asian states with the use of its soft power. However, China's soft power implementation should not be considered as a complete abandonment of hard power. In other words, China occasionally reminds its hard power to the other claimant-states. Joshua Kurlantzick describes China's use of soft power, especially regarding the SCS issue, as the “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick, 2007).

China has implemented this strategy mostly on the non-claimant members of the ASEAN. In this way, China mostly tries to attract states like Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos. Since these states have no claim on the SCS issue, it is easier for them to favor the Chinese side, especially considering the possibility of establishing beneficial economic cooperation with China. These developing countries need foreign investments to support their domestic financial needs such as infrastructure expenditures. China uses its financial support as a bribing factor on the SCS issue in this sense. In the literature, the Joint Communiqué failure in 2012 under

the ASEAN Chairmanship of Cambodia is considered as an outcome of the Chinese strategy. This situation can be evaluated as proof of how successful the strategy of China can be. The Joint Communique failure in 2012 will be covered in detail in the following parts of this chapter (Kurlantzick, 2006).

In addition, China tries to attract Indonesia as well by using its strategy to ensure the consent of Indonesia which is a key actor in the SCS issue. Especially after the inauguration of the Jokowi administration, Indonesia began to focus more on domestic politics rather than foreign policy. The improvement of Indonesia's infrastructure poses as a top priority for Jokowi, and China is willing to financially support Indonesia in this regard. However, so far, Indonesia shows no tendency to align the Chinese in the issue (Connelly, 2014).

China generally makes financial investments in the Southeast Asia region. After all, the prosperity of the SEA, which is the periphery of China, is directly related to the prosperity of China as well. In this regard, China supports and invests especially the infrastructure needs of the Southeast Asian states. The supports have been given to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) through the MSR project and the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) can be evaluated in this respect. In The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in November 2014, Ji Xinjing promised to provide 40\$ billion financial supports especially for the MSR project, and also promised another 50\$ billion support to AIIB (Damuri et al., 2014).

The Nanning-Singapore Economic Corridor is an example of China's activities in this regard. This corridor connects Nanning, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore by train. The "Greater Mekong Subregion" plans to connect Kunming, China to Singapore. Pan- Beibu Gulf Economic Cooperation and the Hainan Initiative can also be related to the Chinese efforts to establishing close relations with Southeast Asia (Peter Dutton, 2011, p. 15). In this context, China both improving its image in the eyes of these states and establishing the mentioned good and connected relations physically with them.

Concentrating on China, it would be wrong to consider the SCS issue as a pure sovereignty and jurisdiction problem. China has the capability to establish its hegemony in the SCS even despite the presence of the USA in the region. However,

China does not intend to do that at the expense of losing the trust of Southeast Asian states. That would harm the future plans of China which are to establish the “center-periphery” relationship with the Southeast Asia. In this sense, China has to be very sensitive to its relations to Southeast Asian states. On the one hand, China has to show its superiority yet, on the other hand, it has to re-establish “good and connected relations” with Southeast Asian states as the MSR project foresees.

As mentioned in the introduction part of this section about China, it is extremely important to understand China's point of view about the SCS issue. However, it should be remembered that China is not alone in the issue. How ASEAN countries in general and SCS claimant-states, in particular, perceive China and pursue policies are also of great importance. In the next part of this chapter, the perceptions of SCS claimant, states on the SCS issue and the policies they carry out within the framework of these perceptions will be discussed.

#### **4.4. The Perceptions of ASEAN Member States on South China Sea**

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are the SCS claimant-states apart from China and Taiwan. Yet unlike China and Taiwan, their claims are not based on historical rights. These states, after gaining sovereignty in the 20th century, generally demarcated their territories on the former administrative areas of their colonists. Their claims on the SCS issue based on their EEZs determined by the UNCLOS. In this regard, they all have disputes between China. On the one hand, they have disagreements among themselves as well (Simões, 2022).

The way these claimant-states perceive the SCS issue rather differently than China's “center-periphery” perception. Their demands are purely obtaining the rights of the nation-states as it is stated in international law. They carry out their foreign policies to meet this goal. In spite of the perceptual differences, likewise China, they also do not wish to gain the enmity of China at the expense of realizing their claims in the SCS. However, they do not think like their prosperity is bounded with that of Chinese in the context of win-win relations. They try to defend its claims on the SCS issue but pays ultimate attention to not annoy China since their asymmetric economic dependencies toward China. This has been addressed in the previous parts of this chapter in numbers. In this respect, while these states are in conflict with China, on

the one hand, they are eager to sustain economic cooperation with China. On the one hand, these states should protect their sovereign rights against China in the SCS disputes, and on the other hand, they should strengthen their relations with China (Kuik, 2015; Simões, 2022). Therefore, it would not be wrong to comment that these countries try to make concessions from China whenever possible. As a matter of fact, even though they do not regard China as a central kingdom, it can be said that the situation in practice is not different from this kind of relationship.

In addition to their asymmetric economic dependencies, these claimant-states do not have a capability that can afford a possible military confrontation with China. In this regard, these states occasionally rely on the USA to maintain their own security towards China. However, it has to be underlined their alignments with the USA are generally temporary and only based on their self-interests. Rather, they rely on the policy of internationalizing the SCS issue in the multilateral platforms, especially ASEAN. By that, they aim to not annoy China and have an opportunity of bargaining. However, it should not be forgotten that these claimant-states have also disputes with each other, set aside the disputes with China. Therefore, even in the multilateral platforms, they occasionally act in a disaccord and that harms the resolution processes. Additionally, they continue to carry out bilateral discussions with China in the SCS issue and that results in the erosion of the value of multilateralism. On the other hand, from time to time, these countries are able to show a common attitude towards China by temporarily agreeing on certain specific issues. Joint submission to the UN can be given as an example. However, given that these claimant-states already adopt the UNCLOS, it will be understood that these temporary compromises are not very extreme (ASEAN, 2022; Cai, 2016; *Military Strength Comparisons for 2022*, 2022).

Likewise, China in the SCS issue, these claimant-states carry out a multi-layered foreign policy in unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, and global levels. Yet unlike China, the hard powers of these countries are not in a position to deter China in the SCS. Additionally, it would not be wrong to say that their soft powers are completely out of the equation. They can shift between the layers if they consider necessary on the specific issues related to the SCS. Contrary to the fact that China favored bilateral



relations more, they mostly prefer multilateral platforms for the possibility of balancing China.

Unilaterally, these states have their own agendas, to begin with. According to the bitterness of the situation, they conduct underwater exploration and exploitation activities in the SCS and even they can invade some of the SCS islands and islets. However, it has to be emphasized these kinds of activities dramatically decreased in the 1990s with the beginning of multilateral interactions. In addition, individual declarations about the SCS or individual submissions to the UN can be considered in this regard as well. For example, the Philippines announced Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding (JSMU). Later, even though Vietnam participated in this, after a while no results were obtained, and it was suspended. Such situations are among the behaviors that cause disharmony within ASEAN. On the other hand, the unilateral act of these countries can be interpreted as showing distrust to the ASEAN platforms from time to time (Roberts, 2016, pp. 6–10).

Bilaterally, these countries have been in contact with each other, with China and with the USA from outside the region. It is difficult to say that they have achieved results in their bilateral relations with each other, considering that they have relatively similar powers. On the other hand, in bilateral relations with China and the USA, the probability of entering one of these countries orbit is also very high. Malaysia's close relationship with China and the Philippines with the US from time to time can be given as an example. Getting close to China means making concessions to China, getting closer to the USA means making China irritated (Roberts, 2016, pp. 6–10). As a result, every relationship carried out bilaterally ultimately harms the ASEAN unity which is perhaps the only possibility for the future resolution of the SCS issue. Even these concessions of China have a ground, it has not to be forgotten that it is generally just temporary.

Multilaterally, these claimant-states discuss the SCS issue through the ASEAN platforms. In fact, this is the most appropriate scenario for these states. Thus, they have the chance to communicate with China as ASEAN, and they also have the possibility to create a balance by attracting the other major powers to balance China. However, the ASEAN unity in this regard is quite fragile.

First of all, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, China has the capability to disrupt the ASEAN unity by interacting with ASEAN states bilaterally. The relations between Malaysia and China can be given as an example here. The good relations between Malaysia and China can be traced back to 1974 when Malaysia became the first Southeast Asian state to establish diplomatic relations with China. In addition, although it protested China's territorial law in 1992, erstwhile president of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammad visited Beijing in 1993 and the two countries expressed a common opinion on “Asian Values”. Especially in this period, Malaysia and China tend to see each other as Asians against the West. In addition, during the visit of Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar in Beijing in May 1999, the two countries published joint statements and emphasized that the negotiations on the SCS issue have to be carried out bilaterally between the claimant-states. In these good relations, the geographical distance between these two countries and the significance of the Chinese Malaysian population in Malaysia plays an important role. Therefore, as an ASEAN founding member, Malaysia is one of the hindrances for the resolution of the SCS issue multilaterally (Hamzah, 2021; Roberts, 2016).

On the other hand, the inclusion of new members to ASEAN has negatively affected the unity of ASEAN on the SCS issue. With the inclusion of Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos to ASEAN in the 1990s, China has better chances to disrupt ASEAN unity on the SCS issue since these new members are not claimant on the SCS issue and thus easily be distracted by China. Finally, the cleavages between the claimant-states about the SCS issue also weakens this unity in ASEAN platforms. There is a disaccord especially between Malaysia and the Philippines in this regard. While Malaysia is close to China in the SCS issues, the Philippines is close to the USA. Malaysia occasionally criticizes the Philippines to draw the USA to SEA. According to Malaysia, the SCS issues have to be discussed bilaterally among the claimant-states of the region (Buszynski, 2003, pp. 351–352).

Finally, SCS claimant-states also carry out activities at the UN level as well. Their submissions to the UN can be considered in this regard. Especially the victory of the Philippines in Hague against China in 2016 is one of the good examples in this sense. However, this victory of the Philippines was not recognized by China, and it was not effective in resolving the SCS dispute between China and the Philippines. In this

sense, it can be suggested that any decisions taken without the content of China would not provide a step to solve the disputes.

It is clear that these states will not be able to individually compete with China in the context of the SCS issue. One reason for this is that they are quite weak in both the economy and military compared to China. On the other hand, the economic asymmetric dependency they have toward China urges them to keep good relations with China. Although this may seem like a stalemate for these states at first glance, there is a way for them to get the best out of the SCS issue or at least not to lose any further. In this sense, acting accordingly with ASEAN seems like the best option for these states to find a permanent solution for the SCS issue. However, the main problem in this regard is the fragility of relations between ASEAN states which causes temporal disunity. The disunity generally derives from the lack of communication between ASEAN states. This situation is exemplified in the third chapter of this dissertation in the regional conflicts between Cambodia-Vietnam, Cambodia-Thailand, or in the Rakhine States crisis. However, after multichannel communication means establish among them both informal and formal, these states tend to understand each other better, and that generally leads to the easy resolution of the problems.

For this scenario, there has to be healthy communication among ASEAN states and later between ASEAN and China. The role of Indonesia, in this sense, is decisive. Indonesia, although being a non-claimant state in the SCS issue, played major roles to decrease the tension among the claimant-states and initiate discussion platforms in which all the claimant-states interact.

The Indonesian role being the communication hub of Southeast Asia has been argued in the third chapter of this dissertation. Indonesia, especially since the early 1990s, began to perform its role in the SCS issue as well. Indonesia aims to ensure that not only the SCS claimant-states, but all the ASEAN states should gather around and interact with China together. However, it has to be underlined that, Indonesia does not aim to unite ASEAN states “against” China. Indonesia aims to manage the communication between the ASEAN states and China to establish win-win relations among them. The SCS is also important in this respect. A possible war between

China and any of Southeast Asia states will negatively affect the win-win relations that Indonesia, and in its own perceptive China, wish to establish. Indonesia has the potential to initiate the opportunity both for China and other claimant-states to communicate with each other more comprehensively.

#### **4.5. Communication Hub Role of Indonesia in South China Sea**

In the former parts of this chapter, it has been underlined that the SCS issue is not a pure sovereignty and jurisdiction problem. First of all, the SCS issue includes a state such as China which is far superior even from the combination of ASEAN states in terms of military and economy. On the other hand, other claimant-states' disagreements among each other results in a disunity within ASEAN. Besides, the SCS issue lasts nearly eight decades and so far, it seems like nothing to be solved in the near future. In such an atmosphere, to find a common ground for these claimant-states and conduct a unified ASEAN relations with China is something above of an "honest-broker" or a "moderator" as some assume Indonesia is one of them. On the other hand, considering the material capabilities, indeed Indonesia falls behind to bear that responsibility even.

As explained in the second chapter of this dissertation, the ancestors of Indonesia played active roles in Southeast Asia throughout the history, and they undertook the role of being the "communication hub" of the region. Especially in this regard, the regulation of the relations between Southeast Asian regional powers and China has been one of the main duties of these hubs. Today, China's approach to Southeast Asia is in the line with the pre-colonial Southeast Asia- China relations. China is again the superior power and Southeast Asian states are again economically dependent on China. It is, by no means, should be understood as the current relations between China and Southeast Asia is identical with the one in the pre-colonial period. However, reading the current developments through the lenses of history helps us comprehend the complexity of the issue clearly. On the other hand, who would be able to explain how China is the biggest threat and at the same time the biggest partner of the Southeast Asian states.

In the pre-colonial period, the ancestors of Indonesia by holding the Malacca Straits were managing the communication not just between Southeast Asia and China but all

world. Today, by the means of ASEAN, Indonesia has a chance to bear the role of being “communication hub” of Southeast Asia and manage the interaction between Southeast Asia and China. Considering Jokowi’s GMF project, Indonesia is willing to take this role to global scale as well.

Given the eight decades long SCS disputes history, the last three decades is discernable in which Indonesia took active role. Indonesian purpose in the SCS disputes is, in the line with the layers of communication hub role. First provide the maintaining the group unity among the ASEAN member states, then provide whole representation of the group in the table and later set the vision for the resolution of the problem.

However naturally, Indonesia occasionally has difficulties to carry out this mission. The unilateral acts of the claimant-states are one of the factors that weaken the hand of Indonesia. On the other hand, the situation that ASEAN states cannot agree with each other on specific matters from time to time can be added to this. While the inclusion of a state like China into a multilateral platform is a difficult task in its own right, Indonesia has to deal with the disagreements between ASEAN member states as well. Considering the China’s abilities to disrupt the unity of ASEAN and the temporary presence of the USA in the region, the Indonesian mission becomes even more complex.

The following part of this chapter, first of all, focuses on Indonesian foreign policies on the SCS issue and later the Indonesian initiatives for the implementation of its communication hub role in SCS.

#### **4.5.1. Indonesian Policies and Initiatives on the South China Sea Issue**

Since its establishment in 1945, Indonesia has been involved in Southeast Asia regional issues in varying degrees. However, after achieving the economic and political stability of the newly established state, Indonesia began to take an active role in the SCS issue as well since the early 1990s. Indonesia, like the other claimant-states apart from China and Taiwan, accepts the EEZs of the UNCLOS and it denies the Chinese nine-dash line claim. China's nine-dash line partially overlaps with the EEZ of the Natunas, which are under Indonesian sovereignty. Therefore, especially

before the 1990s, Indonesia considers China as a possible threat to its sovereignty, although China has never claimed the Natunas (Aplianta, 2015).

Between 1945-1965, Indonesia had good relations with China under Sukarno leadership. However, after the coup in 1965, Suharto took office and terminated diplomatic relations with China. The possibility of communist Chinese influence on Indonesia was the main reason for the Suharto administration to take this decision. However, in the mid-1980s, Indonesia achieved economic growth and began to search for different economic partners to sustain this growth. In this regard, relations with China were re-established in 1990 (Aplianta, 2015).

Immediately after the normalization of relations with Indonesia, China was included in the ASEAN platforms. China participated in the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991 and China accepted as an ASEAN dialogue partner (Aplianta, 2015, p. 6). The inclusion of China to ASEAN platforms was actually the first but not the last contribution of Indonesia to the SCS issue.

Indonesia's policies on the SCS issue follows a similar path with its ASEAN oriented foreign policy cases. As examined in detail in the third chapter of this dissertation, Indonesia performs its communication hub role through three main layers. In doing so, Jakarta effectively utilizes shuttle diplomacy, multilateral platforms, and dynamic equilibrium strategy. Indonesian approach to SCS disputes also includes a high level of informality as a part of ASEAN Way of diplomacy. In this regard, it is seen as the most convenient way for two or more states to communicate informally with each other and to carry the matter to formal platforms after the provision of a consensus, especially on sovereignty and jurisdiction issues. Indonesia has played a leading role in creating and managing informal and formal platforms within ASEAN so far and has proved to have the capacity to perform its role in SCS disputes too. At this stage, Indonesia performs the shuttle diplomacy in which Indonesia proved to be much more successful than the other ASEAN states in the former occasions. When ASEAN states disagree on a specific issue, Indonesia pays serial visits in a short period of time to the parties of the disagreement at the governmental level or below. Thus, Indonesia tries to ensure healthy communication between the parties that could not agree (Anwar, 1994; Aplianta, 2015).

Finally, dynamic equilibrium strategy comes from the "*bebas active*" principle of Indonesia. Indonesia desires to act actively in its foreign policy, without cooperating with any other power, especially outside Southeast Asia. However, this is not always considered feasible when considering the material capabilities of Indonesia, especially against states such as China or the USA. Therefore, it has been necessary for Indonesia to establish a very good balance policy, especially in Southeast Asia region. The dynamic equilibrium policy, previously mentioned in the third chapter of this dissertation, is an extension of this balancing mission. Indonesia tries to create a balance between the participants by creating as many communication platforms (informal and formal organizations, meetings, etc.) as possible and invite as many parties as possible to these platforms. Thus, the powers such as the USA, China, India, or Japan, which are on the same platform, can balance each other, and ASEAN can stay at the driving-seat (Laksmana, 2018; Poling, 2013b; L. C. Sebastian, 2013).

In light of its foreign policies, Indonesia has begun to be more active on the SCS disputes. In this sense, Indonesia has launched two important initiatives in which Indonesia performed the informality, the shuttle diplomacy, and dynamic equilibrium strategy for ensuring providing communication between ASEAN and China on the SCS issue. These initiatives are the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS Workshops) and as one of the fruits of these workshops, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) and the Code of Conduct on the SCS (COC) processes. While SCS Workshops can be considered as an outcome of "representing the group extra-regional scales", DOC and COC processes can be considered as an outcome of "setting the group vision and agenda" layer of Jakarta's communication hub role layers. Finally, the Joint Communiqué failure will address the last layer "maintaining group unity" In the following part, these two initiatives and the active role of Indonesia within them are argued in detail.

#### **4.5.1.1. The Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea**

After achieving the economic and political stability under Suharto management, Indonesia began to perform more pro-active foreign policy during the 1990s. In this period, Indonesia took ASEAN as a milestone of its foreign policy, and it began to be interested in the SCS issue. In this regard, re-establishing diplomatic relations with

China, Indonesia taken the second step with the initiation of the SCS Workshops (Djalal, 2009).

The mastermind behind the SCS Workshops is Hasjim Djalal who is an expert on the Ocean Law and Policy. Djalal served as the Director of Treaty and Legal Affairs of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (1976-1979) and the Director-General for Policy Planning (1985-1990). He also attended the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (1973-1982), where UNCLOS was created, and he was involved in the implementation process afterward. He served as the Ambassador/Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations in New York between 1981-1983. He is currently a member of the Indonesian Maritime Council, Senior Advisor to the Indonesian Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and to Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff (Dedy Yanuar, 2019; *Profile*, n.d.).

Contrary to the fact that they are often misunderstood, the SCS Workshops' purpose was never the resolution of the sovereignty and jurisdiction problems of the SCS issue. The purpose of the SCS Workshops was to gather all the parties of the issue around a table and to enable them to engage in multidimensional dialogue. Thus, the parties would understand each other better and that eventually would lead to the prevention of any conflicts that may arise (Townsend-Gault, 1998, p. 1982). In this sense, the SCS Workshops mostly focused on the issues of marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, and safety of navigation. Since these topics are relatively less sensitive, they were not disturbing the parties. As a result, the Workshops facilitated the establishment of a cooperative atmosphere among the participants. Later, step by step, the parties can begin to talk more sensitive subjects of the SCS issue (Djalal, 2010, pp. 98–99).

The SCS Workshops designed as informal meetings (Track II dialogue) in order to ensure the participation of all SCS claimant-states and others. Otherwise, the Workshops would be improbable since the formal and inter-governmental dialogues bear the possibility of internationalization of the SCS issue which the claimant-states are not willing. This type of design facilitated the participation of China and even Taiwan. Considering China has never engaged in an organization with Taiwan before since rejecting it as a sovereign state, that can be considered as a huge



accomplishment in its own right. Besides, for the first time, China and Taiwan had the chance to exchange ideas on the SCS issue (Townsend-Gault, 1998).

On the other hand, the participants of the SCS Workshops do not compulsorily represent their state but rather they participate in the workshops with their own capabilities. The participants of the Workshops generally consist of foreign ministry officials, academicians, representatives of private companies, journalists, and participants from many different sectors. Therefore, the Workshops provided a chance to discuss all the aspects of the SCS issue without feeling attached to their own country. That leads participants to express their opinions freely and understand their perspectives more comprehensively (Townsend-Gault, 1998).

Additionally, special attention was paid to not institutionalize the SCS workshops. Therefore, a secretariat was not established to manage the Workshops. Instead, the Secretariat (ASEAN) and organizational works to Pusat Studi Asia Tenggara in Jakarta and the South China Sea Informal Working Group (SCS- IWG) in Vancouver, Canada were trusted. Hence, the SCS Workshops kept out of being formal and inter-governmental (Djalal, 2001, pp. 98–99). The Workshops are based on 3 main objectives and modalities below. These were to be improved according to the wishes and readiness of the participants.

1. To promote dialogue and mutual understanding between the parties through the exchange of views and ideas; 2. To encourage the parties concerned to seek solutions to their disputes by creating a conducive atmosphere as much as possible; and 3. To develop concrete cooperation on technical matters on which everyone would and could agree to cooperate, no matter how small the matters were or how insignificant they might appear.” (Djalal, 2001, p. 98)

The SCS Workshops were designed to take into account the sensitivities of all participating countries and ensure their full participation. This can be considered a way for Indonesia to provide the most suitable atmosphere for all parties to engage in dialogue without the fear of making any concessions.

The first Workshop was held in Indonesia in January 1990 (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 257) and later annually held in different cities of Indonesia. The participants of the first Workshop were the 6 ASEAN members of the time. Then, the participants from China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Laos invited to the workshops in 1991, and it followed with Cambodia in 1994 (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 56). Actually, China did not want to

participate in the second workshop. However, Djalal paid a visit to China and convinced Chinese authorities that the Workshops are informal and by no means, they carry the meaning of taking legal decisions or issuing statements. (source) Indonesian role to include China to the organization had the utmost importance since China is the biggest country among the claimant-states. There is a help of the normalization of Indonesia – China relations a year earlier and China’s good perception toward Indonesia (Y. H. Song, 2010).

Between 1991 and 2001, the Workshops were financed by the Indonesian Government and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Later, CIDA cut its financial support and the Workshops were financed by Indonesia, China, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Previously, only the regional states were invited to the Workshops to prevent the non-regional powers from being a party in the SCS issue. However, later, the technical issues began to require expert knowledge. There, it is decided that the participants from outside the region can be invited if it is considered necessary (Y. H. Song, 2010).

Over time, in addition to the main meeting, the Workshops were divided into 4 main categories. The categories were determined as “participants, observers, resource persons, and the committee members” in the order of importance (Aplianta, 2015, p. 9). In this regard, the Workshops have expanded as a series of sub-meetings. Since 1993, additional Technical Working Group (TWG) meetings, Group of Experts (GE) meetings, and other cooperative meetings have been held (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 254). The TWG (Technical Working Group) meets regularly to discuss various topics related to marine scientific research, resource assessment, ways of development, legal matters, marine environment protection, and safety navigation, shipping, and communication (Dedy Yanuar, 2019, pp. 35–40).

These sub-meetings were mostly managed by the “resource persons”, where the technical issues were discussed on the SCS issue. A hierarchy emerged between these meetings, where GEs reported to TWGs and TWGs to the SCS Workshops (Townsend-Gault, 1998, pp. 184–185). Thus, it can be said that the Workshops have become an organization that receives knowledge from the field and also perform practices.

Besides the success of the SCS Workshops, the "donut hole" proposal of Hasjim Djalal was rejected by the parties of the SCS issue. According to this proposal, it is suggested that a common revenue system should be established in countries outside the EEZ of the countries and countries should gain common income in this field. However, this proposal was not accepted (Aplianta, 2015, p. 10). In the light of this proposal, Djalal did not convince these countries within the framework of his proposal, even though he made a number of visits to the SCS claimant states. On the one hand, during that time, there were no healthy communication established between China and ASEAN states and on the other hand the process of finding the ground for multilateral discussions were not met (Y. H. Song, 2010).

A proposal similar to Djalal's proposal came from the Philippines and failed as well. Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC), which is the recommendation of the Philippines, proposes to divide SCS into two as problematic and problem-free areas, to stop all countries' military and unilateral activities in problem areas, and to divide the income from these with a joint commission to be created. Although Vietnam considers this proposal of the Philippines to be positive, the proposal was put on the shelf as China and Malaysia did not support the proposal (Hideshi, 2013, pp. 8–9).

The SCS Workshops are of great importance in a number of ways. First of all, these workshops include all the claimant and related states in the SCS issue. Even Taiwan, which China does not recognize in any platform, is a participant here and it can exchange views with China. In addition to its uniqueness in this regard, the Workshops are the longest-running organization among the Asia-Pacific dialogue mechanisms created on the basis of the sea disputes. The Workshops have been held annually since the early 1990s and they extended the scope of subjects to discuss and areas to cooperate among the participants (Y. H. Song, 2010, p. 257).

On the other hand, the Workshops enable the participants to freely exchange their ideas without carrying their national baggage. In this respect, the SCS Workshops are unique and very valuable (Townsend-Gault, 1998, pp. 186–187). Although not preventing the claimant-states to act unilaterally in the SCS, the Workshops let the claimant-states to comprehend their perspectives better and soften their attitudes

toward one another. Therefore, the Workshops proved that even the participants have disputes in terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction, they can still cooperate with each other (Townsend-Gault, 1998, p. 187). Considering the history of the SCS issue until the Workshops, that can be considered as an accomplishment. The cooperation atmosphere led to the perception that the SCS issue, even quite challenging, is nothing to be unsolved. The tradition generated with the Workshops created the idea that cooperation is key for decreasing the tensions among the claimant-states.

In addition to its importance, the Workshops had some positive palpable outcomes as well. For example, a state that China which has the ability to dominate the region with both its economic and militaristic power could be included in a multilateral platform for the first time in spite of China's insistence of discussing the SCS issue bilaterally with the claimant-states. For the other claimant-states, that is a great deal since they have almost no chance to cope with China at the bilateral level. With the Workshops, they had the chance to exchange ideas with China and take joint decisions without giving any concessions. Besides, the positive atmosphere leads China to change its attitudes toward the other parties. Immediately after the participation in the SCS Workshops, China became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996, and China signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 (Nishimura, 2017).

Another palpable achievement of the Workshops is the participation of all the SCS claimant-states in a joint expedition on the SCS. As a result of the discussions in the SCS workshops, the participant states carried out the Anambas Expedition in Anambas Islands, Indonesia, in March 2002 with the participation of 29 experts from Malaysia, Philippines, China, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia. This joint expedition is obviously important as it is the first expedition made by all parties having disputes in the SCS, even China and Taiwan side by side (Ng et al., 2004; Y. H. Song, 2010) .

However, among the many achievements, perhaps the most important one is that the Workshops was the trigger for the beginning of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) / Code of Conduct on the SCS (COC) processes. In the 2nd SCS Workshop, the participants laid the foundations of the DOC which was intended

to be a guideline for the SCS claimant-states for the resolution of the SCS issue (Djalal, 2001; Laksmana, 2018; Majumdar, 2015). In this sense, it can be inferred that even the main purpose was only the provision of cooperation among the claimant-states, the Workshops also urged the claimant-states to take legal actions for the resolution of the SCS issue.

Ignoring all the achievements, some argue that the SCS Workshops failed to solve the SCS issue since. Therefore, the Workshops are merely talk-shops and nothing to be taken seriously in this sense. However, considering the purpose of the Workshops and nevertheless the point that has been reached, it can be suggested that these criticisms are unfounded. Townsend-Gault, one of the architects of the SCS Workshops with Djalal, argues that the workshops were initiated as a tool for "preventive diplomacy" to prevent a conflict that might occur in the SCS, but over time, the workshops were very successful and adopt the mission of promotion of cooperation as well (Townsend-Gault, 1998, pp. 182–1983). In this sense, while it is mistaken to evaluate the Workshops success in terms of the resolution of the SCS issue, it can also be argued that, even in the resolution of the SCS issue, the Workshops had discernable success with the initiation of DOC as a result of a nearly 10 years of discussions.

With the initiation of the SCS Workshops, Indonesia tried to provide communication between the parties to establish peace and stability in the SCS. It is suggested that the Indonesian experience of providing communication between the parties of Indochina conflicts was decisive behind the success of Indonesia in the Workshops. With the SCS workshops, Indonesia upgraded its role of providing healthy communication between the parties on a greater scale.

On the other hand, in the literature, some argue that Indonesia's non-claimant position in the SCS issue was effective in the initiation of the SCS workshops (Anwar, 1994, pp. 149–150). However, if that is the case, why did Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar not initiate any similar organizations? Considering only the SCS issue would lead to a mistaken interpretation of the Indonesian role in general. The SCS Workshops are not the only initiative of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, after achieving its own economic and political stability with the

“new order” rule, began to play similar roles in ASEAN. Indonesian initiatives are in line with its communication hub role inherited from the pre-colonial Southeast Asia regional system. The failure of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar to play such a role is not due to their economic or political inadequacy, it is most likely because of that these states do not have experience like Indonesia to perform a similar role.

In this sense, although implicitly, the Indonesian role of being the communication hub of ASEAN is accepted by all the ASEAN member states. The best example of this is that the SCS Workshops are held annually in Indonesia and the Workshops are held at the auspices of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Policy Planning and Development Agency. These Workshops are held in Indonesia with the same logic as the ASEAN Secretariat is in Jakarta and the Bali Democracy Forums are constantly held in Indonesia.

Another initiative to observe the communication hub role of Indonesia is DOC/COC processes in which Indonesia tries to set the vision and agenda of the SCS disputes by determining a road map to resolve the disputes.

#### **4.5.1.2. Establishing the Code of Conduct on South China Sea**

The most important development can be considered as the initiation of the DOC/COC processes in the sense of the resolution of the SCS issue. As it was stated earlier, the SCS Workshops paved the way for the initiation of the DOC/COC processes. The DOC was discussed for the first time in the second SCS Workshop and the ideas were improved in the following 10 years.

Before going into details, it should be explained here that normally the DOC and the COC processes stands for the same procedure. As some argue the difference between the DOC and the COC is although uncertain, the most discernable difference is the “perception” that while the DOC is a not legally binding agreement, the COC is legally binding. Actually, the parties, especially ASEAN member states, were willing to initiate the COC. Yet due to the criticisms mostly from China and Malaysia, the document transformed into the DOC which is not legally binding but depends on the consensus among the parties (Buszynski, 2003; Storey, 2017; Thao, 2003).

The first step to the DOC was the ASEAN Declaration on the SCS (ASEAN-DOC), which was declared unilaterally by the ASEAN member states of that time in 1992. In ASEAN-DOC, it was emphasized that the issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction on the SCS issue should be resolved peacefully without the use of force. The ASEAN-DOC also underlines that the parties should engage on the basis of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN-DOC prioritizes that the parties should cooperate in specific areas such as the safety of maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution of the maritime environment, coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery, collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs (ASEAN, 2012a). However, the ASEAN-DOC also emphasizes the eagerness of a more inclusive and legally binding document which is later known as the COC. In this sense, the Declaration of Hanoi has been adopted by ASEAN in the 6th ASEAN Summit in 1998 which underlined the necessity of establishing the COC. Eventually, on 6 April 1999, in Kuamin, China, ASEAN jointly propose to begin negotiations for establishing the COC between ASEAN and China. Accordingly, ASEAN states prepared a COC draft and in March 2000, the draft exchanged with the Chinese draft to merge a common text. However, due to the insistence of China and Malaysia that the SCS disputes have to be solved bilaterally between the claimant-states, the parties could not conclude a legally binding document (Buszynski, 2003; Storey, 2017; Thao, 2003). As a result, the parties agreed on the DOC which can be considered as the first palpable step towards the adoption of the COC.

On 4 November 2002, the DOC was signed in the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, between ASEAN and China. The DOC includes 4 trust and confidence-building measures and voluntary cooperation activities. The DOC states that the parties should seek solutions in friendly ways on the basis of consensus and cooperation (Jensen, 2011).

Additionally, the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity was established on 8 October 2003. For the implementation of the DOC, the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the

Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (JWG) is established as well (Buszynski, 2003).

In this regard, these initiatives can be considered as a result of informal interaction, in a way, to raise the issue to a formal level. In this sense, it can be inferred that the DOC is actually an extension of the SCS Workshops since both have taken the engagement of the parties on rather specific and basic subjects in order to create an atmosphere for cooperation. Similar to the Workshops' TGWs and GEs, the parties initiated additional organizations for ensuring the implementation of the decisions taken. In the literature, some argue that, in the similar vein of the SCS Workshops criticisms, the DOC was a failure for the resolution of the SCS issue since it was not a legally binding agreement. In this sense, Roberts argues that, yet with a more optimistic tone, the DOC can only be successful as far as the states' will for its implementation. Therefore, the ASEAN and China should follow the regulations of the DOC and stay attached to it (Roberts, 2016, p. 6).

However, it should be remembered that although the DOC is not legally binding, it still bears great importance for the resolution of the SCS issue. First of all, for the first time, ASEAN, as a unity, had the opportunity to discuss the SCS issue with China in a formal platform. In fact, since the DOC was signed, China's counterpart in the SCS issue is ASEAN rather than the individual claimant-states. The DOC was the first step in which ASEAN became deeply involved in the SCS issue and the DOC led to the discussions and eventually the drafting of the COC (Koga, 2022).

On the other hand, some argue the acceptance of the DOC was an outcome of the claimant-states bandwagoning to the USA against China in the late 1990s. China considered this tendency as a threat and to keep the claimant-states away from the American orbit, and thus China consented to sign the DOC for placating the other claimant-states. In this perspective, the DOC is barely a success of ASEAN, but rather it is an outcome of the Sino-American rivalry. Of course, these implications can be considered as a purely neo-realistic tone which generally ignores the historical context of China- Southeast Asia relations and the SCS issue (Laksmana, 2018).

It can be considered that Indonesia has a pioneering role in the initiation of the DOC /COC processes since the SCS Workshops laid the foundations of the idea. Since the



first establishment of the SCS Workshops, Indonesia leads the Workshops under the auspices of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, although being a non-claimant state in the SCS issue, Indonesia was one of the insistent states on the COC contrary to the other non-claimant states or even claimant-states such as Malaysia and Brunei. Especially, during the 2010s, Indonesia occasionally proved the necessity of concluding the COC. Apart from its supportive role in the COC process, Indonesia performed vital acts for the maintenance and eventual conclusion of the COC process. Especially in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the COC process reached a deadlock. Set aside, the resolution of the SCS issue, even the unity of ASEAN began to be questioned. However, because of the Indonesian persevering stance, the COC process maintained with minimum damage (Laksmana, 2018).

After the approval of the DOC in 2002, China has continued its unilateral actions in the SCS, though decreasingly. In this sense, the other claimant-states especially Vietnam and the Philippines intensified their will for the establishment of the legally binding COC (Laksmana, 2018). However, alongside criticizing China, the other claimant-states also followed similar unilateral actions in the SCS. Therefore, China responded to the demands of establishing a legally binding COC as the parties could not meet the "appropriate timing" and "appropriate conditions" for the negotiations of the COC since the claimant-states were not even following the regulations of the DOC. In these early years of the 2010s, set aside the establishment of the COC, the DOC began to be questioned by the signatory parties. It can be considered that the negative atmosphere of these years as a result of disunity among the ASEAN member states. After all, China was never eager to adopt the COC. The process was more dependent on ASEAN's stance (Laksmana, 2018).

In this respect, important steps were taken with the Indonesian Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2011 under the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration. One of the most pressing priorities of Indonesian foreign policy during this period was to ensure that the maintenance of the DOC and the beginning of the COC process between ASEAN and China (Laksmana, 2018). In this sense, the COC negotiations have been tried to be reopened, but China has emphasized that since 2007, especially the attitudes of Vietnam and the Philippines have damaged the spirit of the DOC, and therefore a suitable environment for the COC cannot be created yet

(Roberts, 2016, p. 8). To pull China back to the table and pull up other ASEAN states, Indonesia initiated the adoption of the “Guidelines for the Implementation of the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS” in July 2011 (Laksmana, 2018). In this guideline, the old DOC guidelines have been agreed on almost every subject, but a new rule added to the guidelines to report any activities carried out regarding the DOC would be reported to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meetings afterwards. The Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS was saying nothing new indeed. Yet here, Indonesia embraces the mission of pulling the parties back to the table and refreshes their will for the resolution of the SCS issue (Sandy, 2014).

As a result of the positive atmosphere created after the resolution of the Joint Communiqué failure 2012 with the endeavors of Jakarta, the discussion of the COC between ASEAN and China was firstly discussed at the 6th China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) Suzhou, China in September 2013 and the discussions continued in the 9th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (JWG-DOC). On February 27th, in Bali Indonesia, in 19th JWG-DOC, the parties agreed on the basic design of the COC draft. On August 6, 2017, in Manila, ASEAN and China endorsed the framework for the COC. This framework was previously endorsed in the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SOM-DOC) in Guiyang, China on 19 May 2017. However, the phrase “legally-binding” was again missing in this framework. On August 3, 2018, ASEAN and China agreed on a Single Draft of the South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT) (Thayer, 2018).

The process from the adoption of the ASEAN-DOC in 1992 to the single COC draft in 2018 was long and challenging. In addition, a legally binding text could not be created that ASEAN member states wanted. However, the important points here are the fact that China was kept on the multilateral platform and the consensus among the ASEAN member states was recreated. As a result, the hopes for the resolution of the SCS issue in the future has been refreshed. Considering eight decades of history of the SCS issue, the point currently reached, especially during the last three decades,

should be considered as an achievement, thanks to Indonesia's compromising stance on the issue (Sandy, 2014; Thayer, 2018).

#### **4.5.1.3. Joint Communiqué Failure in 2012**

The unity of ASEAN member states had a fatal blow in 2012 during the Cambodian chairmanship of ASEAN. In 2012, during AMM, ASEAN member states failed to issue a joint communiqué regarding the SCS disputes. It posed one of the biggest (Sandy, 2014) problems encountered in the COC process so far. For the first time in ASEAN history, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) failed to issue a Joint Communiqué. The Joint Communiqué is one of the important steps taken in determining common ground and goal among the ASEAN member states. This situation did not only damage the ASEAN member states' common stance only on the SCS disputes but also put the ASEAN unity into question in general (Sandy, 2014; Thayer, 2012).

Indeed, ASEAN states were expecting to take steps to re-open the COC negotiations in 2012 at AMM in Phnom Penh. However, the situation resulted in not even determining the AMM Joint Communiqué. Within the Joint Communiqué, the Philippines requested that China's military deployments at Scarborough Shoal be addressed, while Vietnam asked to address the oil exploitation activities of China in Vietnamese EEZ. Cambodia expressed the opinion that the SCS references and EEZs should be discussed bilaterally between the claimant-states, and thus these issues cannot be addressed in the AMM Joint Communiqué. In spite of the attempts of other ASEAN member states to convince Cambodia otherwise, the meeting terminated without issuing a Joint Communiqué (Sandy, 2014, p. 34).

Considering former Cambodian accord in the SCS issue, the failure of the Joint Communiqué considered as the Chinese influence on Cambodia. Cambodia branded as a Chinese proxy within ASEAN. Indeed, the financial supports provided by China to Cambodia before and after the Joint Communiqué failure can be considered as proof of the Chinese bribe strategy (Sandy, 2014, p. 37).

However, the AMM Joint Communiqué crisis has been overcome by the fast and effective shuttle diplomacy of Indonesia. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty

Natalegawa stated that this situation damaged the ASEAN centrality not just for the SCS issue but in general. Natalegawa paid a series of visits to Manila, Hanoi, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Singapore respectively within just two days between 18-19 July, immediately after the incident occurred and he enabled the parties to communicate more clearly behind the curtains. Natalegawa consulted with the Philippines and agreed upon the “six-point proposal” and convinced the other states for the approval of the proposal one by one. Later the proposal was announced by the ASEAN Chair Cambodia as the ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the SCS. All ASEAN members have agreed on the following 6 principles:

1. The full implementation of the DOC,
2. Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC,
3. The early conclusion of a Regional COC in the South China Sea,
4. Full respect of the universally recognized principles of international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
5. Continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties,
6. Peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law including the 1982 UNCLOS (ASEAN, 2012b).

As it can be understood, these six principles have repeated the common and general stance of ASEAN on the SCS issue and emphasized the insistence on the COC (Putra, 2015; Roberts, 2016, pp. 8–9).

While the Joint Communique issue was ended positively, as Roberts argued the failure had some negative outcomes as well. After the incident, the Philippines applied to the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the UN in January 2013 for the resolution of the dispute between China and the Philippines (Roberts, 2016, pp. 8–9). That can be interpreted as the Philippines’ loss of trust in ASEAN, at least for the management of the SCS issue.

After Indonesia ensured unity among the ASEAN member states, it was time to convince China for the maintenance of the COC process. After the announcement of the six-point proposal, upon the invitation of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited these countries between August 9-13, 2012, (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, 2012). During his Indonesia visit, Yang Jiechi state that China intends to implement the DOC properly first of all, and later China is ready for the COC discussions.

The Joint Communiqué issue poses a great example of Indonesian communication hub role in terms of its maintaining the group unity layer. If the ASEAN states were not able to issue a joint communiqué, all the achievements so far gained in SCS disputes would be lost. Additionally, a disunity among the ASEAN member states in light of a such a sensitive issue would lead to the dissolve of ASEAN.

After ensuring the maintenance of the COC process, Indonesia took several other steps to strengthen the process. Indonesia proposed the "Zero Draft A Regional Code of Conduct in the SCS" which was mentioned firstly in September 2012 in AMM held during the UN General Assembly in New York. Indonesian proposal is based mainly on the 2002 DOC and ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the SCS. The most important contribution of Indonesia with this proposal was the emphasis on the implementation of the COC in Article 6. Indonesian acts after the Joint Communiqué failure at 45th AMM left positive impressions on both China and ASEAN member states and the COC process has been able to maintain (Laksmana, 2018). If Indonesia would not carry out shuttle diplomacy and come out with the six-point proposal, it would create a permanent impasse for the SCS issue. In addition, ASEAN unity would be completely questioned. In this regard, it can be observed that Indonesia is important not only for SCS but also for ASEAN unity in general.

#### **4.6. Chapter Conclusion**

Throughout nearly eight decades of its history, the SCS issue remained on the agenda of China and the Southeast Asian states in varying degrees. Although the discernable improvements can be observed for the resolution in the last three decades, especially with the more proactive foreign policy of Indonesia, the SCS issue is still one of the biggest problems of current Southeast Asian affairs.

While, on the one hand, China aims to re-establish the pre-colonial China- Southeast Asia relations which were basically the center-periphery interaction based on the win-win principle, on the other hand, the other SCS claimant-states endeavor to realize their claims according to the UNCLOS but by not gaining the enmity of China. In this sense, this chapter suggests that one of the main problems for the SCS issue to remain unsolved so far is the lack of healthy communication among the SCS claimant-states. Indeed, any party of the SCS issue does not wish their opponents to

have complete economic losses since they are aware that their prosperities are attached to one another. However, on the other hand, they do not tolerate any maneuvers of the others to harm their interests drawn by their claims in the SCS. Indeed, as it seems, these states cannot be considerably sure of their intentions and thus they have a lack of confidence towards one another. The Indonesian role of providing and facilitating communication among the parties proved to be effective to build confidence in this sense. No diversion has been identified from the very beginning in Indonesia's policies for resolving SCS disputes. Indonesia has kept its foreign policy attitude constant despite the policymakers changing within the framework of the communication hub role suggested in this dissertation.

Consequently, this dissertation, by no means, asserts that Indonesia aims to solve the SCS issue by itself. Indonesia only acts as a hub where all the regional states gather and exchange their ideas freely. In the times of uncertainties or disagreements resulted in the misunderstanding of the parties, Indonesia acts up and by interacting with the conflicting parties, it tries to interpret the genuine situation and convince the parties to build a consensus. In other words, Indonesia provides platforms for the regional states to communicate all together just as it was in the pre-colonial period when the Srivijaya Empire, Majapahit Kingdom, and Malacca Sultanate did the same. While the Malacca Straits were the center of this communication in the pre-colonial period since all regional powers including China were meeting for economic reasons, today, the existence of ASEAN provides similar platforms for Indonesia to perform the role of being the communication hub. Indonesian initiatives, in this regard, always depend on ASEAN and its network in which Indonesia has the ability to guide.

The communication hub role of Indonesia in the SCS has begun to gain momentum during the 1990s immediately after the achievement of economic and political stability in Indonesia. However, it can be argued that especially with the inauguration of the SBY administration, Indonesian effectiveness reached its peak in Southeast Asia. During this period between 2004-2014, apart from the initiation of the ASEAN Community, Bali Democracy Forums, etc., Indonesia played active roles for the maintenance and conclusion of the COC process of the SCS issue. These endeavors

of the SBY administration proved to be worthy of decreasing tensions among the SCS claimant-states.

However, with the inauguration of the Jokowi administration in 2014, in the literature, it is argued that Indonesia accessed to a new dimension in its role both in SCS and ASEAN. Some of Indonesian unilateral act such as declaration of GMF or Indo-Pacific vision without “long-lasting” consultations with ASEAN member states can be considered as a diversion from Jakarta’s foreign policy leanings. The sinking the illegal fishing boats publicly by Indonesian authorities can be considered in this sense. This assertive posture might be considered as threat by other ASEAN member states and badly effect the unity of ASEAN (Parameswaran, 2014). However, apart from that sort of a minor diversions, as examined throughout this dissertation, Indonesian foreign policy has not majorly changed neither in ASEAN nor in SCS. Indonesia both implements its role as a communication hub and takes its own potential to the next level.

All in all, this chapter concludes that the Indonesian role of being the communication hub of SCS has the utmost importance for the “possible” resolution of the SCS issue in particular and for the unity of ASEAN in general.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The primary aim of this dissertation is to describe foreign policy role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism in order to shed light on the relation between Indonesia and ASEAN since the establishment of the organization. The data was majorly gathered from foreign policy statements of the states, letters of agreements, meeting reports, speeches of the policymakers, autobiographies of Indonesian leaders, related archive records, relevant journal articles, academic books, media reports and commentaries published in English and Indonesian languages, and various web sources.

The conclusion chapter reviews the arguments that have been presented throughout the dissertation. This chapter will first discuss how the research problem of the dissertation was identified, and how the research questions that seeks to answer this problem were formulated. It will then explain the assumptions made and the methodology followed in seeking an answer to the research questions. Then, a general analytical overview of the dissertation will be given, before presenting and discussing the key findings of the research. Finally, the dissertation's contribution to literature and the possible future projects it opens up will be discussed.

Over the past two decades, studies on Indonesia's rise have become increasingly popular in the academic literature. Almost all these studies attach great significance to Indonesia. However, these studies and many others lack a clear consensus on how Indonesia's rise will impact ASEAN. It has been suggested that Indonesia's economic and political development could have both positive and negative impacts on ASEAN. Some have suggested that as Indonesia rises, it will adopt a more unilateralist foreign policy and act independently of ASEAN which will negatively affect the ASEAN unity. Others have argued that the Indonesian rise will be a



leverage for the development of ASEAN (Roberts et al., 2015). There is no consensus on this issue in the existing literature. In this sense, the dissertation asserts that the main problem lies in the fact that the foreign policy role adopted by Indonesia within the ASEAN Way of regionalism has not been adequately described in the literature.

Many foreign policy roles have been attributed to Indonesia in the literature. Among these, the most recurring ones are *primus inter pares*, *defacto* leader, or the roles such as conflict mediator, bridge builder, and democracy promoter, or regional power, middle power, and emerging middle power (Acharya, 2014b; Agastia, 2020; Anwar, 1997; Putra, 2015; Rüländ, 2015; Sukma, 1995; Widyaningsih & Roberts, 2014). When all of these are melted in a pot, the result is a blurred image of Indonesia's role within ASEAN. On the other hand, these comparisons often neglect the ASEAN Way, which is a normative structure that stands for ASEAN's *modus operandi*. However, ignoring such a structure and making generalizations over “conventional” International Relations approaches only, will lead to rather incomplete results since it misses contextual knowledge. In this sense, the dissertation inclines to produce knowledge by taking ASEAN Way as a locus of inquiry (Varkkey et al., 2022).

The dissertation aimed to describe the role of Indonesia within the ASEAN Way of regionalism in order to shed light on the future of Indonesia- ASEAN relations. ASEAN Way's historical dimensions were first analyzed in order to better understand Indonesia's role within it. It was then described how the role of Indonesia within the ASEAN Way of regionalism took place throughout the years over several foreign policy cases including SCS disputes. Thus, it will be determined whether there is a diversion in Indonesian foreign policy in the context of Indonesia's foreign policy role in the ASEAN Way of regionalism. The research questions have been addressed as “What is the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism?” and “To what extent the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN Way of regionalism has changed in the 21st century?” A few things will be clarified during the answering of these research questions. The first is the examination of what the ASEAN Way is in terms of a sub- systemic structure. The second is a description of Indonesia's role within that structure. The third is the analysis of the relation between the role of

Indonesia and the ASEAN Way regionalism and finally the possible diversions of the role of Indonesia within last two decades which coincides with “the rise of Indonesia”.

The dissertation begins with an assumption that Indonesia's role in ASEAN is about facilitating communication among ASEAN member states and between ASEAN member states and extra- regional actors. The role that Indonesia does not derive from its material resources, but rather from its diplomatic capabilities. In this sense, the dissertation draws on the works of Amitav Acharya. Acharya suggests that Indonesia contributes to regional matters much more than the great powers such as China, Japan, and India, although it is rather weaker militarily and economically. Acharya argues that Indonesia is able to do this thanks to a kind of virtuous correlation that it possesses, which consist of democracy, development and stability (Acharya, 2014b). This dissertation, instead of this virtuous correlation, gives more importance to Indonesia's diplomatic capabilities which can facilitate communication between regional actors.

In light of the first research question, I began my research on the ASEAN Way of regionalism by reading available academic articles, books, and various web sources. In initial readings, I have figured out that the principle of consensus through consultation of the ASEAN Way has similarities with the pre-colonial regional customs of Southeast Asia such as *mufakat* and *musyawarah*. Additionally, the informality adopted by the ASEAN Way was one of the methods used to provide communication between regional actors in Southeast Asia during the pre-colonial period. Then, I figured out that there is a similarity between the pre-colonial Southeast Asia regional system and the ASEAN Way of regionalism in terms of their working mechanisms. In both structures, it works with a mechanism where the information from the peripheries is gathered in the hub and then distributed back to the peripheries. Both systems demand a communication hub at the center. In Southeast Asia regional system, Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca function as a communication hub of the system in different periods. In ASEAN Way of regionalism, by acknowledging Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca as its ancestors, Indonesia acts as a communication hub and meets the structural demand.

Then, in the light of second research question, I examined how Indonesia's state posture and foreign policy role were constructed over the legacies of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca. In this regard, I referred to speeches of policymakers, autobiographies of leaders, and related archive records. Then, I analyzed a series of foreign policy cases to see how Indonesia's role in foreign policy is carried out in practice. I considered the possibility that these cases might be simply periodic outbreaks, and so I decided to look at how Indonesia handled the SCS disputes, which affected the whole region since before the establishment of ASEAN. I thought that this would be a proper way to evaluate how the role of a communication hub could be applied in a large-scale case. In this section, I drew upon foreign policy statements of states, letters of agreements, meeting reports, relevant journal articles, books, media reports and commentaries published in English and Indonesian languages, articles from various web sources, etc.

I concluded the research that ASEAN operates as a communication network in which Indonesia is the communication hub. There are three main layers to this role which are maintaining group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group extra-regional scales. In turn the SCS disputes case reveals that although Indonesia has adopted a more nationalistic approach in recent years, it has not abandoned its ASEAN- oriented foreign policy completely. On the contrary, it can be concluded that the Jokowi administration and the GMF project represent the most recent phase of Indonesia's maturing the communication hub role in ASEAN.

### **5.1. Summary**

The introduction to the dissertation begins with the determination of the rise of Indonesia and its effects on ASEAN as the research problem. In light of the research problem, the research questions addressed to describe the role of Indonesia in ASEAN Way of regionalism. In this sense, the literature review section of the introduction chapter begins with a discussion of the debate regarding Indonesia's role within ASEAN. Two main groups are identified in this sense. While the neo-liberal/realist group takes the concept of hegemony as their core of inquiry, the constructivist group considers Indonesia as a middle power and assign some

additional roles such as democracy promoter in the light of specific foreign policy cases.

In this stage, I focused on National Role Conception Theory (NRCT) and Karim's contributions of underlining role conflict in Indonesian foreign policy (Karim, 2017, 2018, 2022). Eventually, I have argued that Kirste and Maull's approach, which is a constructivist modification of the national role conception theory, will be more effective in describing the role of Indonesia in ASEAN Way regionalism. Kirste and Maull argue that a state's foreign policy role is constructed not only by the cognitive prior of the state's ideational background, but also by the expectations of the structure within which the state operates (Kirste & Maull, 1996). The role of Indonesia within ASEAN Way of regionalism is therefore described within the context of the ASEAN Way structure in this dissertation.

In the second chapter of the dissertation, the Southeast Asia regional system is examined throughout pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. It is argued that the Southeast Asia regional system had worked as communication network due to the peculiar geography of Southeast Asia. With the advent of colonialism to the region, the system had been interrupted until the establishment of ASEAN in the post-colonial period. The Southeast Asia regional system and the ASEAN Way works as communication network and demands a central power to act as the communication hub.

In the third chapter, how Indonesia constructs its state posture and foreign policy based on the legacy of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca is examined. In this sense, the inherited state symbols, mottos, and principles of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca such as *Tanah Air*, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, *Pancasila*, and *Nusantara* have been examined. Afterward, by looking at the references of the Indonesian leaders to Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Malacca since the establishment of Indonesia, it is discussed how Indonesia's state posture and foreign policy are constructed. After examination of several foreign policy cases, it has been argued that the communication hub role of Indonesia has three layers which are maintaining group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales. Additionally, to perform the communication hub role there are some

requirements such as a structural demand, ideational background, diplomatic capacity adequacy, being a respected and trusted member.

Finally, Indonesia's role as a communication hub within the ASEAN Way of regionalism has been examined in the context of the SCS disputes. An overview of the SCS disputes has been given and the views, claims, perceptions and policies of China and the ASEAN claimant states have been analyzed. The primary reason for doing this is to emphasize that the SCS disputes case is essentially a communication problem which has deep historical roots and a wide scope. In this way, it is demonstrated that the SCS disputes make for an appropriate case study in examining Indonesia's role as a communication hub.

After an overview of the SCS disputes, the case chapter examines three Indonesian initiatives in the context of maintaining group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales, as determined in the previous chapter. These are respectively the Joint Communiqué failure in 2012, the initiation of the workshops on managing potential conflicts in the SCS and the establishment of Code of Conduct on SCS. In conclusion, it is revealed that Indonesian foreign policy, in spite of minor diversions, has not majorly change in terms of the communication hub role both in formerly selected foreign policy cases and SCS disputes case.

## **5.2. Key Findings**

As a result of the research conducted within the framework of this dissertation, some findings were reached. First, it is demonstrated that Indonesia's ASEAN- oriented foreign policy has not changed in its overall goal of acting as a communication hub. This was evident in the examination of the foreign policy cases selected from different periods in Chapter 3 and in the SCS disputes case of Chapter 4. The dissertation demonstrated that Indonesia's role as a communication hub within the ASEAN Way of regionalism is of critical importance to ASEAN. However, when one looks at Indonesian politics focused on ASEAN since its establishment, it is evident that the mainstream policies have not changed. It can be said that Indonesia has primarily pursued an ASEAN- oriented foreign policy. However, if Indonesian

leaders would have completely different opinions on foreign policy, this could lead to changes in Indonesia's role as a communication hub.

Even though Indonesia's foreign policy has not changed much since the establishment in 1945, it has developed in correlation to the nation's economic growth and political stability. The basis of Indonesia's foreign policy has always been guided by *bebas aktif* (free and active) approach and its focus has been Southeast Asia (Sukma, 1997). The Sukarno era can be considered as the period when Indonesia was least interested in Southeast Asian regional affairs. The economic inadequacies and the Cold War environment are effective in this sense. During this period, Indonesia's relations with other regional states were also not stable. Thus, during the Sukarno era, Indonesia was only able to fulfill its role as a communication hub to a limited extent. The Suharto period marked a period of economic growth and political stability for Indonesia, which began to exert a greater influence in regional affairs in Southeast Asia. This was evident in the establishment of ASEAN and Indonesia's involvement in the South China Sea disputes. The Suharto period can be considered as Indonesia's first wave of rising, during which it successfully played the role of communication hub, as demonstrated by the examples given in this dissertation. Subsequently, the Indonesia underwent another transformation during the *reformasi* governments period, during which Indonesia's impact on regional events in Southeast Asia remained at moderate levels despite the instability at the time. Thanks to SBY's period of political and economic reform, Indonesia began to take on a more pro- active role in its foreign policy, shouldering more responsibility. It could be said that this was the period during which the infrastructure for Indonesia's foreign policy was established. Finally, with Jokowi administration, Indonesia has started to take more concrete steps in its foreign policy. The development of Indonesia's sea ports and the construction of new ones are examples of it. During this period, although Indonesia's sinking of fishing boats trespassing in its waters in the South China Sea was perceived as a threat by the regional countries, there was no diversion in Indonesia's foreign policy, especially in the context of the South China Sea disputes (Connelly, 2014; Hamzah, 2015; Madu, 2017). On the contrary, Indonesia's GMF project is designed for the security and economic prosperity of Southeast Asia. In conclusion, in the 21st century, during the SBY and Jokowi eras, no major diversion in Indonesia's role as a communication hub

has been observed through the cases analyzed in this dissertation. Indonesia's economic and political development has made it more active and effective in its role as a communication hub in Southeast Asia.

Second, the dissertation revealed that the communication hub role of Indonesia in terms of maintaining the group unity, setting the group vision and agenda, and representing the group in extra-regional scales, results in maintaining the ASEAN Way. Especially the first layer of the communication hub role, maintaining the group unity, effective in this sense. As discussed in the 3<sup>rd</sup> chapter, Corregidor Affair, Cambodia Vietnam Conflict (1978-1992), Myanmar Rohingya Crisis and in the 4th chapter the Joint Communique failure in the SCS disputes had posed threats to the unity of ASEAN and in some of these cases even resulted in the discussion about dissolving the organization.

On the other hand, the normative structure of the ASEAN Way led Indonesia to perform its communication hub role. If ASEAN were to develop into a Western-style, rule-based supranational organization, this would likely remove the demand for Indonesia to play a role as a regional communication hub. In this possibility, the formal platforms of ASEAN would be enough to take group decisions and so Indonesia would not be a step ahead of other ASEAN member states since there would be no demand for an additional trigger to facilitate communication among the members.

### **5.3. Contribution**

This dissertation helps us eliminate the contradiction in terms, caused by assigning different roles to Indonesia over different foreign policy cases. In the literature, although Indonesia is considered as a middle power in terms of power scale evaluation, because of some actions carried out by Indonesia, it exceeds the capabilities of a standard middle power. In this sense, there is a debate among scholars as to whether Indonesia should be classified as an emerging middle power, regional power, or a middle power with extra abilities. The dissertation, by taking the foreign policy role construction of Indonesia according to its leaders' ideational background and ASEAN Way of regionalism's demand into consideration, make a new description of a foreign policy role for Indonesia. In this vein, rather than trying

to fit it in existing middle power schemes, Indonesia can be considered its own category.

This dissertation, by its very nature, is an abductive research. That is, it neither seeks to test a theory in practice, nor to theorize from practice. However, it may be regarded as part of constructivist literature to the extent that it accepts the ontological assumption that states have certain foreign policy roles, and that these roles are constructed by policymakers' ideational backgrounds. In this context, the dissertation is included in the constructivist contributions made in Southeast Asia and Indonesia. It contributes to this literature as it takes into consideration the ASEAN Way of regionalism, which is majorly ignored in the constructivist literature.

#### **5.4. Future projects**

One of the main claims of this dissertation is that the role of Indonesia as a communication hub and the ASEAN Way of regionalism mutually constitutive constructions. In other words, Indonesia's implementation of this role and being one step ahead of other countries in the region is possible thanks to the ASEAN Way structure. However, some of the policies implemented by Indonesia appear to be aimed at changing the structure of the ASEAN way. These policies could be grouped under efforts to make ASEAN more like Western- style regionalism. Indonesian policies such as challenging non-interference, trying to make ASEAN a supranational body in this context, establishing ASEAN Charter, and pioneering the establishment of regional bodies based on the ASEAN Community vision, Human Rights, and Democracy can be given as examples. Therefore, a dilemma arises here. Although it works in its favor, why does Indonesia occasionally take steps to alter normative character of ASEAN Way? This could be due to different groups within Indonesia having different visions, and these being reflected in their foreign policy. Alternatively, it could be an effort on the part of Indonesia to relieve some of the burden it carries as a communication hub. However, this contradiction in Indonesian foreign policy could be evaluated as a potential future study.

Another potential future project could be examining how the ASEAN member states apart from Indonesia have constructed foreign policy roles within ASEAN, in line with the approach taken in this dissertation. Although Malaysia and Singapore share



a partly common history with Indonesia, they have not been able to construct or achieve a similar role even though the demand for a communication hub in the ASEAN way of regionalism is constant. Similarly, how have countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam that are outside the Indo-Malay culture constructed foreign policy roles in the context of the ASEAN way of regionalism? On the other hand, do they need to construct such roles? Evaluations to be made in terms of other ASEAN member states perspectives would have the potential to be a future project in this context.

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## APPENDICES

### A. CURRICULUM VITAE

#### PERSONEL INFORMATION

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Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University	2014
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#### WORK EXPERIENCE

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2018-	Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University	Teaching Assistant

#### FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English- fluent

Bahasa Indonesia- intermediate

#### PUBLICATIONS

- 1- “Rethinking Indonesia’s role in ASEAN: from leadership to cooptation?”, in ASEAN as a Method edited by Ceren Ergenç, Routledge, 2021

- 2- "The Southeast Asia Regional System: Change and Continuity", *Cogito*, Vol. XII, no. 2/ June, 2020.
- 3- "The effectiveness of Turkey's 'Islamic' soft power in Southeast Asia: The case study of Myanmar" International Conference on "Southeast Asian Islam: Legacy and New Interpretation" The 20th Anniversary of *STUDIA ISLAMIKA*, Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, Jakarta, 14-16 August 2014, Indonesia, 2014.

## B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

### ASEAN YOLU BÖLGESEL CİLİĞİNDE ENDONEZYA'NIN İLETİŞİM MERKEZİ ROLÜ: GÜNEY ÇİN DENİZİ ÖRNEĞİ

“Endonezya'nın yükseliş” özellikle son 20 yıl içerisinde gerek akademinin gerekse de medyanın dikkatini oldukça çekmiştir (Acharya, 2014b; Bresnan, 2005; Reid, 2012; Roberts et al., 2015; White, 2012). Bu konuda karşılaşılan en büyük sorunlardan biri ise yükselen Endonezya'nın ASEAN üzerinde ne gibi etkilerinin olacağına belirsiz olmasıdır. Endonezya'nın yükseliş *reformasi* sonrasında ülkenin yakaladığı demokratik ve ekonomik gelişim ile ilgili olsa da hususun popüler olması Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) ve Joko Widodo (Jokowi) dönemlerinde benimsenen dış politika söylemleri ve projeleri vesilesiyle gerçekleşmiştir.

SBY yönetimi dış politika düsturunu “milyon dost ve sıfır düşman” (*a million friends and zero enemies*) söylemi üzerine kurgulamıştır. Bu söylem halihazırda Endonezya'nın ne Güneydoğu Asya'da ne de küresel boyutta hiçbir devleti düşmanı olarak görmediği ve hiçbir devletin de Endonezya'yı düşman olarak değerlendirmedeği yönünde bir manifestodur (Bimo Yusman & Ted Piccone, 2014). Bu söylemle amaçlanan Endonezya'nın ekonomik büyümesini devam ettirebilmesi için gerekli yabancı yatırımın ve ekonomik iş birliklerinin devamlılığını sağlamak ve bölgesel ya da küresel hiçbir devlet tarafından rakip ya da düşman olarak algılanmamaktır. Bu anlayış çerçevesinde, Endonezya hem G20 (Hermawan et al., 2011; Weck, 2011) hem de İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı (Songbatumis, 2021) bünyesinde oldukça proaktif bir dış politika izlemiştir.

2014 yılında Jokowi yönetimi ile Endonezya dış politikasında daha keskin ve somut adımlar atmaya başlamıştır. Jokowi'nin *Global Maritime Fulcrum* (GMF) projesi bu bağlamda değerlendirilebilir. GMF Endonezya'nın denizcilik kimliğinin (*maritime identity*) canlandırılması ve bu kapsamda Endonezya'nın limanlarının gerek

ekonomik gerekse de güvenlik temelli geliştirilmesini ön gören tek taraflı ve milliyetçi bir girişim olarak değerlendirilebilir. Kimine göre ise GMF güçlenen Endonezya'nın kolonicilik öncesi geçmişini yeniden keşfetmeye başlamasının ilanı olarak değerlendirilebilir (Dewi Santoso; Fadhillah Nafisah, 2017; Yohanes, 2017). GMF gibi tek taraflı girişimlere ek olarak Endonezya ortaya attığı *Indo-Pacific* vizyonu dahilinde ASEAN dışında bir Asya kurgusuna da girdiği öne sürülebilir. Böylelikle SBY döneminde başlayan Endonezya'nın yükselişinin ASEAN içerisinde konumlandırılma sorunsalı Jokowi döneminde daha da yoğunlaşmıştır.

Gerek SBY gerekse de Jokowi dönemlerinde dış politikada sergilenen ve ASEAN dışına taşan bu eğilimler, kuruluşundan bu yana ASEAN'ı dış politikasının merkezine alan Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki geleceğinin ne olacağı ya da yükselen Endonezya'nın ASEAN'ın geleceği için ne ifade edeceği üzerine soruların yüksek sesle sorulmasına neden olmuştur. Bu bağlamda yükselen Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisinde liderlik rolü üstlenip ASEAN'ın uluslararası platformda gücünü arttıracığı, ASEAN'dan bağımsız daha milliyetçi bir dış politika duruşu benimseyip ASEAN'ın birliğinin zarar görmesine neden olacağı (Halans & Nassy, 2013a; Roberts et al., 2015; White, 2012), Endonezya'nın yükselişinin diğer ASEAN ülkeleri tarafından tehdit olarak algılanacağı, ASEAN'ın Endonezya'nın yükselişini engelleyen bir kafes olacağı gibi çıkarımları literatürde ve medyada bulmak mümkündür (Halimi, 2014; Islam, 2011).

Bu tez, Endonezya'nın yükselişi hususundaki belirsizliklerin Endonezya ve ASEAN arasındaki ilişkinin göz ardı edilmesinden kaynaklandığını öne sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisinde aldığı rolün tarihi boyutlarıyla detaylı bir tasvirinin yapılması daha net ve doğru çıkarımlar yapmayı mümkün kılacaktır. Endonezya'nın dış politikasında benimseyeceği bir değişimin ASEAN'a ya da ASEAN içerisindeki yapısal bir değişimin Endonezya'ya etkilerinin belirlenmesi için bu ikisi arasındaki ilişkinin tarihi boyutlarıyla ele alınması gerekmektedir.

ASEAN üye ülkeleri birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini ASEAN Yolu (*ASEAN Way*) denilen normatif bir bölgeselcilik işleyiş usulü çerçevesinde yürütmektedir. Bu bağlamda ASEAN Yolu'nun nasıl oluştuğunu, nasıl geliştiğini ve nasıl bir yapı olduğunu anlamak, Endonezya'nın bu yapı içerisinde nasıl bir rol üstlendiğini ve bu

yapı içerisinde Endonezya'nın rolünün nasıl değiştiğini, geliştiğini tahlil etmek gerekir.

### **Literatür Taraması**

Literatürde temelde iki grup Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki rolünü tanımlamada öne çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki neo-liberal/ realist grup, ikincisi ise konstrüktivist gruptur. İlk grup Endonezya'nın materyal kabiliyetlerine odaklanmakta ve Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki rolünü hegemonya ve üstünlük gibi kavramlarla açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu anlamda Endonezya'nın ASEAN üzerinde hegemonyası olduğu veya gelecekte hegemonya kurabileceği savunulmaktadır. İkinci grup Endonezya'yı bir orta kuvvette güç olarak değerlendirmekte ve belirli dış politika vakaları üzerinden Endonezya'ya demokrasi destekçisi (*democracy promoter*) gibi bazı ek roller atfetmektedir.

Neo-liberal/realist grup, Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki rolünü tanımlamak için hegemonya kavramını kullanmaktadır. ASEAN, 1967'deki kuruluşundan bu yana, siyasi ve sosyo-kültürel açıdan son derece çeşitlilik gösteren Güneydoğu Asya'da istikrarı sürdürmeyi başarmıştır. Bu anlamda ana fikir, Endonezya'nın bölgede bir hegemon olarak diğer tüm devletleri bir araya getirmesi ve bölgede istikrarı sağlamasıdır. Bu fikri destekleyen teori ise Hegemonik İstikrar Teorisi'dir (*Hegemonic Stability Theory*). Endonezya devletinin maddi gücünün yanı sıra yerel geleneklerine de odaklanarak, *Bapakism* de bu grup altında incelenebilir. Son olarak, Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki rolünü açıklamak için İşbirlikçi Hegemonya Teorisi (*Cooperative Hegemony Theory*) neo-liberal/realist grupta yer almaktadır.

Hegemonik istikrar teorisi, uluslararası bir sistemde bir gücün diğerlerine göre daha baskın olduğunu ve bu baskınlığın sistemin istikrarlı bir şekilde sürdürülmesini sağladığını öne sürer. Bu hegemonik güç zayıfladığında, uluslararası sistem istikrarsızlaşmaya başlar. Hegemonik istikrar teorisi, hegemonik gücün yokluğunda istikrarın mümkün olmadığını vurgular (Charles P. Kindleberger, 1973). Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki rolünü açıklayan bir diğer teori de *Bapakism*'dir. *Bapakism* 'e göre devlet bir aile (*kekeluargaan*) sistemidir. Devletin lideri ailenin babası, toplum ise çocuklardır (Bourchier, 2019; Rüland, 2018). Babanın sorumluluğu ailede uyumu sağlamak ve sürdürmektir. *Bapakism*, özellikle Suharto



ve Yeni Dzen rejimi ile birlikte Endonezya i ve dıř politikasında ne ıkmıřtır. Suharto'nun otoriter karar alma yaklařımının paraları olan hiyerarřı, uyum ve konsenss *Bapakism* ile iliřkilendirilebilir (Rland, 2018).

İřbirliki hegemonya teorisi, bir blgesel gcn, blgedeki diđer devletlerin gvenini kazanarak kurumsal kanallar aracılıęıyla kendi deęer ve normlarını dayattıęını ve bylece bu devletleri etkisi altına aldıęını ne srer. İřbirliki hegemonya teorisinin antitezi olarak, grece gl bir blgesel devletin kurumsal bir tuzaęa ekilmesi ve diđer ye devletler tarafından pasifize edilmesi olasılıęı da vardır. Her iki yaklařım da Endonezya'nın ASEAN iindeki roln tanımlamak iin kullanılmaktadır (Nolte, 2010).

Amitav Acharya Endonezya'nın roln "ykselen g" (*emerging power*) kategorisi altında deęerlendirmektedir. Acharya, bu kategorideki devletlerin ncelikle ekonomik, ardından siyasi ve stratejik olarak geliřmekte olan "nc Dnya" veya "Kresel Gney" devletleri olduęunu vurgulamaktadır. Acharya, Endonezya'nın da bu ykselen g rolyle ASEAN devletleri arasında blgesel bir lider olduęunu savunmaktadır. Acharya, Endonezya'nın blgesel liderlięinin byk lde demokrasi, kalkınma ve istikrardan oluřan erdemli korelasyonuna (*virtuous correlation*) dayandıęını savunmaktadır (Acharya, 2014b)

Christopher Roberts ve Widyaningsih, Endonezya'nın ASEAN ierisinde roln kriz/atıřma ynetimi, arabuluculuk ve normlar/deęerler yayılımı vakaları zerinden incelemektedir. Bu anlamda, Endonezya'nın Corregidor Olayı ve 1979 Kamboya atıřmasındaki arabuluculuk rol, insan hakları ve demokrasinin teřvikine dayalı katkıları ve ASEAN'ın kresel lekte prestijini artırma abaları gibi bazı spesifik konularda orta kuvvette bir g olarak Endonezya'nın ASEAN'ın liderlięini elinde tuttuęunu ne srmektedirler (Roberts et al., 2015). Roberts ve Widyaningsih'in bir diđer argmanı da Endonezya'nın ASEAN'ın kuruluřu sırasında diđer blge lkeleri tarafından halihazırda doęal bir lider olarak kabul edildięidir. Bu anlamda Endonezya, ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri gc gz nnde bulundurularak blgesel meselelerden sorumlu olacak řekilde gruba dahil edilmiřtir. Bu anlamda ASEAN'ın daim Genel Sekreterlięi'nin Cakarta'da kurulması rnek gsterilebilir. Dolayısıyla

diğer üye devletler Endonezya'yı bölgesel meselelerden sorumlu hale getirmişlerdir (Roberts et al., 2015).

Agastia, Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisindeki rolünü orta kuvvette güç olarak değerlendirmektedir. Ancak Agastia'ya göre Endonezya, Indo- Pasifik vizyonunu ilan ederek orta kuvvette güç olma özelliğini ASEAN dışında da uygulamaya başlamıştır. Bu güncelleme ile Endonezya "köprü kurucu" ve "bölgesel lider" rollerini de üstlenmektedir. Endonezya'nın Indo- Pasifik vizyonu çerçevesinde Cakarta, sadece Güneydoğu Asya'yı değil, Güney Asya, Doğu Asya ve Pasifik'i de kapsayan bir bölgeselcilik çerçevesi öngörmektedir (Agastia, 2020).

Endonezya'nın dış politika rolünü tanımlamaya yönelik en kapsamlı çalışmalardan biri Jürgen Rüländ tarafından yapılmıştır. Rüländ, Endonezya'nın 1945'ten bu yana dış politika rolünü Holsti'nin rol kuramı kapsamında incelemiştir. Bu anlamda Endonezya'nın arabulucu, köprü kurucu gibi kalıcı rollerinin yanı sıra demokrasi destekçisi gibi yeni rolleri de devreye soktuğunu savunmuştur (Rüländ, 2015, 2018).

Rol kuramının temel varsayımı şudur: "... devletler, özdeşleştikleri belirli rollerle tutarlı davranan aktörlerdir" (Adigbuo, 2007) Rol kuramında bireyler kendilerini ilgili toplumları içinde tanımlar ve beklentileri ve çıkarları doğrultusunda en iyi davranış kalıplarını belirlerler. Rol kuramı, tıpkı bireyler gibi devletlerin de uluslararası bir devletler toplumunda yaşadıklarını ve bu nedenle bölgelerinde veya uluslararası toplumda hayatta kalmak için belirli dış politika davranış kalıpları belirlediklerini öne sürer (Adigbuo, 2007, p. 89). Ancak, bireylerin toplum içindeki rollerini belirlemelerinden farklı olarak, devletlerin ulusal rolleri ilgili devletlerin politika yapıcıları tarafından belirlenir. Belirli bir devletin bir dış politika rolü belirlemesi, politika yapıcılarının bölgedeki veya uluslararası devletler toplumundaki devletlere ilişkin algılarına göre belirlenir (Adigbuo, 2007; Holsti, 1970, p. 240).

Bir devlet uluslararası sistem içerisinde birden fazla dış politika rolüne sahip olabilir. Bu roller devletin kendi dış politika eğilimleri ve sistemik beklentiler tarafından oluşturulabilir. Bu farklı roller bazı durumlarda bir arada bulunabilir veya birbirleriyle çelişebilir. Rol çatışması ikinci durumun sonucudur. Rol çatışmasının bir sonucu olarak, devletin dış politika rollerinden biri diğerini engelleyebilir (Karim, 2022).

Bu bağlamda Karim, Endonezya'nın hem uluslararası sistem düzeyinde hem de ASEAN içindeki dış politika rollerinin potansiyel olarak çatışma içinde olabileceğini savunmaktadır. Konstrüktivist akademisyenler Endonezya'nın devlet kimliğinin özellikle SBY döneminde demokrasi etrafında şekillendiğini ileri sürmektedir (Acharya, 2014b; Anwar, 1997; Rüländ, 2018). Bu bağlamda Karim, demokrasiyi Endonezya'nın devlet kimliği olarak değil, bir dış politika rolü olarak görmenin daha doğru olduğunu savunmaktadır. Demokrasiyi teşvik eden bu rol sayesinde Endonezya özellikle küresel düzeyde prestij kazanmıştır. Ancak Endonezya'nın demokrasiyi teşvik eden rolü, özellikle bölge içinde oynadığı diğer rollerle çatışabilmektedir (Karim, 2017, p. 386).

Karim'e göre Endonezya'nın demokrasi destekçisi ve ASEAN ile uluslararası sistem arasında köprü kurucu rolü, ASEAN içinde bölgesel bir lider olarak konumunu sağlamlaştırmasına yardımcı olmaktadır. Endonezya'nın Rohingya krizi konusunda uluslararası toplum ile Myanmar arasında köprü kurucu rolünü üstlenmesi bunun iyi bir örneğidir. Bu da Endonezya'ya bu konuda bölgeyi temsil etme şansı vermiştir (Karim, 2017). Ancak Endonezya'nın Myanmar'da demokrasiyi teşvik etme çabaları çerçevesinde sergilediği demokrasi destekçisi rolü, Myanmar, ASEAN ve uluslararası toplum arasında iletişim ve uzlaşmanın devamı çerçevesinde sergilediği köprü kurucu rolü ile bir ölçüde çatışmaktadır. Endonezya, askeri cuntanın insan hakları ihlallerine rağmen Myanmar hükümetiyle müzakerelerini sürdürmüş ve böylece demokrasi destekçisi rolünü askıya almıştır (Karim, 2017). Karim'in Endonezya'nın dış politika rolleri içindeki potansiyel çatışmalar üzerine yaptığı araştırma, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliği içindeki rolünü farklı bir perspektiften incelemeyi gerekli kılmıştır. Bu bağlamda tez, rol kuramının konstrüktivist bir modifikasyonunu merkeze almaktadır.

Kirste ve Maull, rol kuramının inşacı bir yeniden düzenlemesini sunmaktadır. Bu inşacı düzenlemede, aktörün dünya görüşü, değerleri, taahhütleri ve hedefleri gibi bilişsel değişkenleri analize büyük ölçüde dahil edilmektedir. Bu bilişsel değişkenler hem ilgili devletin kendi algısından hem de uluslararası sistemdeki diğer aktörlerin beklentilerinden kaynaklanmaktadır (Kirste & Maull, 1996; Wehner & Thies, 2014). Hem ülke içindeki rol inşası, yani "ego" hem de sistem içerisindeki diğer aktörlerin devlet hakkındaki algısı, yani "alter", bir devletin dış politika rolünün

oluşturulmasında ve yeniden oluşturulmasında rol oynamaktadır. Kirste ve Maull her ne kadar ego kısmının daha etkili olduğunu vurgulasalar da hem ego hem de alter kısımlarının rol inşası sürecinde etkili olduğunu savunmaktadırlar. Kısacası, inşacı anlayışta rol inşası süreci bir aktör- yapı ilişkisi içerisinde yürütülür (Kirste & Maull, 1996; Rüländ, 2015).

Bir aktörün rolünün sistemik beklentilerden nasıl etkilendiğini ve buna karşılık aktörün rolünün sistemi nasıl etkilediği incelenmelidir. Bu durum, özellikle Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselcilikteki rolü düşünüldüğünde önemlidir. Endonezya ASEAN Yolu'ndan bağımsız olarak düşünülmesi ve benzer şekilde ASEAN Yolu'nun da Endonezya'nın bu yol içindeki rolü dikkate alınmadan incelenmesi eksik sonuçlara ulaşmamıza neden olacaktır.

Bu anlamda Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselcilikteki rolü hem Endonezya politika yapıcılarının algıları hem de Güneydoğu Asya alt sisteminin işleyiş usulü olan ASEAN Yolu bölgeselcilikinin beklentileri çerçevesinde değerlendirilebilir. Böyle bir bakış açısını benimsemek, Endonezya'nın dış politika rolünün ve ASEAN Yolu bölgeselcilikinin karşılıklı olarak birbirini var eden tarihsel olgular olduğunu ortaya çıkarmamızı sağlar. Bu bağlamda, tez öncelikle ASEAN Yolu'nun, işleyiş usulünün, tarihsel kökenlerinin ve ardından tarihsel sürecinin ve nereden kaynaklandığının ayrıntılı bir şekilde anlaşılmasını sağlamakta, ardından Endonezya'nın bu tarihsel süreç içerisinde nasıl bir rol üstlendiğini ve bu rolün nasıl evrildiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Endonezya, dış politika rolünü Srivijaya İmparatorluğu, Majapahit Krallığı ve Malakka Sultanlığının mirası üzerine inşa ederek aslında Güneydoğu Asya'nın iletişim merkezi olma rolünü miras edinmiştir denebilir. Bu tezin üçüncü bölümünde Endonezya'nın Srivijaya İmparatorluğu, Majapahit Krallığı ve Malakka Sultanlığının mirası üzerinden iletişim merkezi rolünü nasıl inşa ettiği Endonezya liderlerinin konuşmaları ve belirli dış politika vakaları üzerinden incelenmiştir.

Endonezya'nın ASEAN'ın iletişim merkezi olma rolünü inşa edebilmesi için Cakarta'nın karşılaması gereken bazı fikirselle ve materyal gereklilikler vardır. Öncelikle bu rol için yapısal bir talep olmalıdır. ASEAN Yolu'nun normatif yapısı, istişare yoluyla bir uzlaşmaya varmak için üye devletler arasında iletişimin

sağlanmasını gerektirmektedir. ASEAN'ın kurumsal yapısı nispeten zayıf olduğundan ve bağlayıcı kurallar bulunmadığından, istişare süreçlerinin, hegemon olacak kadar güçlü olmayan ancak ASEAN üye devletlerini uzlaştırma kapasitesine sahip bir devlet tarafından yönetilmesi gerekmektedir. Ek olarak bu rolü inşa etmek için fikirsel bir arka plan olmalıdır. Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel sisteminde, Endonezya'nın ataları olarak kabul ettiği Srivijaya İmparatorluğu, Majapahit Krallığı ve Malakka Sultanlığı, tüm bölgenin iletişim ağını elinde tutan merkezi denizci güçlerdi. Endonezya'nın fikirsel arka planı bu güçlerin mirasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca bu rol için gerekli diplomatik yeteneklere sahip olunmalıdır. Bu rolü yürüten devletin liderleri, bürokratları ve diplomatları diplomatik ilişkilerinde başarılı olmalıdır. Birçok örnek üzerinden Jakarta diplomatik açıdan yetenekli bir devlet olarak değerlendirilebilir. Son olarak devlet saygın ve güvenilir olmalı ve çeşitli durumlarda önemini kanıtlamış olmalıdır. Bu bağlamda Endonezya, ASEAN için dahil olduğu neredeyse tüm bölgesel girişimlerde başarılı olmuştur.

Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünün üç temel katmanı vardır. Bu katmanlardan ilki ve en önemlisi ASEAN birliğinin sürdürülmesini sağlamaktır. İkincisi, ASEAN'ı Güneydoğu Asya bölgesi dışında temsil ederek bölge ile dünyanın geri kalanı arasındaki iletişimi sağlamaktır. Üçüncüsü, küresel gelişmeler ve bölgeden gelen talepler ışığında, ASEAN'ın gelişmesi ve ilerlemesi için bir grup vizyonu ve gündemi oluşturulmasına ön ayak olmak ve üye devletleri alınan kararların uygulanması için teşvik etmektir.

ASEAN'ın grup birliğini korumak için ASEAN üye ülkelerinin uyumlu politikalar izlemesi veya bölgesel konularda benzer kaygıları paylaşması gerekir. Ancak durum her zaman böyle değildir. Üyeler arasında olası anlaşmazlıklar ortaya çıkabilir ve bu da grubun birliğini olumsuz etkileyebilir. Bu sorunun üstesinden gelmek için ASEAN üye ülkeleri birbirleriyle etkili bir iletişim içinde olmalı ve farklılıklarını gidermelidirler. Bu anlamda, Endonezya tüm üyeleri mümkün olan en iyi fikirsel düzeyde bir araya getirmeye çalışır. Bunu yaparken, Endonezya aktörlerle doğrudan ve genellikle gayri resmi olarak ikili veya çok taraflı etkileşime girebilir veya aktörlerin birbirleriyle gayri resmi olarak iletişime geçebilmeleri için çalıştaylar gibi iletişim platformları oluşturur. Grup kararlarının uzlaşılı yolu ile alınması ASEAN için

büyük önem taşımaktadır. ASEAN üye ülkelerini bağlayan bir kurallar bütünü olmadığından, ASEAN'ın birlik ve istikrarı sağlama ve koruma konusunda aslında oldukça kırılgan olduğu söylenebilir. Bu bağlamda Endonezya'nın çatışma yönetimini sağlama, arabuluculuk veya köprü ülke gibi rollerinin genellikle tümü ASEAN'ın birliğini koruma katmanı içerisinde değerlendirilebilir.

Grubun bölge dışı ölçeklerde temsil edilmesi hususunda Endonezya ASEAN'ı Asya'da ve küresel ölçekte temsil etmektedir. Bu bağlamda Endonezya bölge dışı düzeyde var olan gelişmeleri ASEAN'a taşır ve diğer üye ülkelerle birlikte bu gelişmelerin bölgeye göre yorumlanmasını ve uygunsa benimsenmesini sağlar.

Grup vizyonunu ve gündemini belirlenmesi hususunda ise Endonezya ASEAN'ın gelişimine yönelik tüm üyelerin yararına olacak bir vizyon ve gündemin belirlenmesine ön ayak olur ve bu vizyonun uygulanmasını temin eder. Endonezya dünyadaki olayların gidişatına ve bölgedeki üye ülkelerin taleplerine göre gruba fayda sağlayacak bir ilerleme vizyonu sunar. Bu anlamda Endonezya'nın bir dünya vizyonuna sahip olması ve yerel ihtiyaçları yeterince iyi analiz edebilmesi gerekir. ASEAN Anlaşması'nın oluşturulması, ASEAN Artı Süreçleri (*ASEAN Plus Processes*), ASEAN Topluluk Vizyonu, Bali Demokrasi Forumu, ASEAN Hükümetler arası İnsan Hakları Komisyonu aracılığıyla insan hakları konusunda farkındalık yaratılması bu kapsamdaki faaliyetler arasında sayılabilir. İletişim merkezi olma rolünün bu katmanında Endonezya resmi ve gayri resmi toplantılar ve çalıştaylar düzenleyerek vizyon ve gündemin belirlenmesini, kabul edilmesini ve akabinde uygulanmasını sağlar.

Endonezya, üyeler arasında anlaşmazlık olması durumunda ikili veya çok taraflı kanallar aracılığıyla üyeler arasında resmi veya gayri resmi iletişim sağlar. Bu iletişim sonucunda üyeler arasında bir uzlaşma oluşturur. Benzer şekilde, bölge ile dünya arasında bir iletişim köprüsü olması durumunda, bölgenin taleplerini toplar ve bölgeyi dünya kamuoyunda temsil eder, aynı şekilde küresel düzeydeki gelişmeleri toplar ve bunların ASEAN içerisinde yayılmasını sağlar. Bölgenin ihtiyaçlarına ve dünya olaylarının gidişatına göre bir vizyon ve gündem belirlenmesini sağlar. Bu vizyon ve gündem tartışılmak, benimsenmek ve uygulanmak üzere ASEAN üye ülkelerinin takdirine sunulur.

Endonezya, üye ülkeleri bir araya getirmek amacıyla ASEAN içinde ilişkiler kurmak ve çalıştaylar düzenlemek için çalışır. Ek olarak Endonezya, fikir toplamak, bu fikirleri yorumlamak ve daha sonra ASEAN üye ülkelerine geri bildirmek için ASEAN üye ülkelerine bireysel delegasyonlar göndererek mekik diplomasisi (*shuttle diplomacy*) uygular. Bu da nihayetinde bir uzlaşya varılmasını ve ortak kararların alınmasına yol açar.

ASEAN üye ülkelerini bir arada tutan yazılı anlaşmalar veya bağlayıcı kurallar yoktur. Dolayısıyla, bu devletlerin bir grup olarak karar alabilmelerinin ve uyum ve birlik içinde hareket edebilmelerinin tek yolu birbirleri arasındaki iletişimi sürdürmektir. Bu anlamda tez, ASEAN'ın kuruluşundan bu yana ASEAN üye ülkelerinin birlikte hareket edebilmelerinin en önemli nedenlerinden birisinin Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolü olduğunu savunmaktadır.

İletişim merkezi rolü Endonezya'ya ağır sorumluluklar da yüklemektedir. Bu bağlamda Endonezya'nın ASEAN içerisinde neden sorumluluk aldığı konusunda görüşler farklılık göstermektedir. Ancak bu teze göre Güneydoğu Asya devletleri tüm farklılıklarına rağmen bölgenin istikrarı ve refahı için birlikte çalışmak zorundadır. Güneydoğu Asya'nın bir bölge olarak hareket etmeye başlamasından bu yana Hindistan ve Çin gibi medeniyetlerden etkilenmiştir. Bu durum, post- kolonyal dönemde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin denkleme dahil olmasıyla birlikte bugün de devam etmektedir. Bu nedenle Güneydoğu Asya devletleri egemenliklerini korumak ve bölgenin istikrar ve refahını sağlamak için birlikte çalışmak zorundadır. Endonezya bu grubu bir arada tutmaya aday en önemli devlet olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda güçlü bir ASEAN güçlü bir Endonezya olarak değerlendirilebilir.

ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinin işleyiş biçimi, ASEAN Yolu'nun benimsediği normlarla ilgilidir. Bu normlar çerçevesinde ASEAN 1967'den bu yana kayda değer bir başarıyla faaliyetlerini sürdürülmektedir. Ancak bu sistemin ideal ya da mükemmel olduğu iddia edilemez. Öncelikle üye devletler arasında istişareye dayalı uzlaşma süreci, üye devletlerin liderleri ve elitleri aracılığıyla yürütülmektedir. Bu liderler ve elitler değiştiğinde, önceki kararlar sorgulanabilir veya yeni bir uzlaşma sağlanamayabilir. Dahası sistemin iletişim merkezi olan Endonezya'da meydana

gelebilecek bir hükümet değişikliği bu anlamda çok daha kritiktir. Yeni lider ve ekibinin Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünü yeniden inşa etmemesi ve dış politikada farklı yollar benimsemesi her zaman mümkündür. Böyle bir durumda ASEAN üye ülkeleri arasında çeşitli olaylarda ortaya çıkabilecek anlaşmazlıklar, uzlaşmaya varılamaması ve nihayetinde ASEAN'ın birliğinin sorgulanması anlamına gelebilir.

Endonezya'daki hükümet değişikliklerini ve bunun ASEAN birliği üzerindeki olumsuz etkilerini zaman zaman görmek mümkündür. Bunun en yakın örneği son Endonezya lideri Jokowi döneminde yaşanmıştır. Jokowi yönetimi Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünden tamamen farklı bir yol izlemese de iç siyasetten kaynaklanan milliyetçi bir dış politika duruşu sergilemektedir. Bu durumun ASEAN'ın birliği açısından olumsuz sonuçlar doğurma potansiyeline sahip olduğu ileri sürülebilir. Literatürde bu bağlamda çalışmalar mevcuttur. Bu anlamda tezin üçüncü bölümünde Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolü liderler ve dönemleri bazında incelenecektir.

### **Araştırma Soruları**

Literatürde Endonezya'nın rolüne ilişkin çalışmalar bulunsa da özellikle Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinde nasıl bir rol oynadığına ilişkin çalışmalar oldukça yetersizdir. Endonezya'daki olası bir dış politika değişikliği ışığında, bunun ASEAN'ın geleceği açısından ne gibi sonuçlar doğuracağı belirsizdir. Bu bağlamda, Endonezya'nın ASEAN için önemi ve rolü daha açık bir şekilde ortaya konmalıdır. Bu arka plan dahilinde, tez iki araştırma sorusu belirlemiştir.

1- Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolü nedir?

2- 21. yüzyılda Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolü ne ölçüde değişmiştir?

Birinci araştırma sorusuna cevap üretme sürecinde, bir dizi konuda çıkarımlar yapılacaktır. Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinde benimsediği dış politika rolünün betimlenmesi, öncelikle ASEAN Yolu'nun nasıl bir yapı olduğunu ve bu yapının tarihsel süreçte nasıl şekillendiğini incelemeyi gerektirmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu tez ASEAN Yolu'nun detaylı bir şekilde anlaşılmasını sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.



Endonezya'nın benimsediği dış politika rolü de bu detaylı anlayış içerisinde konumlandırılacak ve incelenecektir. Öte yandan, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolünü tanımlamak, Endonezya'nın rolü ile ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliği arasındaki birbirini karşılıklı var eden aktör- yapı ilişkisini de ortaya koyacaktır. Bu bağlamda, bu ilişki incelenecek ve hem Endonezya'nın ASEAN için hem de ASEAN'ın Endonezya için önemi vurgulanacaktır.

Tez, söz konusu araştırma sorusunu cevaplarken elde edilen bu çıkarımların, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolünü tanımlamanın ötesinde, gelecek projeksiyonlarında Endonezya ve ASEAN arasındaki ilişkiyi daha iyi değerlendirmek için bir alt yapı oluşturacağını savunmaktadır. İlk araştırma sorusunun yanıtlanmasının ardından tez, Endonezya'nın rolünün 21. yüzyılda değişip değişmediğini ve değiştiyse ne ölçüde değiştiğini analiz edecektir. Böylelikle Endonezya'nın yükselişinin ikinci dalgasını oluşturan SBY ve Jokowi dönemlerinde Endonezya'nın dış politikasında bir sapma olup olmadığı incelenecektir.

Bu araştırma soruları ışığında tez, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki kapsamında, ASEAN üye ülkeleri arasında ve ASEAN ile bölge dışı aktörler arasında iletişimi kolaylaştırıcı bir rolü olduğunu varsaymaktadır. Endonezya bu rolü materyal gücünden ziyade diplomatik kabiliyetleri sayesinde sergileyebilmektedir. Buna ek olarak tez, Joko Widodo yönetiminde Endonezya milliyetçiliğinin son dönemde yükselişe geçmesiyle Endonezya'nın dış politika eğilimlerinde bazı küçük değişimler olduğunun ancak Endonezya'nın bu değişimlere rağmen ASEAN ile ilgili hususlarda önemli rol oynamaya devam ettiğini öne sürmektedir.

### **Metodoloji ve Araştırma Dizaynı**

Bu tezin metodolojik tercihleri, ele alınan araştırma soruları göz önünde bulundurularak mümkün olan en iyi bilgiyi üretmek üzere tasarlanmıştır. Bu anlamda metodoloji ve araştırma dizaynı: ontolojik ve epistemolojik varsayımlar, araştırma stratejisi, veri toplama ve analizi ve tez taslağı olarak düzenlenmiştir.

"Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolü nedir?" ve "Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolü 21. yüzyılda ne ölçüde değişmiştir?" gibi araştırma soruları üzerine bir araştırma tasarlamak, belirli ontolojik ve epistemolojik

önkoşulları benimsemeyi gerektirir. Bu bağlamda sosyal inşacı ontolojiyi benimseyen tez, devletlerin dış politika rolleri olduğu ve bu rollerin politika yapıcılarının değerleri, normları ve ilkeleri tarafından inşa edildiği ve yeniden yapılandırıldığı varsayımına sahiptir. Bu anlamda tez, bireylerin zihinlerinden bağımsız olan nesnel gerçeklikten farklı olarak sosyal olarak inşa edilmiş gerçekliğin varlığını kabul etmektedir. Devletler ya da kurumlar, onları sosyo- kültürel geçmişlerinin oluşturduğu algılarına göre yöneten insanlardan ayrı düşünülemez. Devletlerin dış politika davranışları, politika yapıcılarının kendilerini ve uluslararası sistemdeki diğer aktörleri nasıl algıladıklarına göre inşa edilir (Finnemore, 2003).

Bu ontolojik arka plan bağlamında tez, nicel verilere ve hipotez testlerine dayalı bilgi üretme biçiminin sosyal olarak inşa edilmiş bir gerçekliği incelemek için yetersiz kalacağından pozitivist epistemolojiyi reddetmektedir. Bu nedenle tez, yorumlamacı epistemolojiyi benimseyerek, politika yapıcılarının düşünsel arka planlarını dikkate alarak ve devletlerin dış politika davranışlarını analiz ederek bilgi üretmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Tezin araştırma sorularının her ikisi de "ne" sorusudur. Bu anlamda tez temelde tanımlayıcı bir çalışmadır (*descriptive study*). Ancak Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolünü tanımlamak için oldukça yorumlayıcı bir yaklaşım (*interpretive approach*) benimsenmelidir. Bu yorumlayıcı yaklaşım, ASEAN Yolu'nu oluşturan tarihsel, kültürel, sosyal arka planı içeren kavramları ve Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolünü mümkün kılan düşünsel arka planı incelememizi sağlayacaktır. Bu anlamda tümevarımsal (*inductive*) bir araştırma stratejisi benimsemek yetersiz kalacaktır.

Öte yandan, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki "rolünü" tanımlamak, devletlerin uluslararası sistemde belirli dış politika rolleri olduğunu kabul etmeyi gerektirir. Bu anlamda, bu tez rol kuramını (*National Role Conception Theory*) çıkış noktası olarak ele almaktadır. Ancak bu tez, Endonezya- ASEAN örneğinde herhangi bir teoriyi test etmeyi veya Endonezya- ASEAN örneğine dayalı yeni bir teori inşa etmeyi amaçlamamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, tez tümdengelsel araştırma stratejisini de benimsememektedir. Tez, teorik bilgi ile ampirik bilgi arasında gidip gelerek aktörler tarafından inşa edilen bir sosyal gerçekliğin saf bir

tanımını yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu da hepten gidimsel (*abductive*) araştırma stratejisinin benimsenmesini gerektirmiştir. Tümevarımsal ve tümdengelimsel araştırma stratejilerinden farklı olarak hepten gidimsel araştırma stratejisi, aktörlerin davranışlarının nedenlerinin altında yatan anlamları, yorumları, güdüleri ve niyetleri inceleme fırsatı vermesi bakımından tezin yorumlayıcı tarzına uygundur (Norman, 2006, pp. 89–92).

Tez, bağlama- duyarlı yorumlayıcı analize uygun olarak nitel (*qualitative*) bir araştırma yürütmektedir. ASEAN Yolu'nun beklentileri ve Endonezya'nın düşünsel arka planına göre inşa edilen iletişim merkezi rolü, sosyal olarak inşa edilmiş bir olgudur. Bu bağlamda, bu rolü incelemek için Endonezya'nın ASEAN temelli dış politika vakaları üzerinde niteliksel ve derinlemesine bir analiz yapılmıştır.

Öte yandan, bu tez tarihselciliği (*historicism*) benimsemektedir. Tarihsel yaklaşım, sosyal olguların nereden kaynaklandığını ve zaman içinde belirli süreçlerden geçerek nasıl son halini aldığını inceler. Tarihselcilik, tüm insan düşüncelerinin, kültürlerinin ve değerlerinin temelde tarihsel yönelimli olduğu varsayımını benimser. Bu anlamda, geçmişte var olan anlamları, olayları ve fikirleri yeniden kavramak ve bunların günümüzü nasıl şekillendirdiğine odaklanmak esastır. Bu bağlamda zaman içindeki değişime odaklanılarak belirli olgular anlaşılmaya çalışılır (Berg & Lune, 2016, p. 305).

Bu tez, ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinin yalnızca post- kolonyalizmin bir ürünü olduğunu reddetmektedir. Bunun yerine ASEAN Yolu'nu, tarihsel süreçte coğrafi koşullar aracılığıyla oluşan eski Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel sisteminin bir uzantısı olarak görmektedir. Bu anlamda tez, "ASEAN Yolu" olgusunu değişen koşullar altında tarihsel spektrum içinde incelemektedir. Böyle bir bakış açısı, ASEAN Yolu'nun post-kolonyal dönemin ya da Soğuk Savaşın bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilmesinin önüne geçmektedir.

Tezin son bölümü, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki iletişim merkezi rolünü analiz etmek için Güney Çin Denizi (GÇD) anlaşmazlıkları üzerine bir vaka çalışması olarak düzenlenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, GÇD anlaşmazlıkları birkaç nedenden ötürü bu tez için uygun bir vaka analizi teşkil etmektedir. Öncelikle, GÇD vakası, Çin ve ABD gibi büyük güçleri içerisinde barındırdığından Endonezya'nın

iletişim merkezi rolünü uygulaması için en zor vakalardan biri durumundadır. Bu durum, Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünü analiz etmede GÇD vakasını değerli kılmaktadır. Bu tezin sonuç bölümünde de görüleceği üzere, Endonezya GÇD vakasında anlaşmazlıkları çözemese de tüm aktörleri aynı masada tutmayı, bir vizyon belirlemeyi ve en önemlisi ASEAN üye ülkelerinin birliğini sağlamayı başarmıştır. Bu da GÇD vakasını bu tez için önemli bir turnusol kâğıdı haline getirmektedir. İkinci olarak, GÇD vakası ASEAN üyesi tüm ülkeleri farklı derecelerde etkileyen bir durumdur. Bu açıdan tam anlamıyla bölgesel bir meseledir. Üçüncüsü, GÇD vakası ASEAN'ın kuruluşundan günümüze kadar var olmuştur. Böylece Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünü geniş bir yelpazeden analiz etmemizi sağlayacaktır. Son olarak, tüm Endonezya liderlerinin yönetimi sırasında Jakarta, GÇD konusunda politikalar yürütmüştür. Bu da liderlerin farklı dış politika eğilimlerine göre Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünün uygulanmasındaki farklılıkları incelememize olanak sağlamaktadır.

Tez, nitel bir içerik analizi yürütmektedir. Ana veri kaynakları devletlerin dış politika açıklamaları, anlaşma mektupları, toplantı raporları, politika yapıcılarının konuşmaları, politika yapıcılarının otobiyografileri ve ilgili arşiv kayıtlarından oluşmaktadır. İkincil kaynaklar ise İngilizce ve Endonezya dilinde yayınlanan ilgili dergi makaleleri, kitaplar, medya raporları ve yorumları, makaleler ve çeşitli web kaynaklarıdır.

## **Tez Planı**

Giriş bölümünden sonra gelen ikinci bölüm, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki rolünün analizinde aktör- yapı ilişkilerinin "yapısını" incelemektedir. Bu bölümün amacı, yapının oluşumunu ve evrimini geriye dönük incelerken, belirli bir rolün inşası için yapının aktörden beklentisinin ne olduğunun tahlilidir. Bu anlamda, bu bölüm Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel sistemini ve ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliği tarihsel boyutlarıyla incelemektedir. Bölüm, Güneydoğu Asya'nın bir bölge olarak tanımlanmasıyla başlamakta ve Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel sisteminin temelleri ve tarihsel evrimini üç ana dönemde inceleyerek devam etmektedir: pre- kolonyal dönem, kolonyal dönem ve post- kolonyal dönem. Post- kolonyal dönemde ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliği ve işleyiş biçimi incelenmektedir.

Üçüncü bölümde ise sırasıyla Sukarno, Suharto, *Reformasi* Hükümetleri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ve Joko Widodo dönemlerinde Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünün politika yapıcıların konuşmaları ve devlet sembolleri aracılığıyla inşası ve yeniden yapılandırılması incelenmektedir. Bu arka planda, bir dizi dış politika vakası, bu tezde belirtilen iletişim merkezi rolünün üç katmanı olan "grup birliğinin korunması, grup vizyonunun ve gündeminin belirlenmesi ve grubun bölge dışı ölçeklerde temsil edilmesi" üzerinden incelenmektedir. Bu vakalar Corregidor Olayı, Kamboçya Vietnam Çatışması (1978-1992), Myanmar Rohingya Krizi, ASEAN Sözleşmesi, ASEAN Topluluğu Vizyonu, Bali Demokrasi Forumu, Güneydoğu Asya Dostluk ve İşbirliği Antlaşması, Asya-Pasifik Ekonomik İşbirliği ve ASEAN Bölgesel Forumu'dur.

Dördüncü ve son bölüm, Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğindeki iletişim merkezi rolünü incelemek üzere GÇD anlaşmazlıkları üzerine bir vaka çalışmasıdır. Bölüm, GÇD meselesine genel bir bakış ve meselenin tarihçesi ile başlamaktadır. Bu arka plan ışığında, Çin ile ASEAN'ın davacı devletleri arasındaki algısal farklılıklar incelendikten sonra, Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolü açısından GÇD meselesine ilişkin politikaları ve girişimleri tartışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda üç önemli girişim ayrıntılı olarak incelenmektedir: 1- Güney Çin Denizi'ndeki Potansiyel Çatışmaları Yönetme Çalışmaları (GÇD Çalışmaları), 2- Güney Çin Denizi Davranış Kuralları (COC) ve 3- Ortak Bildiri başarısızlığı.

## **Bulgular**

Bu tez çerçevesinde yapılan araştırma sonucunda bazı bulgulara ulaşılmıştır. İlk olarak, Endonezya'nın ASEAN temelli dış politikasının bir iletişim merkezi olarak hareket etme hedefinde bir değişiklik olmadığı ortaya konmuştur. Bu durum, 3. bölümde farklı dönemlerden seçilen dış politika vakalarının incelenmesinde ve 4. bölümdeki GÇD anlaşmazlıkları üzerinden açıkça görülmüştür. Tez Endonezya'nın ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliği içerisinde bir iletişim merkezi olarak oynadığı rolün ASEAN için kritik öneme sahip olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak kuruluşundan bu yana Endonezya'nın ASEAN odaklı politikalarına bakıldığında ana akım politikaların değişmediği görülmektedir. Endonezya'nın öncelikli olarak ASEAN odaklı bir dış politika izlediği söylenebilir. Ancak Endonezyalı liderlerin dış politika konusunda

tamamen farklı görüşlere sahip olması, gelecekte Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünde değişikliklere yol açabilir.

Endonezya'nın dış politikası 1945'teki kuruluşundan bu yana çok fazla değişmemiş olsa da ülkenin ekonomik büyümesi ve siyasi istikrarı ile bağlantılı olarak gelişmiştir. Endonezya'nın dış politikasının temelinde her zaman *bebas aktif* (özgür ve aktif) yaklaşımı etkili olmuş ve ülkenin dış politikasının odak noktası Güneydoğu Asya bölgesi olarak belirlenmiştir (Sukma, 1997). Sukarno dönemi Endonezya'nın Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel meseleleriyle en az ilgilendiği dönem olarak kabul edilebilir. Ekonomik yetersizlikler ve Soğuk Savaş ortamı bu anlamda etkilidir. Bu dönemde Endonezya'nın diğer bölge ülkeleri ile ilişkileri de istikrarlı olmamıştır. Dolayısıyla Sukarno döneminde Endonezya bir iletişim merkezi olma rolünü ancak sınırlı ölçüde yerine getirebilmiştir. Suharto dönemi Endonezya için ekonomik büyümenin ve siyasi istikrarın sağlandığı bir dönem olmuştur ve Endonezya Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel meselelerinde daha etkili olmaya başlamıştır. Bu durum ASEAN'ın kuruluşunda ve Endonezya'nın Güney Çin Denizi ihtilaflarına müdahil olmasında açıkça görülebilir. Suharto dönemi, bu tezde incelenen dış politika vakaları ışığında, Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi olma rolünü başarıyla yerine getirmeye başladığı bir dönem olarak değerlendirilebilir. Bu bağlamda bu dönem aynı zamanda Endonezya'nın ilk yükseliş dalgasını teşkil etmektedir. Daha sonra Endonezya *reformasi* hükümetleri döneminde başka bir dönüşüm daha geçirmiş ve bu dönemde Endonezya'nın Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel olayları üzerindeki etkisi, o dönemdeki istikrarsızlığa rağmen ılımlı seviyelerde kalmıştır. SBY döneminde ise sağlanan siyasi ve ekonomik istikrar sayesinde Endonezya dış politikasında daha proaktif bir rol üstlenmeye ve daha fazla sorumluluk almaya başlamıştır. Bu dönemin Endonezya'nın dış politikasının altyapısının oluşturulduğu dönem olduğu söylenebilir. Son olarak Jokowi yönetimiyle birlikte Endonezya dış politikasında daha somut adımlar atmaya başlamıştır. Endonezya'nın limanlarını geliştirmesi ve yenilerini inşa etmesi buna örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Bu dönemde Endonezya'nın Güney Çin Denizi'nde kendi sularına izinsiz giren balıkçı teknelerini batırması bölge ülkeleri tarafından bir tehdit olarak algılansa da Endonezya'nın dış politikasında özellikle Güney Çin Denizi anlaşmazlıkları bağlamında bir sapma olmamıştır (Connelly, 2014; Hamzah, 2015; Madu, 2017). Aksine, Endonezya'nın GMF projesi Güneydoğu Asya'nın güvenliği ve ekonomik refahı için tasarlanmıştır. Sonuç olarak,

21. yüzyılda, SBY ve Jokowi dönemlerinde, bu tezde analiz edilen vakalar aracılığıyla Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünde büyük bir sapma gözlemlenmemiştir. Endonezya'nın ekonomik ve siyasi gelişimi, Güneydoğu Asya'da bir iletişim merkezi olarak rolünü daha aktif ve etkili hale getirmiştir.

İkinci olarak, tez Endonezya'nın grup birliğinin korunması, grup vizyonunun ve gündeminin belirlenmesi ve grubun bölge dışı ölçeklerde temsil edilmesi açısından iletişim merkezi rolünün ASEAN Yolu'nun devamlılığı için önemli olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır. Özellikle iletişim merkezi rolünün ilk katmanı olan grup birliğinin korunması bu anlamda etkilidir. Üçüncü bölümde ele alındığı üzere Corregidor Olayı, Kamboçya Vietnam Çatışması (1978-1992), Myanmar Rohingya Krizi ve dördüncü bölümde SCS anlaşmazlıklarındaki Ortak Bildiri başarısızlığı ASEAN'ın birliğine yönelik tehditler oluşturmuş ve hatta bu vakaların bazılarında örgütün dağılmasının tartışılmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak Endonezya'nın bu hususlardaki girişimleri söz konusu vakaların ASEAN'ın birliğini bozmasının önüne geçmiştir.

Son olarak, ASEAN Yolu'nun normatif yapısı Endonezya'nın iletişim merkezi rolünü yerine getirmesine olanak sağlamaktadır. ASEAN'ın Batı tarzı, kurallara dayalı uluslarüstü bir örgüte dönüşmesi halinde Endonezya'nın bölgesel bir iletişim merkezi olarak rol oynamasına yönelik talep muhtemelen ortadan kalkacaktır. Bu olasılıkta, ASEAN'ın resmi platformları grup kararları almak için yeterli olacak ve böylece üyeler arasında iletişimi kolaylaştırmak için ek bir motivasyona ihtiyaç duyulmayacağından Endonezya diğer ASEAN üye ülkelerinden bu husus kapsamında bir adım önde olmayacaktır.

### **Literatüre Katkı ve Gelecek Çalışmalar**

Bu tez, Endonezya'ya farklı dış politika vakaları üzerinden farklı roller atfedilmesinin yol açtığı kavram çelişkisini ortadan kaldırmamıza yardımcı olmaktadır. Literatürde Endonezya güç skalası değerlendirmesi açısından orta kuvvette güç (*middle power*) olarak değerlendirilse de Endonezya'nın gerçekleştirdiği bazı eylemler nedeniyle standart bir orta kuvvette gücün yeteneklerini aştığı görülmektedir. Bu anlamda, Endonezya'nın yükselen orta kuvvette güç mü, bölgesel güç mü yoksa ekstra yeteneklere sahip bir orta kuvvette güç mü olarak sınıflandırılması gerektiği konusunda akademisyenler arasında bir

tartışma vardır. Bu tez, Endonezya liderlerinin düşünsel arka planına göre dış politika rolü inşasını ve ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinin taleplerini dikkate alarak, Endonezya için yeni bir dış politika rolü tanımlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda Endonezya, mevcut orta kuvvette güçler şemalarına sığdırılmaya çalışılmak yerine kendi kategorisi içerisinde değerlendirilebilmektedir.

Bu tez, doğası gereği, hepten gidimsel bir araştırmadır. Yani, ne bir teoriyi pratikte test etmeyi ne de pratikten teoriye ulaşmayı amaçlamaktadır. Ancak, devletlerin belirli dış politika rollerine sahip olduğu ve bu rollerin politika yapıcılarının düşünsel arka planları tarafından inşa edildiği şeklindeki ontolojik varsayımı kabul ettiği ölçüde konstrüktivist literatürün bir parçasıdır. Bu bağlamda tez, Güneydoğu Asya ve Endonezya'ya odaklanan konstrüktivist çalışmalara dahil edilebilir. Konstrüktivist literatürde büyük ölçüde göz ardı edilen ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğini dikkate alması bakımından da bu literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır.

Bu tezin temel iddialarından biri, Endonezya'nın bir iletişim merkezi rolü ile ASEAN Yolu bölgeselciliğinin birbirlerini karşılıklı var eden yapılar olduklarıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın bu rolü hayata geçirmesi ve bölgedeki diğer ülkelerden bir adım önde olması ASEAN Yolu'nun normatif yapısı sayesinde mümkün olmaktadır. Ancak Endonezya'nın uyguladığı bazı politikaların ASEAN Yolu'nun yapısını değiştirmeye yönelik olduğu görülmektedir. Bu politikalar ASEAN'ı Batı tarzı bölgeselciliğe daha çok benzetme çabaları altında toplanabilir. Bu bağlamda Endonezya'nın üye ülkelerin iç işlerine karışmama prensibini esnetmeye yönelik politikalarına, ASEAN Anlaşması'nı oluşturması, ASEAN Topluluğu Vizyonu geliştirmesi, İnsan Hakları ve Demokrasi temelinde bölgesel organların kurulmasına öncülük etmesi gibi politikalar örnek olarak verilebilir. Dolayısıyla burada bir ikilem ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kendi lehine çalışmasına rağmen Endonezya neden zaman zaman ASEAN Yolu'nun normatif karakterini değiştirecek adımlar atmaktadır? Bu, Endonezya içindeki farklı grupların farklı vizyonlara sahip olmasından ve bunların Endonezya dış politikasına yansımalarından mı kaynaklanmaktadır? Endonezya bu politikalarıyla iletişim merkezi olma rolünden kaynaklanan yükün bir kısmını hafifletme çabası içerisinde midir? Bu sorular dahilinde, Endonezya dış politikasındaki bu çelişki potansiyel bir çalışma konusu olarak değerlendirilebilir.



Bir dięer potansiyel alıřma da bu tezde benimsenen yaklařım doęrultusunda, Endonezya dıřındaki ASEAN üye lkelerinin ASEAN ierisinde dıř politika rollerini nasıl inřa ettiklerini incelemek olabilir. Malezya ve Singapur, Endonezya ile kısmen ortak bir gemiře sahip olmalarına raęmen, Endonezya'ya benzer bir dıř politika rol inřa etmemiřlerdir. Benzer řekilde Myanmar, Kamboya, Laos ve Vietnam gibi Malay kltrnn dıřında kalan lkeler ASEAN Yolu blgeselcilięi baęlamında dıř politika rollerini nasıl inřa etmiřlerdir? Bu lkelerin bu tr roller inřa etmeleri gerekmekte midir yoksa bu durum Endonezya gibi belli lkelere mi zgdr? Dięer ASEAN üye lkelerin perspektifleri aısından yapılacak deęerlendirmeler bu baęlamda potansiyel alıřma konuları arasındadır.

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